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"It seems to me that an executive agreement ratified by joint
resolution differs from a treaty largely in name only."
SENATOR FULRIGHT
"It is now admitted that what was sought to be effected by the
Treaty submitted to the Senate, may be secured by a joint resolu-
tion of the two houses of Congress incorporating all its provisions.
This mode of effecting it will have the advantage of requiring only a
majority of the two houses, instead of two-thirds of the Senate."
JoHN C. CA.Luou, in 1845, commenting
on the procedure used for annexing Texas.
I*
Above the holocaust of the present war has arisen a demand from the
people of the United States for a foreign policy that i,.ll do everything
humanly possible to prevent future wars and to secure their other
interests in the contemporary world. The people have made up their
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resolutions, and in the platforms and speeches of party candidates, a
line of policy has been laid down as precisely as the processes of voting
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: Edward S. Corwin. The President: Office and Powers (2d rev. ed.
1941).
CRANDALL, TREATIES: Samuel B. Crandall. Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement (2d
ed. 1916).
ELLIOT, DEBATES: Jonathan Elliot. The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution. 5 vols. (2d ed. 1866).
FARRAND, RECORDS: Max Farrand, ed. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787.
4 vols. (rev. ed. 1937).
FOREIGN RELATIONS: [date]: U. S. Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States (1862- ).
Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause: Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis. The
Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments (1925) 34 YALE
L. J. 685.
HACKWORTH, DIGEST: Green Haywood Hackworth. Digest of International Law. 8 vols.
(1940-1944).
HARVARD RESEARCH, LAW OF TREATIES: Research in International Law of the Harvard
Law School Law of Treaties: Draft Convention, with Comment (1935) (published as
29 Am. J. INT. L. Surpp., No. 4, pp. 652-1226).
Judiciary Committee Hearings: Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on the
Judiciary and the Committee on the Judiciary on H. J. Res. 6, H. J. Res. 31, H. 1.
Res. 64, H. J. Res. 238, H. J. Res. 246, H. J. Res. 264, and H. J. Res. 320 Proposing an
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Relative to the Making of Treaties,
78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
Levitan, Executive Agreements: David M. Levitan. Executive Agreements: A Study of the
Executive in the Control of the Foreign Relations of the United States (1940) 35 ILL. L.
REv. 365.
McCLuRE, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS: Wallace McClure. International Executive Agree-
ments: Democratic Procedure under theConstitution of the United States (1941).
McLAUGHLIN, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: Andrew C. McLaughlin. A Constitutional
History of the United States (1935).
MADISON, DEBATES: James Madison. The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787
(Hunt and Scott, eds., 1920).
MALLOY, TREATIES: William M. Malloy, comp. Treaties, Conventions, International Acts,
Protocols and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers,
1776-[1937]. 4vols. (1910, 1923, 1938).
MILLER, TREATIES: U. S. Department of State. Hunter Miller, ed. Treaties and Other
International Acts of the United States of America. 7 vols. published to date (1931-
1942).
MOORE, DIGEST: John Bassett Moore. A Digest of International Law. 8 vols. (1906).
RICHARDSON, MESSAGES: James D. Richardson, comp. Messages and Papers of the Presi-
dents, 1789-1897. 10 vols. (1898).
WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Westel Woodbury Willoughby. The Constitutional
Law of the United States. 3 vols. (2d ed. 1929).
1.- See, e.g., NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER, THE PUBLIC LooKS AT WORLD
ORGANIZATION (Report No. 19, April 1944). For figures as of Feb. 6, 1945, see 4 OPINION
NEWS (National Opinion Research Center) No. 3.
Typical of the attitude of the nation is a recent poll taken in New Hampshire, reported
in N. Y. Times, March 15, 1945, p. 10, col. 3:
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and popular expression permit. Firmly, deliberately, and in large
majority, the people have said that they want a foreign policy which
continues our war-time alliances and which seeks to create upon that
foundation both a new general security organization, with the United
States as a leading member, and all the other supporting institutions
necessary to secure the full advantages-such as economic well-being
and the promotion of health, knowledge, and the maintenance of
human dignity-that can flow from the free and peaceful cooperation
of the peoples of the world.2
This demand of the people of the United States is based upon an
increasing consciousness that the world is shrinking ever more rapidly,
irrevocably, and imperiously into what a late statesman aptly called
"One World." 3 It is now common knowledge that revolutionary
developments in instruments of destruction, transportation, communi-
cation, and production; constant increases in population; increasing
reliance upon natural resources of wide distribution; and consequent
changes in the various institutions by which man carries on his ac-
"Almost all of New Hampshire's 225 towns expressed overwhelmingly a dsire
that the United States should enter a world organization which would have police
power to maintain peace in the country's first popular vote on the question.
"Returns from 213 towns showed today a vote of about 14,000 for a world
organization, such as was proposed at Dumbarton Oaks, with about 800 against it.
Unanimous approval came from 103 towns."
2. Secretary of State Stettinius has recently made a brief statement of the principal
aims of contemporary American foreign policy. Secretary Stettinius includes, beyond giv-
ing to the armed forces the "fullest possible support" in winning the wa-r and taking "effec-
tive steps to prevent" the fascist nations "from again acquiring the power to wage aggrezzive
war," the following:
"3. Establishment at the earliest possible moment of a United Nations
organization capable of building and maintaining the peace-by force if nece-
sary-for generations to come.
"4. Agreement on measures to promote a great expansion of our foreign
trade and of productiveness and trade throughout the world, so that we can main-
tain full employment in our own country and-together ith the other United Na-
tions--enter an era of constantly expanding production and consumption and of
rising standards of living.
"S. Encouragement of all those conditions of international life favorable to
the development by men and women everywhere of the institutions of a free and
democratic way of life, in accordance with their own customs and desires."
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dec. 12, 1944, reported in
N. Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1944, p. 14, col. 1.
Compare the statement of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier
Stalin in the Yalta Declaration, Feb. 13, 1945:
"We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our Allies of a
general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe that
this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic
and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-
loving peoples."
3. WILLKiE, ONE WoRLD (1943).
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tivities have all combined to make the peace, prosperity, health, knowl-
edge, respect for human dignity, and freedom of the contemporary
world indivisible. The indivisibility of peace has seldom been stated
with greater force than by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, speaking in
1915:
... there is no escape from the proposition that the peace of the
world can only be maintained as the peace and order of a single
community are maintained, by the force which unified nations are
willing to put behind thepeace and order of the world. Nations
must unite as men unite to preserve peace and order. The great
nations must be so united as to be able to say to any single coun-
try, 'You must not go to war'; and they can only say that effec-
tively when the country desiring war kno~s that the force which
the united nations place behind peace is irresistible." 4
It needs no emphasis that contemporary developments in the tech-
nology of war increase the force of Senator Lodge's statement a thou-
sandfold. Similarly, the indivisibility of economic prosperity has
had recent confirmation in the catastropic convulsions of a world-wide
depression; and the great majority of people have come to see "the
incontestable truth" that "there is a clear planetary indivisibility of
production and employment." 6 It is obvious that "most of us are now
alive" and that "most of us are kept alive" by the "vast cooperative
[work of a] world society." 7 Even assuming that its security position
may be impregnable, no nation today can seek refuge from technolog-
ical imperatives by the erection of neo-mercantilistic trade barriers,
without impoverishment of its standard of living. What is true of
peace and prosperity is no less true of all our other democratic values.
The judgment of the American people that their interests can no longer
be protected by nineteenth-century neutrality, isolation, and inaction is
4. The quotation is an excerpt from the commencement oration delivered by Senator
Lodge at Union College in June, 1915. SCHRIFTGIESSER, THE GENTLEMAN FROM MASSAC1lU-
SETTS: HENRY CABOT LODGE (1944) 271-2. See also Lodge's speech before the League to
Enforce Peace, May 27, 1916, quoted in part in LODGE, THE SENATE AND THE LEAGUE OF
NATIONs (1925) 131-2.
5. Commenting on and quoting from Canadian Air Marshall Bishop's book, Winged
Peace, Lieutenant Bolt6 has declared:
"The jerky and inaccurate prototype of today will be replaced by machines
which 'will leave the ground smoothly, impelled by rocket motors,' will fly through
the lower atmosphere by jet-propulsion, and will switch back to rocket-propulsion
when they reach the thin stratospheric altitudes, to cross the Atlantic Ocean in
'three hours, perhaps less.' Needless to say, they will arrive at their destination
before the sound of their coming; and whether they come laden with passengers and
freight or with bombs and air-borne troops depends entirely on what we do in the
next several months about the structure of peace. .. ."
Winged Peace or Winged Death (1944) 159 NATIoN 605, 606.
6. ScHERMAN, THE LAST BEST HOPE OF EARTH (1941) 15.
7. Id. at 10.
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based upon a realistic appraisal of the pervasive interdependence of all
peoples. This basic condition of interdependence, the profound weak-
ness of the world's present system of organization, and, conversely, the
strong power position of the United States in the world society make it
imperative that the United States not only participate, but take a
leading part, in establishing a new order of political, economic, and
cultural relationships and institutions, both in direct association with
other nations, great and small, and through international organizations.
During the interregnum between the first World War and the present
one, the United States vacillated uncertainly between a nostalgic
isolationism and a growing realization of the need for international
cooperation. Since 1941 it has, however, taken the initiative in pro-
moting the organization of international agencies to deal with the
multilateral tasks of preserving peace and coping with numerous
economic problems, including the administration of post-war relief and
reconstruction, the development of backward areas, the control of civil
aviation and the stabilization of monetary exchanges.3 As the time
approaches for the translation of tentative blueprints into appropriate
working institutions, the great question in the minds of people, through-
out the world, who remember the United States' withdrawal after the
last war, is whether this government possesses constitutional pro-
cedures sufficiently democratic, flexible, and efficient to permit it to
give effect to its majority will and, hence, to assume a position of
responsibility and leadership in the world community upon which
other governments can rely.9
It should be clear that, if the United States is to secure its own
interests and to assume a position of responsibility and leadership in
the world community, its executive officers, who are charged with the
task of conducting negotiations with other governments, must be able
to treat the national body politic as a whole and must be able to canvass
it promptly and efficiently as a whole for the majority will, without
being subjected to delays, obstructions, and disintegrating efforts by
S. For brief reviews of the economic measures and problems see H-s, AlAmCA'S
ROLE IN THE WORLD EcoNonxy (1945); BIDWEL, A COMx-ERCIAL POLICY Pon F TiE UNITED
NATIONS (1945).
9. "Every government in the world doubts the ability of the United States to help
organize the coming victory, because all know that the Constitution of the United States
contains a fatal defect. They know that, so far as constructive effort to build a better world
goes, our Government is deadlocked within itself by a division of the power to make and
execute a foreign policy between the President and the Senate. They know that the con-
structive plans of the Executive are doomed to be perpetually paralyzed by a self-as--Zrtive
minority in the Senate." Testimony of Profeisor Denna Fleming, Judiciary Committee
Hearings at 67; quoted with approval in the Report of the Committee, H. R. REP. No. 2061,
78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) 4. It is the principal purpose of this article to show that there is a
perfectly constitutional alternative to this feared deadlock betwveen the President and the
Senate.
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minorities who qiceive their interests to be different from the inter-
ests of the rest ohe nation. One of the prinle purposes for which this
nation was established was to make it "one" 10 with respect to the rest
of the world; th6jcausal factors which were urgent 150 years ago are
obviously reinforced beyond all gainsaying today. The robot bomb
and economic depression, like time, wait for no nation and can strike
any part of the United States with equal ease. A leisurely diplomacy of
inaction and of deference to dissident minority interests supposedly
characteristic of past eras when economic and political change pro-
ceeded at a slower pace and the twin ocean barriers gave us an effort-
less security is no longer capable, if it ever was, of securing the
interests of the United States.
The principal instrument by which the United States can, and must,
cooperate with other governments in that total institutional process of
reciprocities and counter-reciprocities which we call "foreign affairs"
or "foreign relations" is, of course, the agreement, in all its mahy
manifestations. It is in agreements between the member governments
that all of the proposed new international organizations must find
their legal bases, powers, responsibilities, and operating procedures."
If the United States is to attain the goals of its foreign policy, it must,
therefore, have efficient, flexible, and democratic procedures, responsi-
ble to the majority will, and to the whole nation, for the making,
modification, and abrogation 12 of international agreements. The
executive officers of the United States must be able to act promptly
and, hence, must be able to ascertain promptly that their action will
be supported and implemented by the other branches of the govern-
ment when that action corresponds with the majority will of the nation.
Other governments must know, if they are to be willing to undertake
indispensable joint commitments, that the United States can so act to
implement integrated and responsible policy.
It is the thesis of this article, not at all novel, that the constitutional
practice of the United States, hallowed by 150 years of tradition, does
10. See CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, at 201 di seq.; CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL
oF FOREIG9 RELATIONS (1917) 1 el seg. and citations.
11. On the exceptional importance of the agreement in international law see HARVARD
REsEARcH, LAW OF TREATIES, passim.
12. The necessity of adequate procedures for the easy abrogation of international agree-
ments is developed in Section VI infra. Any attempt to endow the configuration of inter-
national arrangements existing at any given time with a delusive immortality-however
appealing in a period of war-engendered uncertainties-can only result in replacing orderly,
regular adjustment with an uneasy stalemate, punctuated by violent unilateral changes.
On this subject see generally DUNN, PEACtFUL CHANGE (1937); Mitrany, Territorial Repi-
sion and Article 19 of the League Covenant (1935) 14 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 834; BRIERLY,
THE LAW OF NATIONS (2d ed. 1936) 69-71, 201-8; NEW FABIAN RESEARCH BUREAU, REVI-
SION OF TREATIES (1932).
[Vol. 54 : 181
TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
make available all the necessary procedures. 3 The wise statesmen
who drafted the Constitution of the United States not only gave the
President a permissive power, "wmith the advice and consent of the
Senate," "to make treaties, provided twro-thirds of the Senators
present concur," 14 but they also gave both to the President and to the
whole Congress broad powers of control over the external relations of
the Government which are meaningless if they do not include the in-
strumental powers, first, to authorize the making of intergovernmental
agreements and, secondly, to make these agreements the law of the
land.15 Throughout our national history, these broad grants to the
President and the Congress have, furthermore, been in fact inter-
preted, by all branches of the Government, in hundreds of instances, to
include such instrumental powers. The result is that our constitutional
law today makes available two parallel and completely interchangeable
procedures, wholly applicable to the same subject matters and of
identical domestic and international legal consequences, for the con-
summation of intergovernmental agreements. In addition to the
treaty-making procedure, which may-as the nation has found from
bitter experience-be subjected to minority control, there is what may
be called an "agreement-making procedure," which may operate either
under the combined powers of the Congress and the President or in
some instances under the powers of the President alone. The practices
of successive administrations, supported by the Congress and by
numerous court decisions, have for all practical purposes made the
Congressional-Executive agreement authorized or sanctioned by both
houses of Congress interchangeable with the agreements ratified under
the treaty clause by two-thirds of the Senate. The same decisive
authorities have likewise made agreements negotiated by the Presi-
dent, on his own responsibility and within the scope of his owm con-
stitutional powers, appropriate instruments for handling many im-
portant aspects of our foreign relations.", Initial choice of the procedure
to be followed for securing validation of any particular intergovern-
mental agreement lies with the President since it is constitutional
practice unquestioned since W, ashington's day that the President alone
13. For the lack of novelty in this thesis see CoRwIN, Tim Co ,srmTmTon AnD WORLD
ORGANIZATION (1944); MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIvE AGREE1FEISTS (1941);
Wright, The United States and InternaionalAgreemnents (1944) 33 Azu. J. IT. L. 341.
The present writers have drawm freely from the existing literature on this subject. They
are especially indebted to the writings of Professor Corwin, Mr. McClure, Professor Quincy
Wright and Mr. David Levitan. Other acknowledgments appear in appropriate places in
the text.
The writers are also indebted to the libraries of the University of Chicago and Duke
University for the loan of unpublished Ph.D. dissertations.
14. U.S. CoNsr. Art. II, § 2, par. 2.
15. For elaboration of this point see infra, Section III.
16. See infra, Sections III, IV and VI.
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has the power to propose or dispose in the actual conduct of negotia-
tions with other governments. 17 When a specific agreement is sub-
mitted to the Congress for approval or implementation, the Congress
may of course question the procedure by which the President seeks
validation of the agreement, but if the Congress is to act rationally-
that is, appropriately to secure the best long-term interests of the
whole nation-it should shape its action in terms of the policy issues
involved in the specific agreement and not in terms of some misleading
and unhistorical notion that the treaty-making procedure is the exclu-
sive mode of making important international agreements under our
Constitution.
This suggestion that the Constitution of the United States affords
interchangeable procedures for effecting interriational agreements
meets, it must be admitted, with a resistance that is difficult to under-
stand in view of the historical record and of this nation's traditional
preference for democracy.' Some resistance comes from those who
genuinely favor democratic, majority control of our foreign affairs
but who, confused about a supposed exclusiveness of the treaty-making
clause, think that a constitutional amendment is the only way out."9
The chief resistance comes, however, from those who explicitly favor
minority control of foreign affairs because they fear what majority
control may be able to achieve in an integrated, responsible foreign
policy. Sometimes the dominant theme of resistance is mere defense of
Senatorial prerogative, upon an assumption often none too uncon-
scious that the safety of the nation and the sanctity of the Constitution
would be imperiled if one-third of the Senate could not dictate the
nation's foreign policy. At other times the theme is, more bluntly, that
there are special minority interests in the country that must be given a
delusive protection however much the interests of the whole nation,
including the long-term interests of all its minorities, may suffer. The
argument, whatever its theme in policy, is always bolstered by a legalis-
tic attempt to find in the Constitution, because of a supposed latent
17. See infra, Section II, at pp. 206-10.
18. See GIBSON, THE ROAD To FOREIGN POLICY (1944) c. 12; Barnes, Book Review,
THE PROGRESSIVE, March 20, 1944, p. 10; see also the articles by Professor Borchard cited
infra notes 21-3.
19. Restrictive interpretations of the proper scope of executive agreements are given,
for example, in Morford, For the Constitutional Amendment as to the Ratification of Treaties
(1944) 30 A. B. A. J. 605; COLEGROVE, THE AmERICAN SENATE AND WORLD PEACE (1944)
31, 105, 110; Editorials, N. Y. Times, April 17, 1944, p. 22, col. 1, N. Y. Herald Tribune,
April 17, 1944, p. 14, col. 1, N. Y. Times, May 22, 1944, p. 18, col. 2. These writers favor a
constitutional amendment permitting approval of treaties by majority vote of both houses.
The present impracticality of this suggestion is demonstrated by Professor Borchard in
Executive Agreements, at 639. The public press of February 27, 1945, carried the story that
the Senate Judiciary Committee has foreclosed consideration of all proposed constitutional
amendments, specifically including this one, for the duration of the war.
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intention of some of its Framers, unstated limitations upon the powers
of the whole Congress and the President. The most complete state-
ment of the case for retention of the minority veto and the most com-
plete revelations of the unpersuasiveness of the arguments by which it
is sought to be sustained have come in a series of recent articles by
Professor Edwin Borchard.^°
Writing in the September issue of the Yale Law Journal2 and the
September-October issue of the Lawyers Guild R ciew, 22 Professor
Borchard has labored valiantly to demonstrate "the inherent unim-
portance and minor character" of the "executive agreement" and has
sought to prove that important international obligations can be con-
tracted only by utilization of the treaty-making power. Invoking a
vague distinction from the writings of an eighteenth-century Swiss
"natural-law jurist and positivist [sic], Emmerich de Vattel," he first
attempts to construct a restrictive theory of Congressional and execu-
tive powers from the one brief and ambiguous phrase of the Constitu-
tion about the making of treaties and emphatically insists not only that
the President has no independent powers to consummate important
international agreements on his own but also that "there is no con-
stitutional warrant whatever for the suggestion that the President
has an option to submit [important compacts] either to the Senate as
a treaty . . . or to the Congress for majority approval." He next com-
presses all executive agreements into one category to find that "the
executive agreement" as "a general substitute for the treaty" is sub-
ject to "many objections": such agreements, he alleges, are "an evasion
of the Constitution," "dishonest and dangerous to the entire Constitu-
tion and to law"; they contribute to the "recent unprecedented infla-
tion of executive power" and "permit the President to involve the
country in secret agreements"; they are of uncertain legal effect and
duration and are terminable "unilaterally" "without incurring the
charge of treaty violation"; they are "unsafe for the United States or
any foreign country" "since, if congressionally approved, they can be
'congressionally disapproved at any time"; and, finally, not being
20. In deference to the high motives and to the public good will of ProfecSor Borchard
we yield to none. It is only because the problem on which he writes is of such moment and
because his influence is so great that we single out his writings for the detailed examination
that follows. In recent hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, the qucztion
was asked if anybody opposed a constitutional amendment to permit the Congrez, rather
than two-thirds of the Senate, to confirm treaties. Congressman Refauver replied: "The
chief oppositionist whom I know of outside the Government is Dr. Edwin Borchard, who is
professor of international law at Harvard [sic]." Judiciary CommittecHearings at 33.
21. Borchard, Shall the Executire Agreement Replace the Treaty? (1944) 53 YALE L. J.
664 (herein cited as Borchard, Executire Agreements). See also the Editorial Comment under
the same title in (1944) 38 Am. J. IxT. L. 637.
22. Borchard, Book Review (1944) 4 LAw-mRs GUILD REv. 59. This repeats, with
considerably less qualification, many of the arguments made in the Yale Law Journal.
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expressly mentioned in the Constitution, they "do not have the con-
stitutional dignity and force of a treaty." The suggestion that the
two-thirds vote required for the Senate's approval of a treaty is un-
democratic and hampers the integration of a responsible foreign policy
for the whole nation Professor Borchard finds completely unpersuasive:
"a treaty should be convincing enough to command a two-thirds vote,"
and "a unanimous vote of a jury" is required to "hang capital offend-
ers." For a contrapuntal theme, in which the House of Representatives
appears as the new villain in the piece, he suggests that reliance upon a
majority vote of both houses of Congress for validating international
agreements might remove debate and voting from their present al-
legedly non-partisan level and plunge them into the turmoil of politics.
Finally, Professor Borchard admonishes the defenders of executive
agreements that the only "lawful" means of terminating minority
control is through a formal amendment, changing the treaty-making
provisions of the Constitution.
Writing in the November issue of the American Bar Association
Journal 23 Professor Borchard completes the circle of advocacy of
minority control by arguing against amendment of the Constitution
to permit treaties to be ratified by majority vote of both houses. His
principal points are that "the desires of small states or states with
special interests" deserve "protection" against agreements "con-
cluded" by mere majority and that "the unprecedented inflation of
the executive power is a strong reason for retaining the decisive re-
quirement of the two-thirds rule." Reiterating his assertion that the
participation of the House of Representatives might make more difficult
the consummation of international compacts, Professor Borchard also,
somewhat inconsistently, finds that "it is not possible to prove that
the senatorial check has not on the whole operated to the country's
advantage." To quench the last possible hope of reform, he points out
realistically that, regardless of its merits, the proposed amendments
would never be approved by two-thirds of the Senate and that it is
probably undesirable, in light of the complex problems now confront-
ing Congress, to submit so important a proposal at this time. 24
23. Borchard, Against the Proposed Amendment As to the Ratification of Treaties (1944)
30 A. B. A. J. 608. See also Borchard, The Two-Thirds Rule as to Treaties: A Change Op.
posed (1945) 3 EcoN. CoUNcIL PAPERS, No. 8.
24. It is not necessary in order to trace the development of a completely adequate, and
even preferable, alternative to the treaty-making procedure to establish the need for a
constitutional amendment. The present writers have no difficulty, however, in agreeing
with Professor Denna Fleming that in the long run "it will be infinitely better to have a
dean, swift amendment of the Constitution by an act of the national will. Amendment by
usage leaves us subject to the constant danger that a jealous Senate will compel the submis-
sion of some great international compact to the obstruction of its minorities and thus invite
a final national calamity." Judiciary Committee Hearings at 69. Cf. Josephus Daniels,
Judiciary Committee Hearings at 106: "Even if it did not lie in the power of one-third of the
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It was some sixty yea-s ago that Mr. Justice Holmes reaffirmed
ancient wisdom in suggesting that the "secret root[s]" from which legal
theories draw "all the juices of life" are "considerations of what is
expedient for the community concerned," "moral and political the-
ories," "institutions of public policy," "even . . prejudices." 25
Many commentators, including notably Professor James Bradley
Thayer, have pointed out that these factors have a special importance
in the field of constitutional law, where theories of jurisprudence are
inextricably entwined with "statecraft, and with the political problems
of our great and complex national life." 21 Professor Borchard, com-
menting that "necessity knows no law," has sought summarily to
dispose of a book by a "distinguished author" who "would have
us believe that it is so important that the United States join an in-
ternational organization to preserve the peace-he assumes this to
be the goal of an international organization-that we must abandon
the constitutional rule providing for consent of two-thirds of the Senate
to ratify treaties." 27 He has also urged that those who point out that
our constitutional practice has created an effective alternative to the
treaty-making procedure are motivated by the fear that a minority of
the Senate may "prevent the association of the United States ith a
projected international organization, of a character still unknovm." 3
He has further characterized as "subversive propaganda" the "fashion
to extol the executive agreement as an exemplification of democracy
as opposed to the so-called undemocratic requirement of a two-thirds
vote in-the Senate." 29
The major policy premise from which Professor Borchard's own
legal arguments stem is not difficult to ascertain. He makes it com-
pletely articulate. It is a strong conviction that the United States
should abjure participation in international political organizations and
retire beyond the Jericho-like walls of his own version of the nineteenth
century juristic conception of neutrality. The opening and concluding
paragraphs of his article in the September Yale Law Journal--char-
acterizing the Treaty of Versailles as "a declaration of war," referring
to the "projected international organization, of a character still un-
known," and applauding Harry Elmer Barnes' encomium of "the
Senators to defeat [the coming treaty of peace], I should still favor changing the Constitu-
tion because the present policy is undemocratic and may in the future, as in the past, thwart
the will of the American people. As both Houses of Congress must unite on legislation of
the highest importance, and both have equal voice in declaring war, both ought to be equal
in declaring and insuring peace by a majority vote of both."
25. HOLl.ES, THE CoMoN LAW (1882) 35, 1.
26. 1 THAYER, CASES Ox CoNsrrruTioA LAw (1895) v; see also FwAnEruRTEr, THE
CommERCE CLAUSE (1937) 1-10.
27. Borchard, Book Review (1944)4 LAYVERS GUmw REv. 59.
28. Borchard, Execulire Agreements, at 665.
29. Borchard, Extraterritorial Confiscalions (1942)36 -2. J. I'r. L. 275,281.
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Senate's treaty power" as "probably the last remaining bulwark of
our national safety"-indicate that at least one reason for his opposi-
tion to the use of procedures other than the treaty procedure for con-
summating international agreements is the thought that retention of
minority veto control may again produce a condition of stalemate,
permitting once more a triumph of the statesmanship of withdrawal.
This conclusion is further substantiated by his recent article on Flaws
in Post-War Peace Plans 30 in which he takes the position that "peace
enforcement" among nations is a contradiction in terms, "at war with
the fundamental facts of international life and with the theory of
international law and relations," because "sovereign nations," "legally
equal," "can not have, or be coerced by, any centralized superior." 31
30. Borchard, Flaws in Post-War Peace Plans (1944) 38 Ami. J. INT. L. 284. See also
Borchard, The Place of Law and Courts in International Relations (1943) 37 Amr. J. INT. L. 46;
Borchard, War, Neutrality and Non-Belligerency (1941) 35 Am. J. INT. L. 618, 622; Borchard,
Book Review (1935) 29 Am. J. INT. L. 717.
31. In making this explicit reference to Professor Borchard's policy preconceptions, it is
not our purpose to suggest that interpreters who do not share these preconceptions may not
honestly come to the same legal conclusions. The variables that may produce a legal belief
or an interpretation of the Constitution are no less numerous and heterogeneous than those
that produce policy preconceptions. (See Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Educalion and
Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest (1943) 52 YALE L. J. 203, 239.) It
is now common knowledge, however, that policy preconceptions are among the most im-
portant variables that predispose legal conclusions and that every interpreter (Professor
Borchard and the present writers not excluded) responds to the words and practices of the
Constitution with his total personality, which includes both his view of world society and
his conception of the role of his government in that society. It is for this reason that we
think it relevant to present a fairly comprehensive summary, and criticism, of Professor
Borchard's more general views. This summary and criticism will also serve the purpose of
making completely explicit our own policy preconceptions.
Professor Borchard's more general views may be summarized thus: (1) "The needs, de-
mands and inter-State relations of nations are relatively few and more stable [than within
nation-States!] and require no constant readjustment." (37 AM. J. INT. L. at 52.) The
"cold facts of political life" disclose "a marked conflict of interests, political, economic and
social" between nations "which admits of little hope that international law, which depends
so largely on mutual respect and trust, will soon be restored to its nineteenth century in-
fluence and prestige." (Id. at 50.) (2) There is little, it appears, that international organiza-
tion and law can do to preserve peace. The "weakness of international law" is that "it deals
with so-called sovereign, independent States." It "presupposes a constellation of so-called
independent States which are not bound to subordinate themselves to any central authority
and, apart from the general rules of customary law, are not bound at all except for their own
agreement." (Id. at 51, 48.) (3) International organization must eschew all use of force or
sanctions. Force or sanctions cannot be imposed without a "centralized superior." "If
there were a superior, it would not be international law; and so long as States are legally
equal, as the recent resolutions admit, there can be no superior authority." States "legally
equal" cannot be coerced. The methods of international law must be "consultative, delibera-
tive, recommendatory, peaceful." (38 Am. J. INT. L. at 286.) (4) An identification of
"preservation of peace with the maintenance of the status quo" and "the veneration of the
status quo, backed by coercion" is what "motivates the practice of intervention, now com-
mon to many nations, in spite of the lip-service occasionally paid to non-intervention."
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For exploring in some detail the issues of law and policy thus joined,
the subsequent Sections of this article will proceed in the following
order:
The "opprobrious epithet 'aggressor' " is a term "of uncertain meaning, but applied celec-
tively to those particular disturbers of the status quo whom the dominant states happen to
dislike." (Id. at 286-7.) (5) Statesmen should "confine attention to those economic prob-
lems, like food, oil and other raw materials, transport, communications, trade barriers,
currency stabilization, credits, and loans and investments, which lie close to the national
lifeline" and "postpone the question of any larger political organization until economic
cooperation is established, when nations are more likely to seek it instead of having it im-
posed." (Id. at 289.) A "new atmosphere of cooperation, of congeniality to voluntary
surrenders of national prerogatives, must be created" which is "utterly inconsistent with the
demand for group-force for sanctions against iaggressors' or disturbers of the staltis qtso."
(37 A-T. J. INT. L. at 51.) (6) "Collective security" is an "unachievable rainbow" the
pursuit of which "has produced an unprecedented assault on international law and helped
to make international relations well-nigh hopeless." "Self-interest can be relied on to induce
hesitation in embarking upon the suicidal recourse to war, if tolerable alternatives are
available." (!!) (38Am.J. INT. L. at289.)
It is interesting, by way of criticism, to note in these attitudes: the underestimation of
the contemporary interdependence of nation-States; the assumption that international
"law" is some unchangeable absolute inconsistent with some unchangeable "sovereignty"
(though a sovereignty curiously modifiable by "custom" and "agreement"); the strange
deduction from the "legal equality" of States that it is illegal for them to organize their ue
of coercion; the suggestion that there is in the nature of things a difference in the procedures
available to the contemporary nation-State and those available to the organizations of an
international community; the attempt to remove "morality" from international law and
relations; the neo-Marnian ezplanation of the causes of international conflict; the denial to
international organization of one of man's principal aims in all of his organizations-ze-
curity; and the hope that even peoples indoctrinated by the fascist ideologies can be in-
duced by an "atmosphere of cooperation" to adopt self-restraint! One might as well argue
that men in a nation-State community are not interdependent, that "law" is inconsistent
with "liberty," that the "legal equality" of men before legal institutions prevents them from
using their institutions to prevent murder and robbery, that the character of men differs
when an observer's perspective is shifted from their national to their international organiza-
tions, that national "law" created to secure men's interests has nothing to do with the
"morality" that summarizes their interests, that men in any given geographical area should
not establish political institutions before they have ordered all their economic and other
affairs, and that, in any event, the use of force to keep down murder and robbery is not
appropriate because quiet talk and an atmosphere of cooperation will induce self-restraint.
The difference between the potentialities of national organization and of international or-
ganization is certainly one of degree only, dependent upon the eatent of the actual inter-
dependence of peoples and their consciousness of that interdependence.
It is improbable that the prime ministers of those traditionally neutral countries, Hol-
land, Norway, and Denmark, or of Belgium, which shed its alliance with France in 1933 to
return to pre-1914 neutrality, vould subscribe to Professor Borchard's statement of first
principles. See generally GATHOnNE-iRDY, A SHORT HISTORY OF Ii;TERIIATIo:.AL Ar--
FAIRS: 1920-1939 (3d rev. ed. 1942) 420-1, 440-99; IHENR$Oiz, FAILurn Or A MISSION
(1939); WELLES, THE Tnm- FOR DECISION (1944) 89-120; HAIBRo, How TO %Vn. Tn
PEAcE (1942) pt. 2; DutN, PEACEFUL CHuAG (1937) cc. 1-3; Roums, Tin Ecozouxc
CAUSES OF WAR (1939); Viner, The Economic Problem in Hus.R (ed.) NEw PErsPLcnMs
ON PEACE (1944) 85; CLARK, A PLACE IN THE SUN (1935); STrsy, VAR AmD TnE PrPvAT
INVESTOR (1935); RAUScENNG, THE VoICE OF DESTRUCTzOz (1940); Je-sup, Book Review
(1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 1042.
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First, an effort will be made to clarify the conventional taxonomy of
the different agreements used in the United States' diplomatic practice
and to indicate the one available criterion that the facts will sustain for
distinguishing between the different agreements permissible under our
constitutional practice.3"
Second, the vague suggestions that the treaty-making clause is
exclusive and that executive agreements must be confined to matters
inherently unimportant will be refuted, and some indication will be
made of the broad constitutional powers of the Congress and the Presi-
dent, no less effective or comprehensive than those of the President and
the Senate, to authorize the making of international agreements and
to make these agreements the law of the land.3"
Third, the full extent to which Congresional-Executive and Presi-
dential agreements have become interchangeable with the treaty in the
actual diplomatic practice of the United States will be described and it
will be shown that there are no persuasive legal or policy reasons why
interchangeability should not be extended to the few remaining prob-
lems upon which it has not yet been fully developed.3 4
Fourth, some important examples of amendment of the Constitu-
tion of the United States by usage will be described for the purpose of
showing that, if the practice of using Congressional-Executive and
Presidential agreements interchangeably with the treaty is in fabct a
development by usage and not within the original contemplation of the
Framers of the Constitution, it is a development not at all unique, but
rather within the best traditions of our history.35
Fifth, a comparison of the legal consequences which courts and other
governmental officials attach to Congressional-Executive and Presi-
dential agreements and to treaties will be made, and it will be shown
that there are no important differences betveen these classes of agree-
ments in binding effect or duration at either domestic or international
law.36 .
Sixth, the reasons that are alleged to have motivated the original
adoption of the treaty-making procedure will be explored and their con-
temporary relevance appraised; the record of the Senate and the effect
of the omnipresent threat of obstructionist tactics by its minority in
thwarting the will of the majority and the national interest will be
examined, and a brief description will be offered of the tactics that have
been used, and are still available for use, by an intransigent minority.
Finally, the suggestion that it is not undemocratic to require a two-
32. Section II, pp. 195-210.
33. Section III, pp. 211-61.
34. Section IV, pp. 261-89.
35. Section V, pp. 290-306.
36. Section VI, pp. 307-51.
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thirds vote for the approval of important international agreements will
be made the subject of at least mild wonder.Y
Seventh, and last, some indication -will be made of how Congressional-
Executive and Presidential agreements may be used, in thorough
consonance with our best constitutional traditions, to meet certain of
the more urgent problems of the post-war world, if the minority con-
trolled treaty-making procedure should for any reason become in-
adequate to meet the responsibilities of that world.vs
II. THE INSTRUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEmENT USED IN
A!mRicAN DIPLOMATIc PRAcTIcE
Much of the misunderstanding that prevails in the contemporary
discussion of treaties and executive agreements is caused by simple
verbal confusion that obscures the relevant facts and policies. Writers
and speakers too often attempt, on the one hand, to make distinctions
between allegedly different kinds of international agreements by using
ill-defined, or even unspecified, criteria that neither distinguish nor
suggest any legal or policy bases for distinction. Just as often these
same writers and speakers fail, on the other hand, to make certain
necessary distinctions between the very different steps, or govern-
mental activities, that are involved in the total process of "making"
an international agreement and, hence, fail also to make necessary
distinctions between the sometimes very different, appropriate consti-
tutional bases for each of the different steps involved in the total
process.
Despite vague assertions that there is a difference in the inter-
national obligation of treaties and executive agreements I and despite
strenuous efforts to find a "true" distinction between the two types of
agreements under our Constitution in the words of that great "natural-
law jurist and positivist" Vattel,2 it seems clear that the practices
37. SectionVIL. (To be published in asubsequent issue.)
38. Section VIII. (To be published in a subsequent issue.)
*XVe have been assisted in preparing this Section by Catudal, Executire Agreemetls: A
Supplement to the Treaty-Making Procedure (1942) 10 GEo. WVAs. L. REv. 653 (herein cited
as Catudal, .Executive Agreements).
1. See Borchard, Executive Agreemenls, at 678; Commerce Committec Hearings at 147,
152, 155. These suggestions stem from the double assumption that executive agreements
upon important matters are not valid under the United States' constitution and that the
practices and doctrine of international law require other governments to know this in-
validity. For discussion of the latter point see infra, Section VI.
2. Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 668. This is now a common effort of writers and
speakers. See Commerce Committee Hearings at 209; Weinfeld, What Did the Framers of
the Federal Constitution Mean by "Agreements or Compacts"? (1936) 3 U. oF Ca. L. REv.
453. For discussion see infra, Section III.
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and doctrines'of international law neither offer any criteria for dis-
tinguishing between treaties and executive agreements nor attach to
such a distinction any differences in legal consequences. Indeed, it
appears on good authority not only that international law does not
make this particular distinction, but that it makes no distinction of
consequence between any of the agreements in common use in inter-
national intercourse. The Harvard Research in International Law3 puts
both points succinctly in its conclusions that "the distinction between
so-called 'executive agreements' and 'treaties' is purely a constitutional
one and has no international significance" 4and that "there is no rule of
international law and no definite usage which determines what shall
be the essential constituent elements of a 'treaty' or which lays down
any tests or criteria by which a 'treaty' may be distinguished from other
international instruments such as conventions, protocols, arrange-
ments, declarations, etc." I Both in diplomacy and in the decisions of
international and domestic tribunals the brief, obscure suggestion of
Christian Wolff, popularized by Vattel and copied without clarification
by a few other early jurists, 6 that there is some kind of a fundamental
distinction between the subject matter of treaties and the subject
matter of other "agreements" has long been discarded. Thus, the
Harvard Research demonstrates7 that the titles-"covenant," "agree-
ment," "act," "arrangement," "protocol," "statute," "pact," "dec-
laration"-are used interchangeably with, and more often in the
conduct of international relations than,8 the erstwhile terms of art,
"treaty" and "convention." Of the treaties and other international
acts to which the United States was a party and which were in force on
December 21, 1932, "123 were 'treaties,' 208 were 'conventions,' 102
were 'agreements' (many of them being in the form of exchanges of
notes), 55 were 'arrangements' (many of which were also in the form of
3. RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, LAW O TREA-
TIES: DRAFr CONVENTION, WITH COMMENT (1935) (published as 29 A. J. INT. L. Surr.,
No. 4, and herein cited as HARVARD RESEARCH, LAW OF TREATIES).
4. HARVARD RESEARCH, LAW o TREATIES, at 697.
5. Id. at687. See also infra, Section VI.
6. See 2 WOLFF, Jus GENTIUM, METEODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM (1764; Car-
negie Endowment ed. 1934) 191, 241-4; VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS (1758; Carnegie En-
dowment ed. 1916) bk. 2, c. 12, §§ 152, 153. But ef. id. at § 192; 1 GROTIUs, LE DROIT DE LA
GUERRE ETDELA PAIX (BarbeyraC's trans., 1768 ed.) 474.
Other jurists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries appear to have been less en-
arnoured of a terminological taxonomy devoid of consequence. See Weinfeld, supra note 2,
at 457-8.
7. HARVARD RESEARCH, LAW OF TREATIES, at 710-22; see also 1 HUDSON, INTER-
NATIONAL LEGISLATION (1931) xv; BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS (1942) 409-10; Basdevant,
La conclusion el la rWaction des traites (1926) 15 RECUEIL DES COURS (Acad6mie de Droit
International) S42, 628 et seg.; note in HuDsoN, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed.
1936) 843.
8. HARVARD RESEARCH, LAW OF TREATIES, at 711.
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exchanges of notes), 35 were 'protocols,' 26 were actually designated by
their own terms as 'exchanges of notes,' S as 'declarations,' 2 as 'general
regulations,' 2 as 'general acts,' 1 as an 'additional act,' 1 as a 'modzes-
vivendi,' and 1 as a 'compact.' " I Not uncommonly a single instru-
ment may be referred to in its text and accompanying documents by
three or four of these different titles.10 Such looseness in taxonomy
raises a strong inference that in this domain taxonomy is unimportant,
and it is in fact seldom disputed today that in the judgment of inter-
national law every validly consummated agreement between govern-
ments is binding, with legal consequences according to its terms,
irrespective of its title."
Whatever distinction there is between treaties and executive agree-
ments must be found, not in the practices and doctrines of interna-
tional law, but in our own unique constitutional law.'2 By common
practice under that law, the term "treaty" is used to refer to every
agreement, whether written or verbal, important or unimportant, vith
one or more foreign nations which, prior to ratification by the Presi-
dent,13 receives the consent of two-thirds of the Senate,' 4 and which is
9. Id. at 712. Similarly, of "the principal international engagements to which Japan
was a party in 1925, 18 were-styled 'treaties,' 34 were 'conventions,' 11 were 'arrangements,'
11 were 'protocols,' 6 were 'declarations,' 2 were 'resolutions,' and there was I 'accord,' 1
'recommendation,' 1 'decision,' and 1 'statute.'" Ibid.
See also Report of the Committee of Experts for the Progressire Codification of Irterra-
tionaLaw (1926) 20 Am. J. INT. L. STir,. 215; DEP'T OF STATE, TREATY I NFO fl 2TIoN B L,.
No. 39, Supp. (1932). A similar free use of language has developed in the case of multi-
lateral agreements. See 1 Huso, INrTERNATioNI L LEGISLrIo.N (1931) LNii--viii.
10. Thus the document entitled a "Pact of Cordial Collaboration," between Italy and
Czechoslovakia, consummated July 5, 1924, is described in the preamble and caption as a
.pact" and in its text variously as a "convention" or "treaty." (1924) 26 LEAGux or
NATIoNs, TP.ATr SERIES 21; see also the documents in (1920) 2 id. at 305:3 Mnjrr,
TREATiES, at 188.
11. Catudal, Executive Agreements, at 654-5. Professor Borchard apparently believes
that "form" is one of the factors setting apart "treaties" from other agreements. Borchard,
Executive Agreements, at 670. However, except for the possible substitution of a different
caption, there is no ascertainable difference in the language, declared binding effect, or
grammatical correctness of treaties and the various other classes of compacts listed in the
text. Borchard cites the Harrard Research Draft of the Law of Treaties (page 691) as cuppart-
ing his criterion. Examination of the Draft reveals only the statement that "treaties" must
be incorporated in "written documents"; this practice is equally common, as the Research
e-xpressly recognizes, when it is decided to call the agreement by one of the other names in
common usage. (Furthermore, the Research recognizes that there are numerous instances
when oral agreements have been held binding by international tribunals Without being
distinguished from treaties. Id. at 689-90.) See also infra, Section VI.
12. HARVARD RESEARCH, LAW OF TRETES, at697-8.
13. "Ratification is the term for the final confirmation given by the parties to an inter-
national treaty concluded by their representatives, and is commonly used to include the
exchange of the documents embodying that confirmation." 1 OpPENHEPt, INTElATION;AL
LAW (5th ed., Lauterpacht, 1937) 711. Under American constitutional law and practice,
the President has the option of deciding whether or not to ratify a treaty after Senatorial
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never submitted for approval to the House of Representatives." The
term "executive agreement," 11 on the other hand, is used both collo-
quially and in scholarly and governmental writings as a convenient
catch-all to subsume all other international agreements intended to
bind the United States and another government.17 Despite many at-
tempts to make distinctions between treaties and executive agreements
in terms of form,"8 subject matter,19 and legal and practical conse-
quences,2" and however surprising or even shocking the conclusion
consent has been given. U. S. CoNsT. Art. II, § 2. Many executive agreements are also
subject to ratification before becoming effective. See infra, pp. 320-1.
14. Thus the modus virendi concluded April 18, 1892, limiting the jurisdictional rights
of the United States in the Bering Sea and its power to control sealing pending the decision
of an international arbitral tribunal, received Senatorial consent under Article II, Section 2,
the "treaty clause" of the Constitution. See 1 MALLOy, TREATIES, at 760.
The compact between-the United States and 14 Latin American nations signed in 1940
was entitled the "Inter-American Coffee Agreement." As, unlike most recent commodity
agreements, it was referred to the Senate for approval before ratification, it is technically
speaking a treaty. See (1940) 3 DEP'T OF STATE BULL., No. 75, p. 482; 76 Treasury Deci-
sions 293 (1940).
This definition accords with that of Dr. Hunter Miller, former Director of the Treaty
Division of the Department of State (see I MILLER, TREATIES, at 9) and, as this article
is designed to show, is the only definition that the facts of our constitutional practice will
sustain.
15. The limiting clause is inserted to differentiate those agreements with foreign nations
which are submitted for approval to both houses of Congress and which happen to be ap-
proved in the Senate by a two-thirds vote. Under Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution
such agreements are not "treaties."
16. Actually there are few documents which bear the title "executive agreement."
See Catudal, Executive Agreements, at 655. But this phrase is used by the Department of
State as the title of the series of publications listing important international agreements,
negotiated subsequent to 1930, which did not receive Senatorial consent under Article 11,
Section 2, prior to ratification. Sometimes Congress has used the term "treaty" in statutes
when it actually sought to describe agreements to be ratified by the President without
referral to the Senate or Congress. See REv. STAT. § 398 (1878), as amended by 48 STAT. 943
(1934), 5 U. S. C. § 372 (1940).
17. The limiting clause is inserted to exclude exchanges of notes regarded by the parties
as but temporary declarations of policies-such as the Lansing-Ishii "Agreement" of 1917,
which was termed by President Wilson a mere "understanding." N. Y. Times, July 11,
1919, p. 1, col. 5.
18. See Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 670, n. 23, and 671.
19. Professor Borchard, in Commerce Committee Hearings at 172, states that "the sub-
ject matter makes it a treaty," and stresses the "importance" of the subject matter. The
subject matter of the particular agreement in question was the development and regulation
of the mutual use of a river forming the boundary between this government and Canada.
Earlier (at page 134) Professor Borchard had admitted, in an opinion introduced into the rec-
ord, that Congress had "inherent power" to admit new states to the union or acquire new
territory. It is not a little difficult to see why, if Congress could, with Canada willing, au-
thorize an agreement to annex the whole of Canada, it cannot authorize an agreement that
includes only the development and regulation of a boundary river !
For further discussion of this point, see infra, Section IV.
20. See infra, Section VI.
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may be to any who have not examined the record, this common usage
is the only distinction that the facts of our constitutional law and prac-
tice will sustain. As will be subsequently demonstrated in great detail,
there are no significant criteria, under the Constitution of the United
States or in the diplomatic practice of this government, by which the
genus "treaty" can be distinguished from the genus "executive agree-
ment," other than the single criterion of the procedure or authority by
which the United States' consent to ratification is obtained. More
explicitly, agreements with other governments, when consummated
pursuant to Congressional authorization or when subsequently sanc-
tioned by Congress, have the identical legal and practical consequences,
both under the municipal law of the United States and at international
law, as treaties, consented to by two-thirds of the Senate. Agreements
with other governments made pursuant to the President's authority
alone, when within the scope of his independent powers, have, further-
more, substantially the same status as treaties under both international
law and the municipal law of the United States, except in some cases
where there is contradictory legislation.2'
In addition to the familiar efforts to confine the exercise of the Presi-
dent's independent agreement-making powers to matters of relative
insignificance, the principal confusion injected into this simple picture
comes from efforts to exclude from the domain of "executive agree-
ments" all agreements with other governments effected by the Presi-
dent pursuant to the authorization or sanction of Congress. Whether
consciously sought or not, the end result of this attempted exclusion
of the most democratic procedure available to the Government for
making international agreements is to pose to the people of the United
States a strictly false choice-that is, a choice between non-exclusive
alternatives: between treaties, on the one hand, which are subject to
minority rejection, and Presidential agreements, on the other hand,
which are feared as potential vehicles of dictatorial whim. There have
even been vague and unsubstantiated suggestions that the excluded
alternative, the negotiation of international agreements by the Presi-
dent pursuant to Congressional authority or sanction, is without
constitutional basis.2 2 The justification proffered for this attitude seems
21. See infra, Section VI.
22. Witness Professor Borchard, in Commerce Committee Hearings at 153:
"There is nothing in the Constitution which provides that an executive agreement
should be sent to Congress subject to the approval of the House and Senate. And I venture
to maintain it is not an executive agreement. It is outside the powers of an agreement and
it is not really an act within the power of Cofigress, because Congress has no power to deter-
mine what Canada should do in its own territory. It is beyond the power of both branches
of the Government." Compare id. at 169, 171. He insists (at page 183) that "if it is a -alid
agreement," the President "doesn't have to submit it to Congress." He assumes (at pages
151 and 165) that an "executive agreement" must become "binding as of the date of signa-
ture." Elsewhere (at page 166) he appears to concede the power of Congress to initiate action
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to be in terms of a semantic confusion that Congress cannot "make
agreements," a confusion that infects even some writers in general
favorably predisposed toward executive agreements. Thus, Mr. Levi-
tan states: "No international agreement can be made 'under statutory
authority.' Statutory authority may validate the international agree-
ment internally but cannot be the legal basis for the international
negotiation." 23 The origin of language of this kind seems to be a
but attempts to make a distinction between this and its power to approve agreements already
negotiated: "The difference is that the approval is in violation of the Constitution. The
Constitution provides for advice and consent of the Senate, and if you could submit a matter
to the approval and advice of Congress instead of the Senate, you will have successfully
evaded the two-thirds rule .... You can initiate certain action, but you cannot by ma-
jority ratify, because you conflict with the treaty-making power." (See similarly id. at
204). Still a little later (at page 203), however, he makes a point of the fact that the docu-
ment submitted to Congress was a "bill" and not a written agreement with another govern-
ment and he seems to assume that a specific agreement must be before Congress for it to
exercise its policy-making powers. Conditioning all of his remarks seems, further, to be an
assumption that there is some kind of a physical limit on the powers of Congress. Thus,
(at page 166) "I don't think the commerce clause could be stretched to build works in
Canada. That could only be done by a treaty with Canada authorizing it. We couldn't
authorize ourselves to build-any part of the works in Canada," and (at page 167) "I believe
the commerce clause can go so far as to authorize the construction of bridges up to the inter.
national boundary. It would not authorize the construction of a bridge on the Canadian
side. . . ." and (at page 204) "This requires joint action, and that is beybnd the power of
Congress. That can only be done by an agreement, by a treaty. I don't believe you could
draw an act directing the President even to make this kind of a treaty with Canada. I don't
think you can do that."
It is difficult to take some of these comments seriously. One wonders whether Professor
Borchard assumes that two-thirds of our Senate has the power to determine what Canada
shall do. There would appear to be no greater difficulty, in so far as the "three-mile limit" is
concerned, in having the whole of Congress, rather than a part of it, declare the policies to
guide or sanction the President's conduct of negotiations with Canada to get Canada to do
something or to permit us to do something within its borders. One wonders again where
constitutional basis can be found for introducing a time element-valid before Presidential
action, invalid after Presidential action-into Congress's powers to authorize or sanction
international agreements withih the scope of its competence. One wonder;, finally, what
absolute requires that an "executive agreement" must be binding immediately upon signa-
ture, why the Congress must have a specific agreement before it to exercise its policy making
powers, and why only "treaties" in our unique constitutional sense are capable of securing
the "joint" action of other countries.
23. Levitan, Executive Agreements, at 371. Curiously, Mr. Levitan himself points out
that no distincton'between treaties and other agreements is today recognized by writers on
international law (id. at 370) and he nowhere suggests any constitutional reason why the
authority of Congress cannot be "the legal basis for the international negotiation." Mr.
Levitan also concludes on a note, strange for his premise of no Congressional authority, that
"only international issues of which the domestic counterpart is within the range of Congres-
sional authority can be dealt with satisfactorily by means of executive agreements." (Id. at
394-5.) "Executive agreements can be domestically validated," he continues, "as long as
they deal with subjects within the legislative competence of Congress; for then Congress
assures internal enforcement of the agreement." (Id. at 395.) The combination of these
statements seems to assume some unstated difference in the authority that determines the
domestic and the international validity of agreements.
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statement by Professor John Bassett Moore (made in presenting the
award for a prize essay) designed to show, not that Congress could
not authorize agreements, but that there was not even any "delegation
of power" involved in such authorization: 24
"In regard to what the author of the essay, following the phra-
seology so often employed, discusses under the head of 'congres-
sional delegation of power to make international agreements,' I
have long, indeed I may say always, been inclined to think that no
'delegation' of power whatever is involved in the matter. As Con-
gress possesses no power whatever to make international agree-
ments, it has no such power to delegate. All that Congress had
done in the cases referred to is to exercise beforehand that part of
the function belonging to it in the carrying out of a particular class
of international agreements. Instead of waiting to legislate until
an agreement has been concluded and then acting on the agree-
ment specifically, Congress has merely adopted in advance general
legislation under which agreements, falling within its terms, be-
come effective immediately on their conclusion or their proclama-
tion." 25
Elsewhere Mr. Levitan suggests that "%ith the exception of the part played by the
Senate through its participation in treaty-making" the Congress Eerves only" 'as a mouth-
piece of public opinion' which the President is legally free to disregard." (Id. at 373.) "It is
important to bear in mind," he writes, "that Congressional initiative regarding foreign rela-
tions can never assume the position of control, but must remain in the nature of advice only.
Because of the frequency with which Congressional advice is eventually acted upon by the
President, it is easy to mistake the real nature of the respective roles of EeNecutive and
Legislature." (Ibid., footnotes omitted.)
This is a somewhat quixotic use of the word "control." It is true that the Congress
cannot force the President to undertake or continue specific intergovernmental negotiations.
But neither can the Senate. On problems within the scope of its constitutional competence,
however, the Congress can declare the policies which the President must follow in any
negotiations that he does undertake. Its sanction for any disregard of these policies can be
the withholding of its cooperation, in the matter of appropriations or implementing legisla-
tion, which may be indispensable to the performance of any agreement the President mahes.
Practically, the "control" of the whole Congress here would appear to be even greater than
that of the Senate alone.
24. As will appear infra (Section III), Professor ,Moore's conclusion that there is no
delegation of legislative power in these cases is correct for other reasons, and any notion
that there is a delegation of such power lingers on largely because of a crude belief that
"power" is some kind of a physical unit capable of manual transfer which once handed forth
is forever gone. What happens is that the Congress never loses control but formulates a
general policy that is to guide the President in certain negotiations and authorizes him to
execute that policy with varying degrees of discretion. Additionally, it sometimes rezzerveLs
the right to approve the particular agreement made before it is permitted to go into effect,
or, alternatively, to disapprove the agreement within a stated period after its negotiation.
25. Moore, Remarks, reported in (1921) 60 PRoc. Ams. PHIL. Soc. xv-.xvi. It is unfortu-
nate that part of Prcfessor Moore's language can bear the inference that Congrezs's only
participation is in the "carrying out" of international agreements. His concluding reference
to "general legislation" enabling agreements to "become effective immediately on their con-
clusion or their proclamation" seems more accurate. It is worth noting, however, that both
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This suggestion that the Congress cannot "make agreements" in-
volves an unnecessary and a deceptive reification of the total, complex
process of "making" an international agreement. It is obvious that this
total process, even on a minimal breakdown, includes a whole series of
activities or steps, such as
(a) the formulation of the policies that are to guide the conduct of
negotiations, 2
(b) the cbnduct of negotiations and the concluding of an agreement
in accordance with the established policies,
(c) the validation or approval of the agreement by the appropriate
constitutional authority for making it the law of the land, and
(d) the final utterance or ratification of the agreement, when re-
quired, as an international obligation of the United States.27
It should be equally obvious that the appropriate constitutional bases
the "making" and the "performance" or "carrying out" of agreements are simply parts of
the total process of intergovernmental reciprocity and that the important consideration,
from the perspective of statesmanship, is this intergovernmental reciprocity-the anticipa-
tions which the conduct of each government reasonably creates in the other and the com-
pleteness and promptness with which these anticipations are fulfilled. If the action of one
branch of the Government is required to "carry out" an agreement, there is all the more
reason why it should be consulted in the "making" of the agreement. This is the core of
meaning in the attempts to distinguish between different kinds of agreements in terms of the
"obligation" they create. It is clear that in terms of constitutional "power" the President
and the Senate can commit the United States Government to any obligation within the
scope of the treaty-making power, that the President can commit it to any obligation within
the scope of his independent powers, that the President and the Congress can commit it to
any obligation within the scope of their combined powers, and that there is in fact a com-
plete overlap between the first and third of these possibilities and considerable overlap
between both of these and the second. The resolution of possible conflicts can be found only
in the statesmanship and forbearance of the different parties. It should not be made at the
expense of our own national interest and effective relations with other governments.
26. It is not intended by this order of presentation to suggest that the power to control
policies, when located in the Congress or the Senate, must necessarily be exercised in advance
of negotiations. Under our constitutional practice, the President may, if he chooses, nego-
tiate in the first instance on his own responsibility and then come to the Congress or to the
Senate for confirmation of his policies. The Congress or the Senate may confirm or discon-
firm. In case of disconfirmation, the President is under no constitutional obligation, as
practice is presently interpreted, to continue the negotiations. He may drop the whole
matter. But, if he does continue the negotiations, he is, as we have seen, constrained, on
penalty of losing indispensable cooperation, to follow the policies prescribed by tile l gisla-
tive body. The control of the Congress or of the Senate is thus a negative control. The
whole history of the nation testifies, however, that it is an effective control with observable
positive effects. See Part II, Section VII.
27. Professor Berdahl has suggested that "The function of managing the foreign rela-
tions may be classified into two distinct branches: (1) the power of intercourse, intercom-
munication, and negotiation; (2) the power of entering into formal or binding international
compacts." BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE (1920) 25.
It is believed that a still further breakdown is indispensable to clarity. As indicated in
the text, the separate step of "ratification" is dispensed with in some cases.
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for each of these different activities or steps in the total process may
be different and that it is only by an unrealistic lumping of all of these
activities into one unit of behavior, identified solely with the conduct of
negotiations, that the Congress can be said to be excluded from partici-
pation in the process of "making" an international agreement. No one
today doubts that the President has complete control of the actual
conduct of negotiations in the making of all international agreements
or that he is the appropriate authority to make final utterance of an
agreement as the international obligation of the United States. The
President has become "the sole mouthpiece of the nation in communica-
tion with foreign sovereignties." 21 It is completely unnecessary to
conclude from this, however, that the Congress has no power to par-
ticipate in the framing of policies to guide the conduct of negotiations
or that it is an inappropriate body to validate agreements, negotiated
by the President, as the law of the land. By constitutional usage, and
as a matter of practical necessity, the Senate has no greater power
than the whole Congress to participate in the conduct of negotiations
with foreign governments. Yet no one concludes from this that the
Senate has no power to participate in the making of international agree-
ments. It is, likewise, true that the Constitution expressly makes
international agreements validated by the treaty-making procedure
the law of the land; yet the Supreme Court has found it unnecessary to
conclude from this that the Congress and the President cannot give
like effect to agreements on subject matters within their competence,
and indeed has squarely held that both the Congress and the hresident
have such power.2 The fact is, of course, that under our Constitution,
as interpreted since the beginning of the Government, the powers to
formulate policies for the guidance of international negotiations and to
make any agreements effected in accordance with these policies the
law of the land are thoroughly divided among the President, the Presi-
dent and the Senate, and the whole Congress."
It is only, therefore, in terms of the power by which they are au-
thorized and validated 3l that international agreements can be dis-
tinguished under our Constitution. It is in these terms, furthermore,
that distinctions must be kept clear if wise policy decisions are to be
made.3 2 In terms of the location of this power, the following are the
28. Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, SEN. Doc. No. 56, 54th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1897) 21. See also Durand v. Hollins, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4,186, at 112 (C. C. S. D.
N. Y. 1860); WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AiERicAN FOREIGN RELATIO.S (1922) § 12.
29. See infra, Section VI.
30. See intfra, Section III. In the foregoing sentence and throughout, except where the
context specifically indicates otherwise, the ternf "whole Congress" is used to include the
President.
31. See infra, Sections III and VI.
32. One consequence of failing to keep these distinctions in mind at all times is illus-
trated by Professor Borchard's broadside condemnation of all "executive agreements,"
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categories of international agreements which may be made by the
Government of the United States:
(1) Treaties, i.e., agreements to which, in accordance with the
treaty-making clause, the Senate gives its "advice and consent" 11 by
two-thirds majority, and which are never referred for formal approval
to the House of Representatives.
(2) Congressional-Executive agreements, i.e., agreements either
(a) negotiated by the President or other executive officer pursuant to
authority conferred in an act or joint resolution of both houses of
Congress or in effectuation of a general policy enunciated in legislation,
or (b) sanctioned by the Congress after the fact of negotiation.
The 23 reciprocal trade agreements 14 made under the Reciprocal
Trade Act of 1934 and its successors3 5 and the agreements for the
annexation and incorporation into the United States of the Texas and
Hawaiian Republics" are examples of agreements made pursuant to
authority conferred by statute or joint resolution. The agreements
made in the 1920s settling the claims of the United States for funds
advanced to the Allies in the first World War were negotiated by the
President pursuant to statute, but did not become effective until
individually approved by Congress.3" The reciprocity agreements
made after the enactment of the Tariff Act of 1890 11 are examples of
compacts which, although not authorized by specific provisions of a
statute, were an appropriate means of effecting its stated purposes.39
In the case of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Ad-
ministration, the agreement providing for the United States' member-
ship and participation was submitted to the Congress after it had
including those subject to the policy control of the Congress, by creating imaginary horribles
that could never be relevant to executive agreements other than those perfected under the
exclusive control of the President. See Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the
Treaty? (1944) 38 Amr. J. INT. L. 637, 641; Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 677-8.
33. The attenuation of the Senate's function as an advisory council to the President,
the role contemplated by the draftsmen of the Constitution, is discussed infra, pp. 207-8.
34. The texts of the agreements are published in 77 Treasury Decisions 138 (1941);
U. S. ExEc. AGREEM'T SER., Nos. 75 (1935), 82 (1935), 91 (1935), 149 (1938), 184 (1939),
216 (1940), 89 (1935), 102 (1936), 67 (1934), 165 (1939); Dep't of State, Press Release, Dee,
29, 1941; U. S. ExEc. AGREEM'T SER., Nos. 147 (1938), 133 (1938), 101 (1937), 97 (1936),
146 (1936), 92 (1936), 78 (1935), 86 (1935), 100 (1935), 95 (1936), 79 (1935), 90 (1936), 163
(1939), 164 (1938), 180 (1939). (The arrangement is in alphabetical order by countries with
which agreements were made.)
35. 48 STAT. 943 (1934), 19 U. S. C. § 1351 (1940); 50 STAT. 24 (1937), 19 U. S. C.
§ 1352 (1940); 54 STAT. 107 (1940), 19 U. S. C. § 1352 (1940); 57 STAT. 125 (1943), 19 U. S.
C. A. § 1351 (Supp. 1944).
36. See infra, pp..263--4 and 266-7, respectively.
37. Seeinfra, p. 278 .
38. 26 STAT. 567 (1890); 26 STAT. 612 (1890).
39. Seeinfra, pp. 273-4.
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been negotiated.40 Similarly, the Albanian reciprocity agreement of
1922 was validated after its negotiation by enactment of Section 317
of the Tariff Act of 1922.41
The sources of authority for these agreements are the numerous
provisions of the Constitution vesting Congress with the power to
legislate in various fields, 42 and the "necessary and proper" clause,
which permits effectuation of these explicitly granted functions by any
appropriate means. 43
(3) Agreements made pursuant to authority conferred in an existing
treaty and agreements in effectuation of a policy enunciated in a treaty.
Most of the numerous agreements authorized in this manner have
provided for modification or extension of existing treaties." Here the
authority is derived from the treaty-making and the "necessary and
proper" clauses.
(4) Presidential agreements, i.e., agreements made by the President
(a) pursuant to his explicitly granted authority as "the Executive" and
as "Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy" 41 and (b) as "the
sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representa-
tive with foreign nations." 46
Agreements made by virtue of the President's independent powers
have dealt with a wide variety of problems. Some have been of minor
significance; others were frankly intended to be nothing more than
vwdi vivendi, pending consummation of a treaty or an agreement
authorized by act of Congress. In many instances, however-such as
the Boxer Protocol of 1900 or the British debt compact of 1927-
these agreements have dealt with matters of great importance and have
remained in effect for long periods of time.17
(5) Agreements made by the President pursuant to overlapping
authority, i.e., where Congress authorizes agreements dealing with
40. See Pub. L. No. 267, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 28, 1944); Briggs, The U .RRA
Agreement and Congress (1944) 38 Am. J. INT. L. 650; COLEGROVE, TaP .SERICAN SFATn
AND WoRLD PEACE (1944) 25-31.
41. 42 STAT. 944 (1922); re-enacted with minor alterations by 46 STAT. 704 (1930),
19 U. S. C. § 1001 (1940). See McCLuRE, ExEcu~rn AGREm!ENTS, at 176.
42. For further discussion see infra, Section III.
43. U. S. CoxsT. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 18; the clause empowera Congress "to make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers (vested
in Congress by the other portions of Article I, Section 8] and all ot hr poxers restle by it-is
Constitution in thw Gorernment of the United Slates, or in any department or offlerr thereof."
(Emphasis supplied.)1 44. For a description of certain agreements in this category see CRAND,.Lw , T%,TmEs,
at 117-9.
45. U.S. CoNsT. Art II, § 2, par. 1.
46. The statement was made by John Marshall while a member of the House of Repre-
sentatives. 2 BENTO3, ABRIDGEmENT, at 466. See also Report of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, SEN. Doc. No. 56,54th Cong., 2d Sess. (1897) 21.
47. See infra, pp. 280-1 and 269, respectively.
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questions which under the Constitution are also subject to independent
Presidential control.
In the remainder of this article, agreements with foreign nations
made under sources (1) and (3) will be referred to as "treaties." Agree-
ments made by virtue of sources (2) and (5) will be referred to--when
separate discussion of this category is appropriate-as "Congressional-
Executive agreements." 48 Agreements made wholly under source
(4) will be referred to as "Presidential agreements." 11 Where joint
reference to the latter two categories is desired, the generic term "exec-
utive agreements" will be used.50
The President as Leader. Whatever the source of the authority to
make any particular agreement, it may bear emphasis that for all
practical purposes the active role in its negotiation and ultimate con-
summation belongs to the President and his subordinates. The Senate
or Congress as a whole can authorize or block, but cannot require,
consummation of agreements; they can recommend the initiation of
negotiations with other nations, but cannot compel their inauguration
or continuance.
Thus, whether the instrument which emerges from the diplomatic
process is placed in effect as a treaty or an agreement, its actual negotia-
tion is conducted entirely under the President's control. 1 In this
respect, the expectations of the Framers have not been realized, and the
procedures prescribed in the Constitution have been drastically altered,
without a formal amendment. When it emerged from the Convention
of 1787, the Constitution sought to give the Senate a measure of nega-
tive control over the process of negotiation by making its approval
prerequisite to the appointment of "ambassadors, other public minis-
ters and consuls." 52 During Washington's first term, the practice
developed of appointing special Presidential envoys to handle par-
ticularly delicate problems, without obtaining the consent of the
Senate to such appointments. 3 Washington's example has been
48. The term has already been used in this sense in earlier portions of the text.
49. This terminology has been used by Professor Quincy Wright.
50. At some places, the generic terms "international agreement" or "international com-
pact" will be used to refer collectively to agreements validated under any of the above five
sources of constitutional power. These catch-all terms are used synonymously.
51. Where the agreement is negotiated pursuant to delegated Congressional authority,
the legislative body may of course set limits beyond which the instrument may not go. But
within the area of allowable discretion, choice of both policy and details belongs to the
Executive.
52. U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
53. In February 1791, President Washington informed the Senate that he had desig-
nated Gouverneur Morris to negotiate with the British regarding effectuation of certain
terms of the Treaty of Peace and that he had sent Colonel David Humphreys to Madrid and
Lisbon on a diplomatic mission. 1 RsicARDsoN, MESSAGES, at 96-8. See also 1 BENTON,
ABRIDGMENT, at 221-2; HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES, 1789-1817 (1920) 31, 37,
59-61.
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emulated by almost all his successors in office. 4 More important, it is
clear the Framers anticipated that-the Senate would normally function
as an executive council, advising the President or his subordinates
during the course of negotiations, as had been the case under the
Articles of Confederation. 55 This proposal for continuous consultation
or for any significant degree of advance consultation proved to be un-
workable and was abandoned during the administration of George
Washington. 5 The quadrupling of the size of the Senate since 1787
has been only one of many factors which has precluded rev-ival of the
54. See WRISTON, ExEcuTrvE AGENTS IN AMERIcAN FOREIGN RrmTboNs (1929); 2
HAYNErS, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES (1938) 590-6; CORwIN, THE PRESIDENT'S
CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1917): CORWIN, TrE PRESIDENT, at 230-2; WRIGHT, THE
CONTROL OF AMEPICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1922) 328-34.
Despite the restrictions embodied in 35 STAT. 672 (1909), 22 U. S. C. § 31 (1940), and
the interpretation of Attorney General Caleb Cushing that under the Constitution the
consent of the Senate must be obtained to the consent of all officers having diplomatic
functions, whatever their title or designation [7 OPs. ATT'Y GEN. 190, 192-3 (1855) 1, special
agents appointed without such consent have frequently been given authority over-riding
that of regularly designated ministers and have been officially referred to as possing
ambassadorial rank. See CORWIN, THE PRESIDENr, at 231,410-1. Se aEo note 60infra.
55. As to the expectations of the draftsmen see C. C. Pinckney's remarks to the South
Carolina ratifying convention, 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES, at 277-81; Tansill, Th'e Treaty-Making
Powers of the Senate (1924) 18 A.. J. INT. L. 459, 462; HENRY CrABOT LODGE, The Treaty-
Making Paowers of the Senate in A FIGHTING FRIGATE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES
(1902) 219, 231-2. The Foreign Secretary of Congress under the Articles of Confederation
was instructed to submit to Congress all correspondence regarding agreements and all
drafts of treaties. See ROGERS, THE AMERICAN SENATE (1926) 58-9.
56. At the beginning of his first term Washington believed the Senate would regularly
function as an advisory council to the President in the negotiation of treaties and that this
sphere of its activities was to be differentiated from its general legislative functions. 11
WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON (Ford, ed., 1891) 415, 417-9. In the summer of 1789, Acting
Secretary of State Jay and Secretary of War Knox appeared before the Senate to explain the
circumstances under which the first treaties submitted to that body, the French Counsular
Convention and the Fort Harmar Indian agreements, had been negotiated. HAYDEN, THE
SENATE AND TREATIES, 1789-1817 (1920) 4-16. Later in 1789 Washington himself attended
two executive sessions with General Knox to secure the advice of the Senate as to the terms
of a proposed treaty with the Southern Indian tribes. Id. at 25-30. The constraint and
tension which marked these sessions and the unwillingness of the Senators to discuss the
merits of the proposed treaty in front of the President led Washington to remark that he
"would be damned if he ever went there again." 6 MEMOIRS OF" JOHN QUcY.ADAMIS (1875)
427; see also JouRNAL. OF WILLLM MlACLAY (1927) 128. For 3 or 4 years thereafter Wash-
ington, although adhering to his declared intention not to appear before the Senate, trans-
mitted reasonably complete information as to the general provisions of the treaty intended
to be made in those cases when he submitted the nomination of the proposed envoy for
confirmation. By 1794, when the negotiations for the important treat), with England were
commenced, Washington had adopted the policy of giving the Senate only an indication of
the contemplated scope of the agreement. See HAYDEN, supra, at 30-106. This practice was
continued by Adams and Jefferson. See id. at cc. 6, 7. Thus the Senate's role was reduced
from that of participating vicariously in the negotiation of treaties to that of exercising a
right of giving or withholding consent to agreements, in whose making it had played no
direct part.
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original plan.57 Occasionally, Presidents have sought to secure an
advance expression of opinion from the Senate as to its views on a
particular agreement; but the terms of such references have ordinarily
permitted little more than a statement of support or disapprobation,
without the opportunity to play a coordinate role in the actual de-
visal of terms." But if the institution by the present administration of
frequent conferences between State Department officials and leading
members of the Senate and House foreign affairs committees on post-
war international organization is almost unprecedented,"5 the delay in
establishing so sensible a procedure is in considerable measure the re-
sult of the Senate's general past insistence that its "independence"
would be jeopardized if representative members were associated with
the Executive in the formulation of agreements. 0
Once an agreement or treaty has been signed and referred for con-
sent, the legislative arm may, of course, exercise its undoubted power
t6 modify or reject completely the President's proposal.! But the
57. See also Part II, Section VII.
58. Thus in 1846 Polk obtained an advance declaration from the Senate approving the
convention settling the Oregon boundary dispute with Great Britain; certainty of adoptlon
seemed especially essential as the President wished to clear his diplomatic decks before
precipitating war with Mexico. For this and other instances of advance Presidential con-
sultation see CRANDALL, TREATIES, at 67-72; see also WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN RELATIONS (1922) 249-51; Fleming, The Advice of the Senate in Treaty Making
(1930) 32 CURRENT HISTORY 1090-4.
59. Earlier Secretaries of State (e.g., John Hay) regularly consulted with individual
Senators as to pending negotiations, but no attempt was made to establish regular machinery
for such interchange of views. See WRIGHT, 1oc. cit. supra note 58.
60. Thus objection was made to the appointment of Senators Lodge and Underwood as
delegates to the 1921 Conference on Limitation of Armaments and to the appointment of
several Senators to the Commission which drafted the Treaty of Paris ending the Soanish-
American War. See DANGERFIELD, IN DEFENSE OF THE SENATE (1933) 292; CORWIN, TuH
PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1917) 66; CRANDALL, TREATIES, at 78; 2
GEORGE HOAR, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SEVENTY YEARS (1903) 50. The constitutional basis for
these objections was the provision of Article I, Section 6, paragraph 2, that "no person hold-
ing any office under the United States shall be a member of either house during his con-
tinuance in office." This objection is invalid, however, as it has been authoritatively held
that special Presidential envoys are not entitled to compensation and do not hold "office"
under the Constitution. 23 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 533 (Knox, 1901). See also CORWIN, Supra, at
65-8; 4 MooRE, DIGEST, at 440. But see note 54 supra.
The present national administration has frequently appointed Senators and members of
the House of Representatives as delegates to international conferences at which it was
contemplated multilateral agreements would be adopted. This practice was followed with
the 1933 London Economic Conference, the 1944 Bretton Woods Monetary Conference,
the 1944 International Labor Organization Conference, and the 1945 San Francisco Con-
ference of the United Nations.
61. The power of the Senate to alter treaties has an unquestionable constitutional
foundation. See Haver v. Yaker, 9 Wall. 32, 35 (U. S. 1869); 5 MARSHALL, LIFE OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON (1804) 360-9. In addition to serving as a medium for expression of Senatorial
views, the power to modify has been used by Presidents to attempt to obtain concessions not
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power is wholly negative, for there is no procedure by which the Presi-
dent can be compelled to resubmit a modified agreement to the other
nations concerned for further negotiations. In addition, in many
situations the President possesses power under the Constitution to dis-
regard the Senatorial or Congressional veto and consummate agree-
ments on his own responsibility.62
Nor is the President required to put into operation a treaty to which
the Senate has consented or an agreement which Congress has au-
thorized or approved. Generally speaking, diplomatic practice requires
a formal act of ratification before an international arrangement vill be
regarded as binding; 6 3 the decision as to whether or not to ratify an
approved agreement or treaty is wholly executive. In more than 50
cases, Presidents have declined to ratify treaties to which the Senate
had given its consent.6 4 Moreover, once a treaty or agreement has
been ratified, the President's authority to terminate its domestic or
international force by an act of denunciation is coequal with that of
Congress; 65 if the lesser alternative of modification seems preferable,
numerous precedents sanction use of a simple executive agreement to
alter a treaty or any other international compact.c"
As has already been intimated, the evolution of Presidential su-
premacy was something dubiously within the contemplation of the
Framers. But if usage-stemming alike from the growing need for
rapid action and specialized knowledge in the conduct of international
affairs 67 and from the bold course pursued at the beginning of the
secured by the original negotiators or to include provisions suggested by the other cignatory
after negotiation. See 2 HA-IrEs, THE SENATE OF THE UNTrED STTES (1933) 603-23; Tan-
sill, The Treaty-Making Powers of te Senate (1924) IS A. J. Is"r. L. 477,482.
62. See infra, Section III.
63. See CRANDALL, TREAT ES, at 343-52; United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691. 748
(U. S. 1832); United States v. Sibbald, 10 Pet. 313, 324 (U. S. 1836). Until there i3 an ex-
change of ratifications, either nation is privileged to rescind its acceptance of the agreement,
unless, of course, its terms provide otherwise. Armstrong v. Bidwell, 124 Fed. 690 (C. C. S.
D. N. Y. 1903). But after ratification, all "political" rights created by the agreement, i.e.,
all rights pertaining to the national States rather than inuring to the benefit of their citizens,
are retroactively made effective as of the date of original signature. United States v. Reynes,
9 How. 127, 148 (U. S. 1850); Haver v. Yaker, 9 Wall. 32, 34 (U. S. 1869). But see infra,
Section VI.
64. DANGERFIELD, IN DEFENSE OF THE SENATE (1930) 91. See also Jom; NV. DAvis.
THE TREATY-MAIMNG POWER IN THE UNITED STATES (1920) 15; speech in 1906 by Senator
Spooner reprinted in CoRwrN, THE PRnsmEN's CONTROL Or FOREIGN RL.LATONS (1917)
171. The President also has power to decline to submit a signed treaty to the Senate or to
withdraw it after submittal but prior to the giving of consent. See 2 HAtcEs, Til SENrATE
OF THE UNITED STATES (1938) 636-9; DAViS, koc. cit. supra.
65. See infra, Section VI.
66. See infra, Section VI.
67. The distinguished historian Charles Beard recently stated:
"It may be said, perhaps in tones of horror, that the concentration of forces proposced
above would mean the creation of an agency of substantially unlimited power over foreign
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Republic by Washington, Adams, and Jefferson "-has given the
President the whip hand in the formulation of foreign policy, there are
weighty practical considerations which preclude arbitrary action ex-
cept in emergencies; for, on most important problems, the effectuation
of international agreements and the implementation of foreign policy
are wholly dependent upon the adoption of corollary domestic legisla-
tion. Moreover, the President's power to fulfil obligations entered
into by treaty or agreement is dependent upon the willingness of both
houses to provide necessary appropriations. Here usage has sanc-
tioned complete Congressional independence; 69 the House of Repre-
sentatives has invariably insisted upon, albeit never exercising, its
right to refuse to appropriate money to implement ratified treaties,
upon disagreement with their provisions. 0
As will be seen in the next Section, neither the affirmative powers of
the President nor the negative controls residing jointly or separately
in the two houses of Congress are self-sufficient. The conduct of an
effective foreign policy is dependent upon cooperation and upon a
proper recognition of the especial competence of the Executive in
selecting the details and the pace of administration of a mutually
acceptable program. The question remains of whether national safety
permits this machinery to be unnecessarily complicated by retention
in one of its constitutent organs of a minority veto power.
relations. The contention is conceded. The answer to objections is that found in the Fed-
eralist. Since the United States is in no position to limit the powers of other nations, it
should set no limits to the powers of its Government to deal with them, save that of ultimate
responsibility to the nation from which its authority is derived. It will be said, also, that
such power may raise great perils in foreign relations. The answer is that more perils are
created by divided, confused, and irresponsible powers, variously directed and often con-
trolled by private interests contrary to the supreme public interest. If power adequate to
defining public interest and enforcing it cannot be entrusted to any public body, then
national interest is a meaningless shibboleth and the maintenance of national economic
security as public interest is impossible. Objections are, in fact, largely academic. There is
good reason for believing that the autarchic tendencies of other governments will force such a
concentration of policy and power in the United States, despite all theoretical objections
that ingenuity can devise and offer. Again, it is a question of a correct interpretation of
trends in the world realities of the living present." BEARD, THE OPEN DOOR AT HOME
(1935) 298-9.
68. See McLAuGHLIN, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, at 248-63, 294-9, 331-47; SMALL,
SOME PRESIDENTIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY (1932) 57-72, 75-7.
69. See CRANDALL, TREATIES, at 168-70, 176-8, 240; SOL BLOOM, THE TREATY-
MAKING POWER (1944) 5-8.
70. See WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1922) 6, 226. The
Supreme Court avoided the question of whether the House was required under the Constitu-
tion to appropriate money to effectuate a treaty in De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, 198
(1900). A circuit court, presided over by Justice McLean of the Supreme Court, held in
1852 that Congress's power to refuse to vote an appropriation was unquestioned. Turner v.
American Baptist Missionary Union, 24 Fed. Cas. 344, No. 14,251 (C. C. D. Mich. 1852).
But such refusal would constitute an international delinquency on the part of the United
States. See 5 MOORE, DIGEST, at 231.
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIVISION OF CONTROL OVER THE MA.KING
OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
To appreciate the full extent to which our Constitution divides con-
trol over the making of international agreements between the Presi-
dent, the President and the Senate, and the whole Congress, it is
necessary to bear in mind, as indicated above, that the total process
of making an international agreement includes a whole series of dis-
tinguishable activities or steps, such as the formulation of policies to
guide the conduct of negotiations, the conduct of negotiations and the
concluding of an agreement in accordance with the established policies,
the validation or approval of the agreement by the appropriate con-
stitutional authority for making it the law of the land, and the final
utterance or ratification of the agreement, when required, as an inter-
national obligation of the United States. Control over the actual
conduct of negotiations with other governments and over the final,
formal utterance of an agreement as an obligation of the United States
is admitted by all commentators to have become the exclusive prerog-
ative of the President. It has been suggested above, in accordance with
the views of a number of other contemporary observers, that control
over the formulation of policies to guide negotiations and over the
authorizing or sanctioning of agreements as the law of the land is so
thoroughly divided between the President, the President and the
Senate, and the whole Congress as to create tvo completely adequate,
but parallel and independent, procedures for the making of inter-
national agreements: a treaty-making procedure under the control of
the President and the Senate and an agreement-making procedure
under the control, in some instances, of the Congress and the Presi-
dent, and, in other instances, of the President alone.' It is our belief
that both constitutional practice and decision for 150 years and the
words of the constitutional'document itself, when construed, as legal
documents have immemorially been construed, in terms of contem-
porary conditions and interests, completely confirm this view.
The argumentation of the writers and speakers who seek both to
exclude the whole Congress from any significant participation in the
process of international agreement-making and to confine the in-
dependent powers of the President to the making of agreements on
matters of unimportance or temporary interest can be put in easy
summary. Their first effort is to secure a focus of attention solely upon
1. A more complete accuracy might describe the procedures as three, since in dealing
with many subjects the President has powers independent of the Congress that cover the
whole range of activities involved in making an agreement. It is more common, however,
simply to speak of "treaties" and "executive agreements" and this classification suffices for
our present purpose of showing that in the combined powers of the Congress and the Presi-
dent there exists a constitutional and much-practiced alternative to the treaty.
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the single, explicitly discretionary, and ambiguous "treaty-making"
clause of the Constitution to the exclusion of all the other relevant
clauses of the Constitution granting powers to the Congress and the
President, which are meaningful only if they include the authorizing or
sanctioning of international agreements. Their next step is to attempt
to extract, with automaton-like precision, from this one "treaty-
making" clause of the Constitution a supposedly literal, but admittedly
latent, "true meaning" of the words, which limits the powers of the
whole Congress and the President. because it allegedly includes a
distinction (made by an eighteenth century Swiss jurist, popularizing a
German)-which does not distinguish even in the work of its author-
which some of the Framers of the Constitution may have intended to
make, though they did not say so, in another clause of the Constitution
expressly limiting only the powers of the states. Their final step is
to discount the hundreds of precedents, confirmed by interpretations
of Supreme Court Justices, Presidents, and Congressmen, and extend-
ing throughout the 150 years of our national history, that sustain the
use of Congressional-Executive and Presidential agreements as alterna-
tives to "treaties" on the ground that these precedents are irrelevant
for obscure technical reasons or else "unconstitutional" or "evasive of
the Constitution." It is our purpose in the ensuing pages to explore
these tergiversations in some detail and to show that they are neither
sound in law nor wise in policy and that the whole Congress and the
President have powers to shape policy for guiding intergovernmental
negotiations and to make intergovernmental agreements the law of the
land which are wholly comparable to those of the Senate.
Theories of Constitutional Interpretation-Fact versus Fancy.
It may not be inappropriate to recall-by way of prologue-that,
during the course of our national history, jurists and statesmen have
announced two antithetical theories of constitutional construction.
The first of these, perhaps best described as the mechanical, filiopietistic
theory, purports to regard the words of the Constitution as timeless
absolutes. The sole problem of an interpreter, under this theory, is to
find what meaning the words had in terms of the idiosyncratic purposes
of the Framers in the light of the conditions and events of their day.
It is assumed that this meaning can be discovered and can and must be
applied, without loss or change, to the problems of the present day, by
completely different people under completely different conditions.'
2. The difficulties that inhere in quixotic attempts to ascertain and apply the "true
meaning" of constitutional and legislative draftsmen are carefully outlined in Radin, Statu-
tory Interpretation (1930) 43 HARV. L. REv. 863; Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interprdla.
lion," id. at 886; Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 1;
Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation (1899) 12 HARV. L. REv. 417; Freund, Interpreta-
tion of Statutes (1917) 65 U. OF PA. L. Rrv. 207; Jones, Statutory Doubts and Legislative In.
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This variety of what Bentham has described as "decision without
thought or mechanical judicature" 3 has seldom been more baldly
phrased than in Chief Justice Taney's opinion in the Dred Scott case:
". .. as long as [the Constitution] continues to exist in its
present form, it speaks not only in the same words, but with the
same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from
the hands of its framers. . . ." 4
The second theory, which may be described as adaptive or instru-
mental, treats the Constitution as "an instrument of government"
rather than as a mere "text for interpretation." 5 This theory received
its classic statement in Chief Justice Marshall's reminder in McCdloclh
v. Maryland that the Constitution was "intended to endure for ages to
come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs." I It recognizes that words must take their "meaning" from a
total context of people, time, conditions and purposes, and that the
Framers could have had no real "intention" with respect to most of
the important problems of the present day. The function of an inter-
preter, under this theory, is not to maintain an impossible fidelity to a
fiction but to consider how we have lived under the document and how
our whole tradition suggests that the words should be interpreted in
the light of the long-term best interests of the nation. Mr. Justice
Holmes with his usual happy language has thus summarized the
attitude:
tention (1940) 40 COL. L. REv. 957; Horack, In the Nanw of Legislalire Intention (1932) 3
IV. Vt.L L. Q. 119; Corwin, Judicial Reriew in Action (1926) 74 U. oF PA. L. REv. 639; de
Sloovhre, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes (1940) SS U. oF P,%. L. REv. 527;
Pound, Spurious Interpretation (1907) 7 COL. L. REv. 379; C nozo, NATunr oF T E
JuDicLAL PROCESS (1921) 14 et seg.
3. 7 WorxsOFJERM BEaNTMaI (Boving, ed., 1343) 246.
4. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 426 (U. S. 1856). The same thought was ex-
pressed in Mr. Justice Sutherland's dissenting opinion in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398,448,449 (1934):
"If the contract impairment clause, when framed and adopted, meant that
the terms of a contract for the payment of money could not be altered in inritum
by a state statute enacted for the relief of hardly pressed debtors to the end and
with the effect of postponing payment or enforcement during and because of an
economic or financial emergency, it is but to state the obvious to say that it means
the same now."
See also Mr. Justice Roberts' opiniori in United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 62-3
(1936); Mr. Justice Brewer's opinion in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437,
448-9 (1905); The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443 (U. S. 1851); 1 COoLEY, CorsrnruTzoM.A
LnrTATIoNs (8th ed. 1927) 124.
5. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution in Fru.'FiRuTR (ed.) Mn.
JusTIcE HOLS (1931) 46, 58. See also WVOODROW WILSON, CONSTITU'ioN.-AL GoVErs-
MENT IN THE UZITED STATES (1911) 192.
6. 4Wheat.316,415 (U.S. 1819).
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". .. when we are dealing with words that also are a constit-
uent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must
realize that they have called into life a being the development of
which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted
of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that
they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost
their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a
nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our
whole experience, and not merely in that of what was said a hun-
dred years ago." 7
It should, however, be no cause for wonder, since theories of con-
stitutional interpretation like other legal and governmental theories
must often serve as "handmaidens to political necessity," 8 that there
is abundant evidence of the invocation of both the "mechanical,
filiopietistic" and the "adaptive, instrumental" theories by the same
justices and the same statesmen, on different occasions for different
purposes.9 Indeed, there is reason to believe that the chief difference
between interpreters is in the extent to which they are conscious that
they are inevitably reading into the words of the Framers their own
preferences and their own perceptions of past and contemporary
events. From a detached scientific perspective, it is utterly fantastic
to suppose that a document framed 150 years ago "to start a govern-
mental experiment for an agricultural, sectional, seaboard folk of some
three millions" could be interpreted today by contemporary judges in
terms of the "true meaning" of its original Framers for the purpose of
controlling the "government of a nation, a hundred and thirty millions
strong, whose population and advanced industrial civilization have
7. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 433 (1920). See also Chief Justice Hughes'
majority opinion in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 415; Chief
Justice Waite's opinion in Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1, 9-10
(1877); Mr. Justice Holmes' decision in Gompers v. United States, 233 U. S. 604, 610 (1914);
Mr. Justice Matthews' opinion in Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 530-1 (1884); Mr.
Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 472
(1927); McBAIN, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (1927) c. 1; WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL Gov-
ERNMENT (1890) 6-9; Corwin, The Constitution As Instrument and As Symbol (1937) 30
AM. POL. SC. REv. 1071.
8. See, e.g., BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1922); SCHLESINGER,
NEW VIEwpOINTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1922) c. 10; FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE (1937); CoRwIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT (1934); RANDALL, CON-
STITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (1926) c. 1; Lerner, The Supreme Court and Amen.
can Capitalism (1923) 42 YALE L. J. 668.
9. Compare Mr. Justice Story's broad language in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, I
Wheat. 304 (U. S. 1816), written in the ascendancy of the Federalist judges, with the crabbed
interpretation, made during the high tidewater of Jacksonian power, of his dissenting
opinion in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 598 (U. S. 1837), and of
portions of his Commentaries on the Constitution, originally published in 1833. See, e.g., 2
STORY, COMMENTARIES ONTHE CONSTITUTION (Sth ed. 1891) 653.
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spread across a continent." 10 Each generation of citizens must in a
very real sense interpret the words of the Framers to create its ovm
constitution. The more conscious the interpreters are that this is
what they are doing the more likely it is that their interpretations wi"ll
embody the best long-term interests of the nation." In truth, our very
survival as a nation has been made possible only because the ultimate
interpreters of the Constitution-Presidents and Congressional lead-
ers,12 as well as judges 13-have repeatedly transcended the restrictive
interpretations of their predecessors. Forty years ago, Professor James
Bradley Thayer, one of the great students of our constitutional history,
gave the classic exposition of the Constitution's expansive powers:
"And so it happens, as one looks back over our history and the
field of political discussions in the past, that he seems to see the
whole region strewn with the wrecks of the Constitution,-of what
people have been imagining and putting forward as the Constitu-
tion. That it was unconstitutional to buy Louisiana and Florida;
that it was unconstitutional to add new states to the Union, from
territory not belonging originally to it; that it was unconstitutional
to govern the territories at all; that it was unconstitutional to
charter a bank, to issue paper money, to make it a legal tender,
to enact a protective tariff,-that these and a hundred other things
were a violation of the Constitution, has been solemnly and pas-
sionately asserted by statesmen and lawyers. . . Men have
found, as they are finding now, when new and unlooked for situa-
tions have presented themselves, that they were left [by the Con-
10. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 1, 3. Woodrow
Wilson pointed out that "... we have read into the Constitution of the United States the
whole expansion and transformation of our national life that has followed its adoption."
WILSON, CONSTITUTiONAL GOVERmENr IN THE UNITED STATEs (1908) 157.
11. Unhampered by compulsive subservience to imaginary absolutes, they are free to
consider rationally what statesmanship requires in terms of contemporary conditions and
objectives. Dean Landis has aptly contrasted those who "drape a corpze with the stars and
stripes" with those who "count the pulse-beats of a living organism." Landis, Boo!: Review
(1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 545,547.
12. See opinion of Chief Justice Taft in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 106
(1926); Mumbto, THE IAKERS OF THE U.,w~rrTEN CoNsTiTuTiON (1930); 1 BRYCE, kmn-
IcAN COmfONWEALTH (1888) c. 34; Hamilton, Who Are the Fathers? (1938) 1 NAT. LAV-EXs
GUILD Q. 287; see also infra, Section V.
13. The Supreme Court has contributed to national survival by its willingness to over-
rule its own decisions when circumstances revealed their inadequacy to meet changing
social or economic needs. See, e.g., Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1871); Graves v. New
York, 306 U. S. 466 (1939). For a list of decisions in which the Supreme Court reverved its
own earlier opinions see dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Burnet v. Coronado
Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 405 (1932) including footnotes. See also CoRwIZ., THE COl.-
STITUTION AND WHAT IT AIEANs TODAY (7th ed. 1941) 4,26-7,42-4, 64, 109-10; Willis, The
Part of the United States Constitution Made by the Supreme Court (1938) 23 Iow,. L. REv. 165;
Sharp, Movement aid Change in Suprene Court Adjudication (1933) 46 Hrv. L. REv. 361,
593,795.
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stitution] with liberty to handle them. Of this quality in the Con-
stitution people sometimes foolishly talk as if it meant that the
great barriers of this instrument have been set at naught, and may
be set at naught, in great exigencies; as if it were always ready to
give way under pressure; and as if statesmen were always standing
ready to violate it when important enough occasion arose. What
generally happens, however, on these occasions, is that the little-
ness and the looseness of men's interpretation of the Constitution
are revealed .... ," 14
The Framers Revisited-A 'Constitutional Exclusweness That Never
Has Been.
No one today seriously contends, when the question is squarely put
and answered, that the treaty-making procedure is the exclusive mode
by which the Federal Government can under the Constitution make
international agreements. 15 The Constitution does not provide that the
treaty-making procedure is to be the exclusive mode. The relevant
language is in fact "permissive rather than mandatory" in form: "[The
President] shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present
concur." This is in contrast with the clearly mandatory language in
the previous section of the same Article that reads: "The President
shall be Commander-in-Chief ... ." 16 Whatever, furthermore, ex-
trinsic evidence may suggest to have been the latent meanings which
some of the Framers may have read into these words-and their "true
intention," if any, as we will find, is indeed a speculative domain of
impenetrable obscurity-the crucial constitutional fact is that the
people (Presidents, Supreme Court Justices, Senators, Congressmen
and electorate) who have lived under the document for 150 years have
interpreted it to be permissive in the treaty-making clause and to
possess other clauses that authorize the making of international agree-
ments other than treaties on most of the important problems of peace
and war. Yet despite this consistent and continuous interpretation,
vigorously and officially confirmed by the Supreme Court, the key
argument of those who attack Congressional-Executive and Presiden-
tial agreements is an innuendo or half-explicit assumption that the
14. Thayer, Our New Possessions (1899) 12 HARV. L. REV. 464, 468-9; see also 1
THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1895) v-vi; speech of Theodore Roosevelt re-
printed in (1903) 37 Am. L. REv. 93; 4 BEVERIDGE, LIFE OF JoHN MARSHALL (1919) 308;
McLAUGHLIN, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND PARTIES (1912) 283-4.
15. See Borchard, Book Review (1942) 42 COL. L. REV. 887; MCCLURE, EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTS, at 289.
16. U. S. CONST. Art. II, § 2, par. 1 (emphasis supplied). See Catudal, Executive Agree.
ments, at 653; Wright, The United States and International Agreements (1944) 38 Am. J. INT.
L. 341, 342. See also Hamilton's discussion of an analogous point in TE FEDI IRALiST, No.
83; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee. I Wheat. 304 (U. S. 1816).
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treaty-making procedure is exclusive. This appears to be the principal
implication of the charge that the use of such agreements is a "dis-
honest and dangerous evasion of the Constitution." Thus Professor
Borchard writes: "The Constitution refers only to treaties, giving to
them legal effect as the supreme law of the land, and says nothing
about Presidential executive agreements" and, again, ". . . executive
agreements do not have the constitutional dignity and force of a
treaty, since the Constitution makes no mention of them, but specif-
ically mentions treaties." 17 It is unfortunate that lay commentators
too-including many persons who are sincerely devoted to the pro-
motion of post-war international cooperation-have followed the Pied
Pipers of strict constructionism in attempting a literal construction of a
non-existent text and have also concluded that the utilization of
Congressional-Executive or simple Presidential agreements in lieu of
treaties is a species of constitutional evasion.' 8
The complete answer to this charge of constitutional evasion is
found, as we have indicated above, in the text of the Constitution itself
and in how We have lived under that text for 150 years. The treaty-
making clause, despite the exclusive attention which some ,witers
bestow upon it in efforts to woo its enigmatic meaning, does not ex-
haust the provisions of the Constitution that relate to the control of
this government's relations with other governments. In addition to
the treaty-making clause with its broad, permissie grant of power,
there are other clauses of the Constitution which grant equally broad
powers to both the Congress and the President, powers which have no
practical meaning unless they include control over this government's
relations with other governments.'9
The grants of power to Congress which are most obviously relevant
are in Article I, Section 8:
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common
defense and general welfare of the United States; ...to regulate
17. Borchard, ExeciireAgreernents, at 667,678.
18. See Editorials, N. Y. Times, April 17, 1944, p. 22, col. 1, N. Y. Times, May 22,
1944, p. 18, col. 2. The Editors of the Times believe the Constitution Ehould be formally
amended to permit approval of treaties by majority vote of both houses.
See also COLEGROvE, TAE AuEmic.z SENATE mND WORLD PEACE (1944) 28, 31, 95,
105, 110 and passim. Colegrove believes the Senate minority veto should be terminated but
believes this can be accomplished only by a constitutional amendment modifying the treaty-
ratifying process.
19. In formulating these summary statements of the powers of the President and Con-
gress we have greatly been assisted by CORWIN, THE PnSwnMEhN'S CoNTROL OF FonMiox
RELATIoNS (1917) 1-6. It should be noted that the somewhat restrictive views on the ex-
tent of direct Presidential authority stated in this work have since been modified. See
CoRwrn, THE PRESIDENT, c. 6; CORwIN, THE CONsTITUTION Am Woriw Onr. -,zATxo
(1944) cc. 2, 3.
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commerce with foreign nations; . . . to establish an'uniform rule
of naturalization; . . . to define and punish piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas and offenses against the law of nations;
to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make
rules concerning captures on land and water; to raise and support
armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a
longer time than two years; to provide and maintain a navy; ...
to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or
in any department or officer thereof." 20
In addition, there are numerous other grants of power to Congress,
which may appear on their face to relate to matters of wholly domestic
import, that have been interpreted to include the power to authorize
the making of international agreements.
21
The most important grants of power to the President, including the
power to make treaties, are stated in Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Article II:
"The executive power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America. . . .The President shall be Com-
mander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and
of the militia of the several States when called into the actual
service of the United States; . . .he shall have power, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, pro-
vided two-thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall
nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls....
The President shall have power to fill all vacancies that may
happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions
which shall expire at the end of their next session. . . .He shall
receive ambassadors and other public ministers; he shall take care
that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the
officers of the United States." 22
It is obvious-and has been recognized since the beginning of our
history-that, from any objective point of view, these broad grants of
power, in comprehensive and undefined terms, to the Congress, to the
President, and to the President and the Senate, overlap in their
reference to the factual events that constitute the relations between
this government and other governments and between our people and
the people of other governments. 23 Thus, Madison emphasized at some
20. The summary, excerpted from U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, is quoted from CORWIN,
THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1917) 2.
21. See, e.g., infra, pp. 239-40.
22. Quoted from CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 20, at 3.
23. See CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 20, at 3-6; WRIGHT, THE CONTROL or AMERICAN
FOREIGN RELATIONS (1922) c. 18. The restrictive views stated in the latter work as to the
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length in 1796 that "if taken literally, and without limit" these passages
from the Constitution "must necessarily clash with each other." 24
More recently, Professor Corwin has described these constitutional
grants as "logical incompatibles," 21 and concluded that "the Constitu-
tion, considered only for its affirmative grants of powers which are
capable of affecting the issue, is an invitation to struggle for the priv-
ilege of directing American foreign policy." The factual events that
constitute "the foreign relations" or "the foreign affairs" of the United
States in fact comprise a total process of continuing activities or insti-
tutional patterns of behavior-reciprocities and counter-reciprocities-
by which the people of the United States seek to use their government,
in cooperation with other governments and peoples, to promote the
fuller achievement of all their values. The making and honoring of
agreements with other governments is an important, perhaps the most
important, functional part of this total institutional process; arbi-
trarily to sever out from the total process of international cooperation
the making and honoring of agreements would certainly, from a func-
tional perspective, if it did not do violence to or even destroy the total
process, leave nothing but a bare husk of unimportant activities. Con-
stitutional powers such as "to regulate foreign commerce" and "to
declare war" or to act as "Commander-in-Chief" must, therefore, if
they are to be powers that include control over their subject matters
and not mere nominal investitures of ceremonial attributes, include
the power to shape the policy that is to control agreements made with
other governments with respect to such subject matters. The power to
regulate foreign commerce, for example, is most futile if it does not
include the power to authorize the making of agreements indispensable
to effecting the regulation desired.21 Taken together, furthermore, the
powers of the Congress and the President would appear to cover all
permissible scope and effect of Presidential Agreements have since been modified by the
author; see Wright, The United Stales and International Agreements (1944) 38 AM. J. INT. L.
341.
24. Quoted in 1 BENTON, ABRIDGEIENT, at 648; 5 Ax..LS OF Co.;a. 487 (1796). See
also 6 WRITINGS OF JA IES MADISON (Hunt, ed., 1906) 154.
25. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, at 222.
26. Id. at 200. For further references to varying interpretations see WVright, Treaties
and the Constitutional Separation of Powers in the United States (1918) 12 Am. J. INT. L. 64.
27. Chief Justice Marshall long ago indicated the broad discretion vested in Congress
to choose the means for effectuating its delegated powers:
"To have prescribed the means by which the government should, in all future
time, execute its powers, would have been to change, entirely, the character of the
instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code. ...Let the end be legiti-
mate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appro-
priate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,415,421 (U. S. 1819).
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practical regulation of the whole of the external affairs of the nation.28
Conversely, powers "to make treaties" or the power to advise and
consent to the making of treaties, if they are to be construed to grant
more than mere authorization to make noises with the throat or to put
shapes on paper, must include power to participate in determining the
policy that is to control the framing of such agreements. Nor does the
Constitution state any limitation upon the scope of the subject matter
of treaties. For reconciling these obvious conflicts in the factual refer-
ence of the words of the Constitution, different interpreters at different
periods in our national history have sought to prescribe meanings for
the words that rather arbitrarily limit the powers, now of one branch of
the Government, now of another. Some, such as Jefferson and Madison,
have sought to limit the treaty-making powers of the President and the
Senate by emphasizing the powers of the whole Congress.2" Others,
such as the contemporary opponents of the Congressional-Executive
agreement, have sought to limit the powers of the whole Congress by
emphasizing the powers of the Senate under the treaty-making clause.
Still others have sought to circumscribe the President's constitutional
initiative and powers in the making of international agreements by
emphasizing the powers of both or either the Congress and the Senate.
It should be clear that logic offers no way of putting an end to this
controversy. In Madison's now quaint language, there are no "separate
orbits" in which the various powers can move and no "separate objects"
on which they can operate without "interfering with or touching each
other.3" The powers of the different branches of the Government must
move in the same orbits and they cover the same objects. 3 Nor is it of
28. Nor is there any reason why they should not be taken together. Thus Professor
Corwin has written:
"Besides, thanks to the fact that the maxim against delegation of legislative
power is held not to apply in the diplomatic field, inasmuch as the powers delegated
merge with 'cognate' powers of the President, acts of Congress may validly leave'
the President substantially complete discretion whether he shall enforce them or
not, and this freedom of action-or inaction-may be utilized to promote a
specific diplomatic policy ... .
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, at 226; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U. S. 304,319-20 (1936); POMEROY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1880) 452.
29. See infra, p. 239 and notes 105 and 106.
30. Quoted in 1 BENTON, ABRIDGEMENT, at 649.
31. This point is well recognized in the powers of the whole Congress to terminate
international agreements, including treaties, and to control any appropriations necessary to
implement such agreements. Both of these powers are discussed infra, Section VI.
One report of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, quoted by Professor
Corwin in THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1917) 36, makes a distinc.
tion "between the existence of a constitutional power and the existence of an ability to effect
certain results." This may be an apt description of some events for certain purposes, but
in this context any distinction between powers, constitutionally exercised, that produce
the same results is purely verbal. In the world of reality it is the results that affect the lives
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supreme importance today to indulge in literary speculation about
why the Framers created these overlaps or how some of the Framers
may have expected such conflicts to be resolved. The important fact
today, from any consciously adaptive or instrumental approach to the
Constitution, is the fact that this very great flexibilit, in the constitu-
tional language does exist and that such flexibility affords opportunity
-and an opportunity of which abundant advantage has been taken-
for the development by usage of procedures, immediately responsible
to the democratic will of the whole country, in the making of interna-
tional agreements. 32
It may perhaps bear still further emphasis that the Constitution
itself creates the opportunity for this development by usage. The
Framers themselves explicitly recognized that there are international
agreements other than treaties and put this recognition into the docu-
ment. In Article I, Section 10 the Constitution, in imposing certain
limitations on the states, provides that "No state shall enter into any
treaty, alliance or confederation," but continues that "No state shall,
without the consent of Congress . . . enter into any agreement or
compact with another state, or with a foreign power." Unless one
takes the position that the Framers sought to deny to the Federal
Government the power to use techniques of agreement made available
to the states-an argument completely refuted by the debates at the
Convention and by contemporaneous history 3 -the conclusion is in-
escapable that the Federal Government was intended to have the power
to make "agreements" or "compacts." 14 The fact that-despite the
of people. Madison's comment is appropriate: "Treaties and laws, whatever the nature of
them may be, must in their operation be often the same." 1 BENTON , AlriDGE!u-i,N at
649.
Compare also Professor Dodd's comment:
"That statutes enacted within congressional powers may deal with the came
subjects as treaties is demonstrated by the judicial problem of construing con-
flicts between the two, and by the well-established principle that a treaty may be
abrogated or modified by statute. (Pigeon River Co. v. Cox, 291 U. S. 138)."
Dodd, International Relations and the Treaty Power (1944) 30 A. B. A. J. 360,361.
32. See infra, Section IV.
33. See Tam FEDERALIST, No. 23 (Hamilton); 1 HccKETT, Tm Co,-SnTunwO;AL
HISTORY OF TE UNITED STATES (1939) 164-6; 1 BUTLER, THE TR ar-MMAInM Powr. or
THE UNITED STATES (1902) 237-90, 294-7, 378; 1 McM.,LsTEr, HISTORY OF Tm PEonE or
THE UNITED STATES (1893) c. 3; see also Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199 (U. S. 1796).
34. This conclusion is also indicated by the fact that before the adoption of the Con-
stitution the United States had entered into three agreements with other nations by pro-
cedures other than the treaty-making process stipulated in the Articles of Confederation.
The "executive agreements" adopted during this period were the "Preliminary Articles of
Peace" with Great Britain of Nov. 30, 1782; the Moroccan ship signals agreement of 1786;
and the exchange of notes in 1784 between Franklin, the American Minister, and the French
Minister of Foreign Affairs, whereby an "unconditional favored nation" policy was cub-
stituted for the "conditional favored nation" provision, contained in the formal Treaty of
Amity and Commerce of 1778. 2 MILLER, TREATIES, at 3; these agreements are reprinted
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broad grants of substantive power set out above, the permissive
formulation of the treaty-making clause, and the express recognition
of agreements other than treaties-the power to make agreements
other than treaties was not granted in more express terms, can seri-
ously concern only those who make something especially mystical
out of "the power to make agreements." 11 As has been indicated
above, when broken into its component parts, "the power to make
agreements" includes several clearly distinguishable powers, among
which are the power to conduct negotiations with foreign governments
and the power to frame the policies for controlling such negotiations."G
It can scarcely be denied that the President needs no new powers be-
yond those expressly granted to him in the document to enable him
to conduct negotiations with other governments and that he has the
exclusive power to conduct such negotiations. Nor would it appear
that any effective question can be raised about the powers of the whole
Congress and the President either to frame policies for controlling
the conduct of negotiations or to make any agreements concluded the
law of the land. From a practical perspective, all the President requires
to make his negotiations with other governments effective is an assur-
ance, on problems demanding commitments beyond his own powers to
fulfil, that the Congress will honor his negotiations and assist in ful-
filling all necessary commitments. For the giving of such assurance by
the Congress, the broad legislative powers outlined above would ap-
pear to be fully ample. It is thus clear that wholly apart from the
in id. at 96, 158, 219. An analogous exchange of notes in September 1778 between the
American Minister at Paris and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs had served as the
technique for modifying Articles 11 and 12 of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce ratified
earlier that year. Id. at 33-4. However, abrogation of the treaty in this regard had been
directed by the Continental Congress. 2 WHARTON, REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRE-
SPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1889) 569. Accordingly, unless one is prepared to adopt
the position that the government created by the Constitution was meant to be weaker in
dealing with foreign affairs than its admittedly feeble predecessor, the conclusion follows
that it was intended to possess the authority to consummate important agreements by
means other than the treaty clause. Actually, as is well known, strengthening of the hand
of the central government in controlling foreign relations was one of the primary reasons for
the convocation of the Constitutional Convention. See 1 BUTLER, TIlE TREATY-MAEING
POWER OF THE UNITED STATES (1902) 156-61, 164; COXE, JUDICIAL POWER AND UNCON-
STITUTIONAL LEGISLATION (1893) 274-6; 1 VON HOLST, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1889) 40-50.
35. An analogy may be appropriate. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 7, par. 2, in describing the
law-making powers of Congress, refers only to bills. Par. 5 refers also to "orders," "resolu-
tions," and "votes"; but it is clear that these were not considered to be techniques of legisla-
tion interchangeable with the "bill." See Searcy, The Use of the Congressional Joint Resolu-
lion in Matters Relating to Foreign Affairs (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in the Duke
University Library) c. 1.
Yet more than 5000 joint resolutions have been adopted which under Supreme Court
decisions are as much "the law of the land" as any bill ever enacted. Searcy, supra, passirn.
36. See supra, Section II.
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treaty-making clause, admittedly non-exclusive, the Constitution offers
a completely adequate procedure for coping with the whole problem of
international agreements.
There is in fact a curious, backhand recognition of this completely
adequate constitutional procedure, independent of the treaty-making
clause, for effecting international agreements even in the writings of
those who most vigorously oppose the use of this alternative procedure.
Thus Professor Borchard, after writing at great length to prove that
agreements negotiated with the approval of the whole Congress are not
interchangeable substitutes for the treaty and that "there is no con-
stitutional warrant whatever for the suggestion that the President has
an option to submit his compact either to the Senate as a treaty...
or to the Congress for majority approval," - paradoxically reverses
his position and seeks to dispose of the many precedents, contradictory
of his point of view, in which the President has consummated important
agreements pursuant to Congressional authorization or under his owvn
independent powers, by the suggestion that all of these agreements
can be justified either by Congressional statute or by Senatorial waiver
of the particular assumption of power. "Circumstances have forced
the executive," he writes, "in the conduct of military affairs and certain
aspects of foreign relations, to conclude-either with or without Con-
gressional authorization-numerous agreements with foreign countries
covering the movement of armed forces, the adjustment of claims,
protocols, tariff and postal agreements, modi vivevdi, and, as in 1898,
1918, and 1943, even armistices"; but he insists, "It suffices here to
point out" that these agreements "have dealt either with routine ques-
tions, within the President's admitted constitutional powers, or have
related to matters which the Senate deemed too unimportant for formal
treaty procedure, or which the Congress had previously authorized." 12
In his classification of executive agreements he recognizes that there
are "two major classes: (1) those authorized by Congress, and (2) those
negotiated by the President on his own responsibility" ;, and, noting
that "by far the greater number fall within the former class," he lists
some of the more important authorizations with respect to postal
agreements, tariffs, debt funding, lend-lease, territorial acquisition, and
membership in international organizations. He attempts to distinguish
the annexations of Texas and Hawaii on the ground that "in neither
case was the annexation outside the powers of Congress," 41 powers
which he elsewhere describes as "the inherent power of Congress
to admit new states to the Union or to acquire territory." 41 Coming
37. Borchard, Executire Agreements, at 671.
38. Id. at 670 (emphasis supplied).
39. Id. at 671.
40. Id. at 673.
41. Commerce Committee Hearings at 134.
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to the agreements which "the President, on numerous occasions, has
been obliged" to enter without authorization of Congress, Professor
Borchard finds that "In so far as they touch questions which properly
are the subject of treaties, they can sometimes be justified on the
ground that the Senate has acquiesced in such exercise of executive
power, finding nothing in the transaction disparaging to its preroga-
tives." 42 He finds it "more difficult to justify the 1940 destroyer-naval
bases exchange, on legal grounds, but Congressional acquiescence may
be inferred from the almost unanimously approved Lend-Lease Act of
March 11, 1941, and from the votes authorizing appropriations for the
bases." 43 It probably needs no emphasis that this attempt to dis-
tinguish between the powers of the whole Congress to authorize impor-
tant international agreements, interchangeable with treaties, and the
powers of the whole Congress or of the Senate to "acquiesce" in such
agreements is an incredibly transparent reliance upon tweedledum and
tweedledee. If the Constitution contains no provision for the power of
authorization, by what miracle of constitutional fundamentalism can
the "power of acquiescence" be extracted from the text? It should be
obvious that the advocates of a non-expressed exclusiveness of the
treaty-making clause, who disregard all the other relevant clauses of
the Constitution, cannot even begin to develop a consistent and tenable
explanation of the many important international agreements, other
than treaties, made during our history.
It has already been noted that some of the difficulty which some
writers have, entirely apart from policy preferences, in recognizing the
competence of the whole Congress to participate in the process of
international agreement-making stems from an unnecessary absolut-
ism about the meanings of "make agreement" and "executive agree-
ment." This attitude may bear further illustration from th6 writings
of Professor Borchard. "The Executive agreement," he writes in his
article Against the Proposed Amendment as to the Ratification of Treaties,
"is limited by its inherently minor and unimportant character and
comes into force on signature. It does not depend on approval by
anybody but the President." 44 In rejecting Professor Corwvin's sugges-
tion "that since Congress can legislate within an undefined area on
foreign affairs, it may delegate these 'cognate' powers-whatever that
means-to the President-so that in his hands will be combined execu-
tive and legislative powers" (a procedure, it may be noted paren-
thetically, that has been practiced uninterruptedly since 1794), he
reaches a rhetorical climax in insisting that "the argument" would
"seem to require Congress-if not the President-to violate its oath of
42. Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 674.
43. Id. at 676.
44. Borchard, Against the Proposed Amendment as to the Ratification of Treaties (1944)
30 A. B. A. J. 608, 609, n. 12.
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office and the Constitution." '45 In another article Professor Borchard
insists with equal vigor that the suggestion "that Congress has an un-
defined power to legislate in the field of foreign affairs" has "nothing to
do with the case." 41 He is much vexed by the intimations of other
writers that "an executive agreement is as good as a treaty" or "that an
executive agreement is the same thing as a treaty." 47 It must be ad-
mitted that the conventions of our literary usage permit any witer to
define any word any way he wants to, so long as he makes clear what
he is talking about. WVhen, however, a writer seeks to clothe his ow
peculiar definitions with attributes of inherence and universality and
to demand that other people make important decisions in terms of such
definitions it becomes worthwhile to investigate the source of his mean-
ings. It is legitimate for Professor Borchard, if he wishes, to use the
phrase "executive agreement" to refer only to those agreements nego-
tiated by the President under his own powers. It is completely illegiti-
mate, however, for him -to take his own arbitrary definition of "execu-
tive agreement" and to deduce from it the conclusion that the whole
Congress has no power to frame policy to guide the President in making
important international agreements other than treaties. Nothing in
either the Constitution or international law prescribes any such con-
45. Id. at 609. The phrase "cognate powers" is one borrowed by Professor Corwin
from Mr. Justice Sutherland. See note 192 infra. The "whatever that means" is Profezor
Borchard's.
The meaning of Mr. Justice Sutherland and Professor Corwin is reasonably clear. The
word "cognate" is simply their way of indicating that the powers of the Congress and the
President refer in considerable measure to the same subject matter.
46. Borchard, Book Review (1944)4 LAwnERs GuI.D Rrv. 59,60.
This same semantic confusion about what is involved in the "maling" of an agreement
seems to underlie Professor Borchard's novel and repeated insistence that when an agre-c-
ment is referred by the President to the Congress, the Congress has power only to consnt or
disapprove, but laclm the power to suggest amendments, such as the Senate possess s in the
case of treaties. Commerce Committee Hearings at 146, 148, 201 cl seg. Professor Borchard's
notion seems to be that a legislative body cannot amend an agreement unless it has a docu-
ment physically before it and itself makes verbal changes on the parchment. Thus he states:
"This is not submitted to the Senate in the form of a document which you have to consider
and have the right to amend as we have amended 162 of our treaties. You have got to take
this or leave it. You can't modify the thing, you can't place a comma in it." (Id. at 143.)
To Senator Ferguson's question "Is there anything in the law to say that we could not
change it? Couldn't we draft laws as we see fit?", he replies, "You can draft laws, but you
can't draftlareements between foreign countries."
It should be obvious that when the legislative function is conceived as that of forming
policy, rather than of pushing pens on specific pieces of parchment, there is no difficulty in
the Congress making amendments to agreements. The powers of the Congrezs to tell the
President to go back and do his job over and do it in a specific way, if he does it at all, are
fully as great as those of the Senate. Senator Ferguson's answer to Professor Borchard on
this point, illustrated by reference to the amendments made by Congress to the UNRRA
agreement, would appear conclusive.
47. Borchard, Book Review (1944) 4LAWVERS GuiLD Rv. 59,60.
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clusion. The fact that there are some agreements called "executive"
approved wholly under the powers of the President does not in any
realm of logical discourse preclude the possibility of there being other
agreements--call them "executive," "Congressional-Executive," or
what you will-approved under the powers of the whole Congress.
Whether.an executive agreement is "as good as a treaty" or the "same
thing as a treaty" can, furthermore, be of interest only to legal philos-
ophers still in search of Platonic absolutes. The important facts are
that, under the broad grants of power in our Constitution, alternative
procedures have developed, and have been utilized throughout our
history for the making of international agreements on all important
subject matters with identical legal and practical consequences, and
that all distinctions in the naming of these agreements-"treaties,"
"executive agreements," or "Congressional-Executive agreements,"
etc.-are merely convenient labels, unique to our own constitutional
law, to indicate the specific constitutional authority under which a
particular agreement has been made.
The Framers and Vattel-A Constitutional Distinction That Never
Has Been.
The next step in the argument of the advocates of minority control
of the foreign affairs of the United States is that, even though the Con-
stitution does not make the treaty-making clause the exclusive mode
by which the Federal Government can make international agreements,
it does create a fundamental distinction, though one nowhere stated,
between the "treaties" and the other international agreements which
the Federal Government can make. The contention is that the Con-
stitution establishes not interchangeable procedures for the making of
international agreements but rather one procedure, the treaty-making
procedure, for all important matters and for agreements with an
especial constitutional dignity and legal effect, and another procedure,
the Congressional-Executive and Presidential agreement-making
procedure, for unimportant subject matters and for agreements of
lesser constitutional dignity and legal effect.43 It is admitted that
there is no warrant for this distinction in the language either of the
treaty-making clause or of the clauses granting powers over foreign
affairs to the Congress and the President. The effort to ground the
distinction in the- language of the Constitution relies on Article I,
Section 10, already referred to, which prohibits the states from entering
into "any treaty, alliance or confederation," but permits them, with
Congressional assent, to consummate "any agreement or compact with
another state, or with a foreign power." It is argued that this language
makes a clear distinction between treaties and other agreements and
48. This is the burden of all of Professor Borchard's recent writing in the field.
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that the Framers of the Constitution in imposing this distinction as a
limitation upon the activities of the states also intended to impose it
as a limitation upon the powers of the Federal Government. 41
It should be obvious that the language of the Constitution itself,
even with respect to the limitations on the powers of the states, makes
no clear distinction between treaties and other agreements. The only
distinction it expressly makes is that the states cannot make the one
but can, with the consent of the Congress, make the other. To spell
out a distinction in substance, which they seek to apply not only to
the states but also to the Federal Government, the advocates of minor-
ity control find it necessary to turn to "the great Swiss natural-law
jurist and positivist [sic], Emmerich de Vattel," -" a popularizer of the
work of an earlier German writer, Christian Wolff." It is alleged that
"the framers of both the Articles of Confederation of 1777 and the
Constitution of 1787 were under the influence of . . . Vattel" 52 and
that, following Vattel, "The 'Founding Fathers' formulated this dis-
tinction in terms of 'important' matters, which were to be the subject
only of formal federal treaties-knourn to the Founders as 'treaties of
peace, of amity and commerce, consular conventions, treaties of navi-
gation'--and 'routine' or unimportant questions, which the States
were left free to conclude between themselves by mere agreements."5 3
49. The present writers agree that this language shows that the Framers kmew of
international agreements other than "treaties." They do not, however, find any clear
distinction in the language and see no evidence of an intention by the Framers to use the
distinction, whatever it was, to limit the powers of the whole Congress.
50. VATTEL, LE Daorr DES GENS (1758; Fenwick's trans., Carnegie Endowment ed.
1916).
51. The relevant language of Wolff is brief:
"A treaty (foedus in Latin] is defined as a stipulation entered into reciprocally
by supreme powers for the public good, to last forever or at least for a considerable
time. But stipulations, which contain temporary promises, or those not to be re-
peated, retain the name of compacts [pactiones in Latin]."
WOLFF, Jus GENTIum, A1 )HODO SCIENTIFIC. PERTRACTATLYU (1749; Carnegie Endowment
ed. 1934) c. IV, § 369.
Wolff does not appear to have made any practical consequences depend upon the
distinction. It takes but a brief glance to see that his world of "perfect and imperfect,"
"equal and unequal," and "real and personal" treaties is completely alien to contemporary
problems.
52. Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 668. This statement is made on the authority of
Weinfeld, What Did the Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by "Agreements or Com-
pacts"? (1936) 3 U. op Cia. L. REv. 453.
53. Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 669-70. Professor Borchard derives this defini-
tion from Weinfeld, supra note 52, at 460, where it is used as a description of the kinds of
international agreements intended by the Framers to be made only by the national govern-
ment. However, neither Weinfeld nor Levitan [in Executive Agreements] concludes that it
was intended these "important matters" could be dealt with by the Federal Government only
through "formal . . . treaties."
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The language from Vattel, in translation approved by Professor
Borchard,4 which is supposed to support this construction reads:
"Section 152. Treaties of Alliance and other public treaties....
A treaty, in Latin foedus, is a pact entered into by sovereigns for
the welfare of the State, either in perpetuity or for a considerable
length of time.
"Section 153. Compacts, agreements or conventions. Pacts
which have for their object matters of temporary interest are
called agreements, conventions, compacts. They are fulfilled by a
single act and not by a continuous performance of acts. When the
act in question is performed these pacts are executed once for all;
whereas treaties are executory in character and the acts called for
must continue as long as the treaty exists.
"Section 192. Treaties executed by an act done once for all.
Treaties which do not call for continuous acts, but are fulfilled by a
single act, and are thus executed once for all, those treaties, unless
indeed we prefer to give them another name (see Sec. 153), those
conventions, whose pacts which are executed by an act done once
for all and not by successive acts, are, when once carried out, fully
and definitely consummated. If valid, they naturally bring about a
permanent and irrevocable state of things. ... 5
In accord with two other recent writers, 1 Professor Borchard concludes
"that the term 'agreement or compact' referred to in the Constitution
of the United States is derived from the 'agreement, convention, com-
pact,' or the original French 'accords, conventions, pactions,' discussed
by Vattel. " 51
It will be noted that the distinction Vattel makes is not in terms of
important and unimportant. His distinction is in terms of agreements
"executory in character" and calling for acts which "must continue
as long as the treaty exists," and of "matters of temporary interest"
"fulfilled by a single act and not by a continuous performance of acts."
Nor is it without interest that he indicates in Section 192 that exactly
the same type of subject matter which is supposedly appropriate for
"compacts, agreements or conventions" can also be appropriately
handled by "treaties." This suggests that his distinction may be a
mere matter of names and that he makes no practical consequences
54. Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 668. The translation used was made by Weinfeld,
supra note 52. It should be noted that the verbal identity of Vattel's classification of the
types of international agreements with Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution is not
present in Fenwick's Carnegie Foundation translation of Le Droit des Gens, produced before
the beginning of the current controversy as to the proper function of executive agreements,
See 3 VATTEL, op. cit. supra note 50, bk. 2, c. 12, §§ 152, 192.
55. LE DROIT DES GENS, bk. 2, c. 12, quoted in Borchard, Executive Agreement, at 668.
56. Weinfeld, supra note 52, and Levitan, Executive Agreements, at 366-9.
57. See Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 668-9.
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depend upon it.-s Examiation of the other relevant sections of Le
Droit des Gens indicates that his distinction is a mere matter of names
and that Vattel himself expressly denies that it makes any difference.
In Section 206 he states:
"The public compacts called conventions, agreements, etc.,
when they are entered into between sovereigns, differ from treaties
only in the subjects with which they deal (§ 153). All that we have
said of the validity of treaties, of their execution, their dissolution,
the obligations and the rights they give rise to, etc. is applicable to
the various conventions which sovereigns may conclude with one
another. Treaties, conventions, agreements, are all public con-
tracts and are all governed by the same law and the same princi-
ples. We shall not weary the reader with a repetition of what has
already been said, and it would be useless to enter into the details
of the various kinds of conventions, which are all of the same
nature and which only differ from one another in their subject-
matter." -9
Reference back to Section 153 makes it clear that he is introducing no
distinction of "subject matter" other than the one already mentioned.
It is, therefore, putting quite a lot into Vattel when Professor Borchard
writes, "It is further apparent that Vattel believed that many perma-
nent transactions-such as a cession of territory or peace agreement-
should be accomplished by treaty even though consummated by a
single act." 10 Vattel not only knew nothing of the procedural distinc-
tion in our Constitution, as he wrote his treatise in 1758, but he made
no difference in mode of "accomplishment" or effect depend on his ovM
taxonomy.
Even if it be conceded that a lately reanimated, secret intention of
the Framers to incorporate into the Constitution this relatively mean-
ingless taxonomy from Vattel could, despite a different constitutional
practice for 150 years, be relevant to the making of important decisions
today, it is scarcely credible that the Framers could have had any such
intention. It may be granted that some of the Framers were acquainted
with the work of Vattel.61 It is a totally different proposition, however,
58. It may be that this was the Idnd of distinction that Bentham had in mind when he
criticized Vattel "for stating propositions that are 'old-womanish and tautological,' for
building castles in the air, and, when he says something, for saying it with so dull a p~rcep-
tion of the principles of utility that his statement resolves itself into a formula like this: 'It is
not just to do that which is unjust.' " de Lapradelle, Ilroduction, in 3 VATrm, op. cit. supra
note 50, at xliv [quoting from 10 Vonxs oF JEnEur Bnx iHA~ (Bowring, ed., 1843) 5841.
See also HALL, INTERNATioNAL LAw (Sth ed., Higgins, 1924) 418, n. 1.
59. 3 VATTFL, op. cit. supra note 50, bk. 2, c. 14, § 206.
60. Borchard, ExecutireAgreements, at668.
61. See de Lapradelle, supra note 58, atxi-x-.x; Veinfeld, supra note 52, at 458-9; 2
VH.ARTON, REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CopiPnsroNDENcE OF Ta UNITED STATES (18S9)
64.
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to conclude that they intended, without saying so, to take a distinction,
which was without practical consequences with its originator and which
had few, if any, proponents among the other important international
law writers of the time,62 and to create from it not only a limitation
upon the power of the states, but also a test for determining the ap-
propriate subject matters for the different procedures by which the
Federal Government could make international agreements. Mr. Wein-
feld, upon whose researches Professor Borchard depends-after much
painful literary detective work in comparing different drafts of the
Articles of Confederation and of the relevant clauses of the Constitu-
tion with each other and with definitions in Dr. Johnson's dictionary,
and after considering the practice under the Articles of Confedera-
tion-concludes that the Framers intended to incorporate into the
language limiting the states, not Vattel's patent distinction between
"executory" and "executed," or Professor Borchard's "important" and
"unimportant" agreements, but rather a new latent distinction between
"settlements of boundary lines with attending cession or exchange of
strips of land" and "regulation of matters connected with boundaries as
for instance regulation of jurisdiction of offenses committed on bound-
ary waters, of fisheries or of navigation," and other agreements. 3 It is
worth noting that Mr. Weinfeld nowhere suggests that the distinction
he finds with respect to limitations on the states was intended by the
Framers as a limitation on the Federal Government:
Indeed, it is completely gratuitous to assume, whatever the distinc-
tion the Framers intended to make between "treaties" and "agree-
ments" in imhosing a limitation upon the power of the states, that they
also intended to impose this same limitation upon the power of the
Federal Government. 4 Their general designs for the respective powers
62. See Weinfeld, supra note 52, at 457.
It may be wondered why, even assuming that the Framers labored under the illusion
that they were incorporating some fundamental distinction from international law, such a
putative distinction should not be forgotten now that the illusion is recognized. It has
already been noted that contemporary international law knows nothing of such a dichotomy,
See HARVARD RESEARCH, LAW OF TREATIES, at 686; BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS (1938)
at 409. Professor Oppenheim's words are completely apt: "Again, the distinction made by
the Government of the United States between treaties, which can only be ratified by the
President with the consent of the Senate, and agreements, which do not require such consent,
has nothing to do with International Law. It is a distinction according to the constitutional
law or practice of the United States." 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed., Lauter-
pacht, 1937) 709, n. 3.
63. Weinfeld, supra note 52, at 464.
It is not easy to see why the Framers used such vague language if they intended a
reference so specific.
64. An aphorism of Mr. Justice Holmes' is relevant: "A word is not a crystal, trans-
parent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and
content according to the circumstances and time in which it is used." Towne v. Eisner, 245
U. S. 418, 425 (1918).
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over foreign affairs of these different organs of government were com-
pletely divergent. The debates at the Convention and contempo-
raneous history indicate clearly that the Framers sought to confine the
states within narrow limits in order to strengthen the national govern-
ment and to prevent disunity. 5 The same evidence affirms, on the
other hand, that the Framers sought to make the control of the Federal
Government over foreign relations as comprehensive as possible."c
Even with respect to the constitutional limitation imposed upon the
states, though it is possible that the Framers may have found Vattel's
dichotomy between "treaties," on the one hand, and "compacts, agree-
ments, or conventions," on the other, a useful verbal device for creating
a distinction in power of an undisclosed nature, there is no conclusive
evidence that they had any very specific factual reference in their use
of the terms. Instead of embarking upon elaborate essays in retrospec-
tive mind-reading upon scant evidence, it seems much safer to con-
clude with Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Dean Landis that "There is no
self-executing test differentiating 'compact' from 'treaty' " and that
political judgment was expected to be the decisive factor in circum-
scribing "the area of agreement open to the states." 17 The fact that
the Framers subjected all compacts between the states to the approval
of the Congress, rather than of the courts, 3 supports the conclusion
that they sought to devise a general mechanism, to be used as cir-
cumstances might require, for control "over affairs that are projected
beyond state lines." 69 This breadth of interpretation is confirmed also
by the record of governmental practice under the Articles of Con-
federation, in which the terminology ascribed to Vattel had likewise
been previously employed. 0 Five interstate-compacts had been nego-
65. See Madison's "Preface," in MADisoN, DEB..TES, at 1, 11-13; reprinted in 3 FAr-
RAND, REcoRDs, at 539, 547-9. See also I BUTLER, TlE TRE,%TY-MAs.xNGw POVER I THE
UNITED STATES (1902) §§ 163-7; CORwnI, NATIO.%AL SUPREU.ACY (1913) 21.
66. See sources cited supra note 65; see also I HocKErr, CosnTtumioNL HISTORY Or
TEM UMTrED STATES (1939) 164-5, 178; Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause, at
695-6; CoRwIN, NATIONAL SUPREmAcY (1913) 21, 33.
67. Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause, at 695, n. 37. See also Comment
(1935) 45 YALE L. J. 324,327-8; Levitan, Executire Agreements, at 365-71.
68. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention had defeated the propoal that
Congress be given a veto power over state legislation (2 FARmtND, REcoRDs, at 21, 27-3),
but had provided that the federal courts should have jurisdiction over "controversies
between two or more states." U.S. CoNsT. Art. III, § 2.
69. Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause, at 695.
70. Article VI of the Articles of Confederation prohibited the states from entering into
"any conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty with any King, prince or state," but per-
mitted them to enter into "any treaty, confederation or alliance whatever between them"
with the consent of Congress. In practice, the states entered into "agreements" between
themselves without consent of Congress; the Supreme Court upheld one of these compacts
in Wharton v. Wise, 153 U. S. 155 (1894). See also Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact
Clause, at 732-4.
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tiated before the drafting of the Constitution;" in addition to the
adjustment of boundary disputes, undoubtedly conceived in 1787 as
the major immediate field for application of the device as between the
states, 72 these dealt with the regulation of navigation and fishing rights
and with jurisdiction over boundary waters.73 These compacts were
neither "of temporary interest" nor were they "fulfilled by a single
act"; moreover, the boundary agreements necessarily involved terri-
torial cessions of greater or lesser magnitude.7 4 They demonstrate un-
questionably that the draftsmen were acquainted with a use of inter-
state compacts for much broader purposes than might be inferred from
a literal interpretation of Section 153 of Le Droit des Gens."
Whatever, furthermore, may have been the original and undisclosed
"intention" of the Framers in creating their limitation on the power
of the states, 150 years of history and numerous court decisions clearly
inyalidate any belated attempt to interpret the "compact clause" as
authorizing the states to enter into only a limited class of "unimpor-
tant" or "immediately executed" agreements." Compacts have been
utilized to create joint administrative boards to regulate harbor devel-
It is clear that a few of the members of the Second Continental Congress, which drafted
the Articles of Confederation, had read Vattel's Le Droit des Gens. See 2 WHARTON, Op. Cit.
supra note 61, at 64-7.
71. 'Four were negotiated while the Articles of Confederation were in force; see Frank-
furter and Landis, The Compact Clause, at 732-4. The broadest-gauged compact was the
Virginia-Maryland Agreement of 1785. MD. LAWS (Dorsey, 1840) vol. 1, p. 187; VA. STAT.
(Hening, 1822) vol. 12, c. XVII, p. 50. In addition, Virginia and North Carolina had entered
into a boundary agreement in 1777, before the ratification of the Articles, See BARNETT,
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS (1906) 6.
72. See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 723 (U. S. 1838). The late Dean
Hall of the University of Chicago Law School concluded that Article I, Section 10 was also
intended to "enable each state, with the consent of Congress, to make agreements with
foreign countries respecting the reciprocal rights of their inhabitants." HALL, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW (1910) 328; see also Mikell, The Extent of the Treaty-Making Power of the Presi-
dent and Senate of the United States (1909) 57 U. OF PA. L. REv. 435,528.
73. Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause, at 732-4:
74. See Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39 (U. S. 1870); Levitan, Executive Agree-
ments, at 464.
75. Quoted supra, p. 228.
76. See, e.g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296, 313 (1921); Virginia v. West
Virginia, 206 U. S. 290 (1907), 246 U. S. 565 (1918); Newark v. C. R. R. of N. J., 267 U. S.
377 (1925).
Several attempts have been made to differentiate between the various types of arrange-
ments, but these classifications proceed wholly on a verbal level and are refuted by examina-
tion of the agreements consummated in the past 150 years. The most curious of these
.exercises is Chief Justice Taney's assertion-without production of any differentiating
criteria-that there must be a distinction between an "agreement" and a "compact." Holmes
v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 571 (U. S. 1840); see also 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTI-
TUTION (5th ed. 1891) §§ 1402-5; cf. Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause, at 67.
For reasonably complete lists of interstate compacts see NAT. CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK: 1931, 361; ELY, OIL CONSERVATION THROUGH INTERSTATE
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opment and interstate parks,n to 'provide protection for women and
minors as industrial workers,78 to conserve natural resources," to pro-
vide for allocation of -ater rights,0 and, before the enactment of the
Federal Power Act of 1935, to regulate interstate utility operations.8 '
All of these compacts dealt with problems of more than temporary in-
terest. Certain of them-particularly the 1935 oil agreement 52 and the
New England states minimum -wage agreement-contained no provi-
sions of their own, but merely provided for the enactment of legislatiofn
by the states. In terms of the conceptualism imputed to the eighteenth
AGREEMENT (1933). There have been several agreements between states and foreign nations
dealing with boundary questions or riparian rights. See Bruce, Thc Compacts ard Agrcz.
ments of States with One Another and with Foreign Powers (191) 2 MIN. L. Rnv. 500.
77. The most important of these compacts is that providing for the creation of the
Port of New York Authority, which since 1921 has supervised the construction of improve-
ments and regulated many aspects of commercial activity in the leading maritime center in
the United States. N.J. Laws 1921, c. 151, Laws 1922, c. 9, Laws 1930, c. 244; N. Y. Laws
1921, c. 154, Laws 1922, c. 43, Laws 1930, c. 419; 42 STAT. 174 (1921); 42 STAT. 822 (1922);
see also The Port of New York Atlwrity (Sept. 1933) S FORTU=n 22.
78. Seven northeastern states signed a compact of this nature in ,May 1934. Sze John-,
son, Interstate Compacts Affecting Labor (1934) 24 Azu. L B. LEG. REv. 71.
79. Several compacts have been devised in attempts to prevent destruction of aquatic
life. See the New Jersey-Delaware Agreement of 1905, 34 ST r. 53 (1907), N. J. Laws,
1905, c. 42, Del. Laws 1905, c. 5; the Oregon-Washington Agreement of 1915,40 STAT. 515
(1918), Ore. Laws 1915, c. 1S8, § 20, Wash. Laws 1915, c. 31, § 116. An oil conservation
compact was entered into by nine states in 1935; see Comment (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 324,
337, n. 64; Kan. Laws 1935. c. 215; Okla. Sess. Laws 1935, c. 59, art. 6; N. M. Laws 1935,
c. 128.
80. The most important agreement in this field is the Colorado River Compact of 1921.
See 42 STAT. 171 (1921); Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause, at 745-6; Bannister,
Colorado Rirer Compact (1924) 9 CORN. L. Q. 388.
If, as is contended, the word "agreement" has the Same meaning uith respect to the
Federal Government as with respect to the states, it is curious that there zhould be any doubt
about the constitutionality of the proposed agreement with Canada with respect to the St.
Lawrence. But see Professor Borchard's strenuous insistence that the St. Lawrence agree-
ment is unconstitutional. CommerceCommittee Hearitgsat102-216.
81. See the Kansas-Missouri Agreement of 1922, 42 STAT. 1058 (1922); Kan. Laws
1921, c. 304; MNo. H. J. 1258 and Mo. SEN. J. 932 (51st Gen. Ass'y, 1921-1922).
Use of compacts to deal with industrial problems has been widely recommended. See
Donovan, State Compacts As a fetlhod of Settling Problems Common to Several States (1931)
80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 5; DOUGLAS, THE Liri-:R,, TRADITIoN (1935) 124; CL,%nn, Tri RIsE
OF A NEw FEDERALISM (1933). Experience suggests, however, that this is a Eomewhat
clumsy and dilatory technique, as contrasted with the federal public corporation or regional
authority, such as the TVA. See NAT. REsouRcEs PA:N.wG BD., REGIOM'L FAcrons R.
NATIONAL PLANNING (1935); LrLiENTEAL, Tum TENNESSEE VALY AuTruomar (1944);
FINER, THE TVA-LEssoNs FOR INTERNATio L APPLiC-mON (1944) cc. 1-9; Corwin,
Lessons of the Colorado River Compact (1927) 16 NAT. Muxic. REv. 459; Vandenbhzch,
Regions Versus States (1933) 21 Ky. L. J. 432; Freund, Concurring 2[emorandum in NAT.
CONF. OF Co snt'Rs ON UNFoams STATE L.WS, H.ANDBOOK: 1921,357. It is pozible that come
desirable compromise between efficiency and decentralization can be worked out by com-
bining the interstate compact and the federal public corporation.
82. See note 79 supra.
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century jurists by Professor Borchard and Mr. Weinfeld, these agree-
ments unquestionably have trenched into the domain deemed reserved
for "treaties." 83 Usage and judicial legislation, moreover, have de-
parted from the mandatory language of the Constitution even to the
extent of 1ermitting the states to enter into certain classes of agree-
ments without securing Congressional consent.14 The most important
of these categories is that of compacts settling boundary disputes "-
the very class of agreements with which the Founders are supposed to
have been most preoccupied.8 It would be indeed strange if a process
of historical interpretation which has been so generous to the states,
expressly limited by the constitutional language, should be ungenerous
to the Federal Government, not expressly so limited, especially since
the Constitution was intended "to make our states one as to all for-
eign . . . matters." 87
Some may question still, since it is a matter of record that proposals
to give the House of Representatives a role in the treaty-making
process were defeated in the Constitutional Convention,83 why the
Framers did not with more complete explicitness confer upon the
Federal Government the power to make international agreements
other than treaties. It must be admitted that it is in the nature of
things impossible in this year of 1945 to obtain any very exact informa-
tion about what was in the minds of the 55 Framers in 1787 and of the
more numerous acceptors of the Constitution in 1788 and the years
83. See notes 56 and 57 supra.
84. The doctrinal distinction is that only compacts affecting the "political sover-
eignty" of the states or the United States need Congressional approval. Robinson v. Camp-
bell, 3 Wheat. 212 (U. S. 1818); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 726 (U. S.
1838); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503, 518-20 (1893). Seeralso Wharton v. Wise, 153
U. S. 155, 170 (1894); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1, 17 (1900); McHenry County v. Bardy,
37 N. D. 59, 163 N. W. 540 (1917); 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION (5th ed.
1891) §§ 1402-3; 3 Ops. ATr'Y GEN. 661 (Legar6, 1841); WARREN, THE SUrREBIE COURT AND
SOVEREIGN STATES (1924) 75 el seq. This result has been sharply criticized as permitting a
departure from the mandatory language of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution; see
Comment (1935) 35 COL. L. REV. 76, 78; Comment (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 324, 326.
85. The first of these boundary compacts consummated without advance procural of
Congressional consent is the 1803 agreement between Virginia and Tennessee. VA. REV.
CODE (Shepherd, 1819) c. 22; 1 LAWS OF TENN. (Scott, 1820) 798 [Laws 1803, c. 58]. In
Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503 (1893), the Court found that Congress had given its
"implied assent" to the compact by its continued silence. An analogous convention between
North and South Carolina was ratified in 1815. 2 LAWS OF N. C. (Potter, 1821) c. 885; 1
S. C. STAT. (Cooper, 1838) 419. For a complete list of agreements negotiated tip to 1925
without the consent of Congress see Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause, at 749-54.
86. Weinfeld, supra, note 52, at 453 et seq.; Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall, 39
(U. S. 1870).
87. The concluding words are from a letter sent to Washington by Jefferson during the
course of the Constitutional Convention. Quoted in WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CON-
STITUTION (1928) 451.
88. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 538.
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immediately following. 9 In so far as agreements made by the President
under the powers specifically granted to him are concerned, the omis-
sion could be a reflection of the eighteenth century view that the con-
duct of foreign affairs under the tripartite power theory is most ap-
propriately an executive function." In this, as in other matters, the
Framers may have felt no need to express what was commonly re-
garded as self-evident. 91 With respect to agreements negotiated by the
President under authorization from the whole Congress, Professor
Quincy Wright has suggested that the fact "that explicit proposals to
attach the House of Representatives to the treaty power were voted
down" proves only "that the Convention wished to make it possible
for the President to make treaties without submission to the House.
It does not prove that the Convention intended to prevent Congress
from exercising its constitutional powers to authorize or implement
international agreements made by the President alone." 92 Some of the
acceptors of the Constitution-and surely no greater deference should
89. It may appear on the surface that it was scarcely rational for the Framers to have
contended about whether the House was to participate in the making of treaties or whether
the vote was to be by a normal or exceptional majority unless it was intended that the treaty
was to be the sole mode of effecting international agreements. Any one who still thinks,
however, that a clear and rational intention of the Framers can be gleaned from the docu-
ment, even when supplemented by the extant records of extrinsic evidence as to the Framers'
intention, may disabuse himself of the notion by looking at Mr. Charles Warren's recent
summary in Judiciary Committee Hearings at 79. (See also infra, Section VII.) If this is not
enough, a glance at the references in Wright, The United States and International Agree-
ments (1944) 38 Am. J. IN~r. L. 341, and in McCLuRE, E.ECUTiVE AGREE!IENTS, c. 11, should
suffice. As has been indicated in the text, too much of the other behavior of the Framers
becomes irrational upon any simple assumption that the treaty-making clause, despite its
non-exclusive language, was intended to be exclusive. In defense of the Framers, it may be
remembered that there are intimations from contemporary psychology and elsewhere that
even modem man is not entirely rational in his conduct, verbal and otherwise.
Once it is admitted that the treaty-making clause is not exclusive, as everyone of any
intellectual responsibility does and must admit today, the door is opened for all the nebulous
speculation which we have recited in the text and for the much more significant develop-
ments in practice which have in fact occurred.
90. See 1 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (Nugent's trans. 1823) bk. 11, c. 6,
p. 152; LocKE, Two TREATISES or CivmL GOVERNIENT § 147; 1 VAxrrL, LE DROIT DES
GENS (1758; Fenwick's trans., Carnegie Endowment ed. 1916) bk. 2, c. 12, § 154. Professor
Quincy Wright has presented a somewhat different interpretation of the eighteenth century
views, in WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AmERICAN FOREIGN RELATIoNS (1922) §§ 74-38. See
also statement of William R. Davie, who had been a delegate to the Constitutional Conven-
tion, at the North Carolina ratifying convention, 4 ELLIOT, DE.AT.ES, at 119; 3 FnR.AN-D,
REcoRns, at 347-8.
91. Compare THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 83 and 84 (Hamilton).
92. Wright, supra note 89, at 350.
It may not be amiss to call Vattel to the aid of the general conclusion. The fifteenth of
his 45 maxims of statutory interpretation reads: "Every interpretation that leads to an
absurdity ought to be rejected." DWARRIs, GENERAL TREATISE ON STATUTES (Am. ed.,
Potter, 1873) 128.
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be paid to the hidden purposes of some of the draftsmen of the docu-
ment than to the announced opinions of the delegates to the state
ratifying conventions 93-- certainly were in part motivated by an
understanding that, at least in so far as commercial arrangements were
concerned, the powers of the Congress as a whole would be concurrent
with, if not superior to, those of the Senate and President under the
treaty clause.14 It may also be recalled, to emphasize anew the practical
dilemma created by the "logical incompatibles" in the grants of the
Constitution, that the questions "Why did not the Framers make the
treaty-making clause exclusive?" and "What meaning can be given to
the grants to the Congress and the President of certain powers over
foreign affairs if they do not include the power to authorize the making
of important agreements?" are questions just as relevant as the ques-
tion why the Framers did not more explicitly state the powers of the
Congress and the President. Some light may be shed' over the darkling
waters by remembering, what has not yet been adverted to, that the
Framers, while concerned with creating a strong national government,
were conscious that there was a great deal of opposition to centraliza-
tion which would have to be propitiated to ensure ratification of the
Constitution. 'The need to propitiate the small states "-a rationale
whose contemporary invalidity is indicated in a subsequent Section "-
surely might have been adequate reason for failure to state more ex-
plicitly the scope of powers conferred on a house selected wholly on the
basis of population. Several delegates have indicated the deliberateness
with which the Convention left vague certain aspects of the new govern-
ment's power to remove objections to its ratification. Thus, Gou-
verneur Morris, one of the principal draftsmen of the final version of
the Constitution, 8 long ago indicated the equivocal nature of certain
portions of the document: ". . . it became necessary to select phrases
93. During the debate on the powers of the House in controlling foreign relations in
1796, Madison said:
"If we were to look, therefore, for the meaning of [the Constitution] beyond
the face of that instrument, we must look for it, not in the General Convention
which proposed, but in the State Conventions which accepted and ratified it."
Quoted in WARREN, op. cit. supra note 87, at 794.
94. Congressman Holland stated in 1796 that the North Carolina ratifying convention,
to which he had been a delegate, adopted the Constitution only on the understanding that
the power of the President and the Senate to make commercial treaties was limited by the
delegation to Congress of the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. 5 ANNALS OF
CONGRESS 546 (4th Cong., 1st Sess.).
95. See McLAUGHLIN, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, at 198-205; 3 FARRAND, RECORDS,
at 150 et seg., 172 et seq.; 1 ELLIOT, DEBATES, at 344-89, 480-2; 2 id. at 224.
96. See infra, Section VII.
97. Ibid.
98. See RODELL, FisY-FIVE MEN (1936) 192; Mussey, Gouierneur Morris in 13 DicT.
A. BIOG. (1934) 209,211.
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which, expressing my own notions, would not alarm others ... ."
Any'person who has ever drawn a document of any consequence re-
quiring the approval of a number of people is familiar with this neces-
sity.
The fact of final and decisive importance, however, that puts to
permanent rest these obscurities and omissions in the fundamental
document is, as we have several times indicated above, the interpreta-
tion of the people who have lived and worked under it for 150 years. It
has been their conclusion that the treaty-making procedure is neither
exclusive nor the sole recourse of the Federal Government for the mak-
ing of important international agreements. Whatever some of the
Framers may in their secret recesses have intended about the treaty-
making clause, and whatever, furthermore, the much perplexed mem-
bers of the state conventions may have thought that the Framers'in-
tended, the generations of Presidents, Supreme Court Justices, Sena-
tors, Congressmen, and plain citizens who have made our Constitu-
tion "a continuously operative charter of government" IC) and our gov-
ernment a living organism, have decreed that the Constitution confers
upon the Congress and the President all of the broad powers needed to
establish a completely adequate procedure wholly independent of the
treaty-making procedure-and considerably more responsive to ma-
jority will and the national interest--for the making and honoring of
international agreements of all kinds and of all degrees of importance.
No illusion as to the exclusiveness of the treaty-making clause, that is
at all affected by intimations of reality, can survive the fact that of
99. 1 ELLIOT, DEBATES, at 506-7 (letter to Pickering, Dec. 22, 1S14). See also remarls.
of former delegate Abraham Baldwin, 5 A,.N-A.Ls OF CONG. 537 (1796).
It may not be inappropriate to compare the language of former Chief Justice Hughes on
"legislative ambiguity": "Moreover, legislative ambiguity may at times not be wholly un-
intentional. It is not to be forgotten that important legislation sometimes shows the effect
of compromises which have been induced by exigencies in its progress, and phrases with a
convenient vagueness are referred to the courts for appropriate definition, each group in-
terested in the measure claiming that the language adopted embodies its views." Quoted
in GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCEs OF E LAw (2d ed. 1921) 173, n. 1.
The general view has been that the maxim of construction expressio vnius esi exelfisio
alterius has no validity as a canon of constitutional construction. See ThE FEDm mLisT,
No. 83 (Hamilton).
Professor Radin has offered the following cogent language: "The rule that the exPre&-
sion of one thing is the exclusion of another is in direct contradiction to the habits of Eplch
of most persons. To say that all men are mortal does not mean that all women are not, or
that all other animals are not. There is no such implication either in usage or in logic, unlezs
there is a very particular emphasis on the word men .... So far from being logical, as some
courts have called it, it illustrates one of the most fatuously simple of logical fallacies, the
'illicit major,' long the pons asinorum of schoolboys." Radin, Statutory Ivelrprcalion (1930)
43 HARv. L. REv. 863-73.,
100. Mr. Chief Justice Stone, in Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of the Wage
and Hour Division, 312 U. S. 126, 145 (1941).
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the "nearly two thousand international instruments" entered into by,
the United States between 1789 and 1939 "only some eight hundred
were made by the treaty process." 101 Even the most casual summary
must dispose of any lingering, oligarchical hope that these'some twelve
hundred international agreements other than "treaties" have been
confined to matters of unimportance or of Presidential whim. " 'Impor-
tance' and 'dignity,' " Professor Quincy Wright has written, "are hard
words to define, but the United States annexed Texas and Hawaii,
ended the first world -war, joined the International Labor Organization,
the Universal Postal Union and the Pan American Union, settled over
ten billion dollars worth of post-World-War I debts, acquired Atlantic
naval bases in British territory during World War II, acquired all
financial claims of the Soviet Union in the United States, joined the
United Nations pledging itself not to make separate peace in world
war II and to accept the Atlantic Charter, submitted over a score of
cases to international arbitration, and modified the tariff in numerous
reciprocal trade agreements, by means other than the treaty-making
process." 102
The Powers of Congress.
The powers of the whole Congress to authorize or sanction inter-
national agreements are as broad as its general legislative powers to
frame policies for the control of the international affairs of our govern-
ment and people. The most strikingly relevant of these powers have
already been quoted above. 03 A long line of precedents establishes
that within the range of these powers, "the treaty-making power to
the contrary notwithstanding," the Congress may authorize the Presi-
dent to deal with other governments "by negotiation and agreement"
and can assure the President that any agreements he makes will not
only become the law of the land but will also receive all necessary im-
plementation. 104 As we have seen, in the first decades of our national
101. Wright, supra note 89, at 344.
102. Id. at 343.
103. Supra, pp. 217-8.
104. The quoted words are from CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORoANIZA-
TIoN (1944) 44.
Under the "necessary and proper" clause the powers of the Congress to implement valid
agreements are plenary.
The full constitutional role of Congress in the making of international agreements some-
times escapes even writers predisposed to favor executive agreements because of the com-
mon failure to distinguish all the steps that are involved in "making" an agreement. Thus,
Mr. McClure, following the passage from Professor John Bassett Moore analysed above in
Section II, has written: "The making of agreements with other countries is an executive
function and hence, under the Constitution, vested wholly in the President." McCLUR,
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, at 332. Elsewhere he finds "no original Constitutional authority
in Congress" to "authorize" the making of international agreements "unless, indeed, 'au-
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existence, some interpreters, such as Jefferson and Madison, even took
the position that these powers of the whole Congress were exclusive of
the treaty-making procedure and that that procedure could not be
utilized to ratify international agreements dealing with "subjects of
legislation" confided to the Congress."' "This last exception is denied
by some on the ground that it would leave very little matter for the
treaty power to work on. The less the better, say others." "I 1hile
practice under the Constitution has not substantiated this early con-
tention that treaties may not trench into the area of Congressional
power,107 it has confirmed beyond doubt the corollary proposition that
the treaty-making power is no barrier to Congressional authorization
or sanction of agreements."'
The first authorization of Congressional-Executive agreements de-
veloped under a clause of the Constitution which at first glance appears
thorize' simply means that Congress proposes not to use its power in contradiction"; and
he suggests that this now acknowledged power of Congress has its legal basis merely in
"constitutional usage." Id. at 372. It is true, as we have indicated above, that the Con-
gress has no power to "make agreements" in the sense of conducting negotiations, and that
the President needs no authorization in this respect. But the Congress has a considerably
more important role in the total process of "making" international agreements than that of
merely proposing "not to use its power in contradiction." As we indicate in the text, it can
shape policies on subject matters within its powers, it can make agreements effected in
accordance with these policies the law of the land, and it can provide any necessary im-
plementation. Whether these powers are based on interpretation of the language of the Con-
stitution or on usage is, strictly, a matter of concern only for rhetoricians, but it may le
recalled, as we have shown in the text, that any other interpretation of the express powers
of the Congress makes them completely quixotic. Mr. McClure is more discerning when
he writes (at page 353) that, on certain assumptions, "the executive agreement, 'authorized'
or confirmed by Congress, becomes an instrument that must be regarded as more con-
servative and constitutionally better substantiated than the treaty" and that in "actual
practice, congressional 'authorization,' as in the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, enables
Congress to dictate the terms within which negotiations must be confirmed and hence to
participate in a very direct way in the actual conduct of international relations."
105. See JEFFERSON, MANUAL OF PARLMENTARY PRACTICE (1797-1801) § 52; see also
Gallatin's-remarks during the debate on the Jay Treaty of 1795, 5 ANNALs OF CoNG. 465
et seg. (4th Cong., 1st Sess., 1796) and Madison's remarks, id. at 487-95. See also note 94
supra.
The House of Representatives has several times adopted resolutions declaring that it
would be unconstitutional for the President to make treaties modifying the provisions of
tariff acts, unless pursuant to legislation, approved by both houses. See 2 HiNDs, PnRcz-
DENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1907) 989; H. R. REP. No. 1848, 48th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1884) 1; H. R. REP. No. 4177, 49th Cong., 2d Sess. (1887); but see H. R. R'.
No. 225,46th Cong., 3d Sess. (1880).
106. JEFFERSON, loc. cit. supra note 105.
107. In pursuance of his interpretation, Jefferson at first proposed to submit the Lou-
isiana Purchase agreement with France to Congress, but was dissuaded by his cabinet on
the grounds of political necessity. See HAYDEN, TAE SENATE AND TREATIES, 1789-1817
(1920) 139; 5 MooRE, DIGEST, at 225. This was one of the earliest Presidential iterations of
the interchangeability of agreements and treaties.
108. See Wright, supra note 89, at 341, n. 3.
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to pertain to purely domestic problems. Article I, Section 8 empowers
Congress to "establish post offices and post roads," As early as 1792,
Congress interpreted this language to include the power to enact
legislation authorizing the Postmaster General to make agreements
with foreign nations for reciprocal deliyery of mailed matter."' Numer-
ous analogous statutes have been enacted in subsequent years, under
authority of which more than 300 postal conventions have been nego-
tiated. 10 The courts have held that these conventions were "part of the
law of the land," 1I just as treaties are under Article VI of the Consti-
tution. There is thus evidence dating from. Washington's first adminis-
tration of a "contemporaneous construction" that the treaty-making
power is not an exclusive pre-emption of the right to make inter-
national agreements." 2
The administrations of President Washington and John Adams
furnish two striking examples of situations where authority over
specific problems was asserted concurrently under the treaty-making
power and the grants of legislative authority to Congress. In 1795 the
Jay Treaty with England was. submitted to the Senate by Washington.
The following year legislation was introduced in the House authorizing
appropriations to effectuate certain portions of the Treaty. Although
concurring in Washington's assertion that it had no right to participate
in the making of treaties,"1 the House asserted that it was not bound
to pass implementing legislation, because of its "constitutional right
and duty . . . to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of
carrying such Treaty into effect . ," "4 The House, although
generally passing appropriation acts or other legislation incidental to
previously ratified treaties, has never receded from the position taken
in 1796 115 under the leadership of Madison and Gallatin."'
Previous to the adoption of the Constitution several treaties and
109. 1 STAT. 236 (1792).
110. Seeinfra, p. 277.
111. See Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U. S. 215, 217 (1882); United States v. 18 Packages
of Dental Instruments, 222 Fed. 121, 124 (E. D. Pa. 1915).
112. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of uniform "con-
temporaneous constructions" in interpreting the language of the Constitution. Cooley v.
Port of Philadelphia, 53 U. S. 299, 315 (1851). It has also been held that they sanction an
interpretation of the Constitution different from that which might otherwise be reached by
the ordinary canons of interpretation. Ware v. United States, 4 Wall. 617 (U. S. 1866);
The Laura, 114 U. S. 411 (1885).
113. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 767 (1796); t RICHARDSON, MESSAGES, at 194-6.
114. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 771 (1796).
115. See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1871) 835; CRANDALL, TREATIES, at 165
et seq.; 5 MOORE, DIGEST,, at 224, 232; RoBINSoN, A HISTORY OF Two RECIPROciTY TREA-
TIES (1904) 164; 171-2; Burr, The Treaty-Making Power of the United States (1912) 51 Pioc.
Ami. Pnm. Soc. 271,289, 291.
116. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 465, 488, 767, 778 (1796); see also McLAUG LIN, CON-
STITUTIONAL HISTORY, at 258-61; 1 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 483.
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an alliance had been consummated with France; 117 these instruments
had become "the law of the land" under Article VI. Yet in 1798,
when war with France seemed imminent and it was decided to abrogate
the treaties, the procedure was adopted of enacting a resolution of
denunciation by majority vote in both houses 113 instead of submitting
a resolution for approval by two-thirds vote of the Senate. This course
was approved by President Adams and sanctioned in a series of court
decisions.119 Since there is no provision of the Constitution which can
be construed as authorizing Congress to terminate treaties by enact-
ment of a statute, the 1798 resolutions furnish what is perhaps the
first example of the assertion of residual Congressional authority to
legislate in the field of foreign relationsY-D Subsequent Congresses con-
tinued to assert the power to abrogate treaties by joint resolution of
both houses.' 2 1
There is, moreover, at least one important area which in later years
was completely closed to the treaty-maling power by Congressional
legislation. During the first eight decades of government under the
Constitution, agreements with Indian tribes were made exclusively by
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate; ,22 such
treaties comprised a substantial proportion of the total number ratified
during these years. 2 3 Yet by an act adopted in 1871 it was provided
117. 2 MILLER, TREATIES, at 3,35,45, 158.
118. 1STAr.578 (1798).
119. See The Eliza, 4 Dall. 37 (U. S. 1800); Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259, 272 (U. S.
1817); Hooper, Adm'r v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408, 416 (1887).
In the Hooper case, 22 Ct. Cf. at 416, the court said in part: "As to the p2riod after
July 7, 1798: On that date the abrogating act passed by the Congress was approved by the
President and became a law within the jurisdiction of the Constitution; a law replacing to
that extent the treaties, and binding upon all subordinate agents of the nation, including its
courts, but not necessarily'final as the annulment of an existing contract between two
sovereign powers."
120. Seeinfra, pp.255-61.
121. See, e.g., 9 STAT. 109 (1846); 13 STAT. 566 (1865); 36 STT. 83 (1909); 38 STAT.
1184 (1915);41 ST.T. 1007 (1920).
122. 5 MOORE, DIGEST, at 220-1.
123. See HAYE N, THE SENATE AND TREkTrES, 1789-1817 (1920) 1,4, 11-16,21-39,95-
100,133.
124. REv. STAT. § 2079 (1877), 25 U. S. C. § 71 (1940). The debates on the adoption of
this legislation furnish an interesting example of the assertion of concurrent powers in the
field of foreign relations. It was conceded that the Congress as such was powerlezs to inter-
fere with the making of any particular treaty; however, the position was taken that, despite
the absence of an explicit constitutional ground of power, Congress was authorized to deter-
mine whether the Indian tribes were or were not independent nations with which treaties
could be made. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. (1871) 763-5;id. at 1821-5. The fictional
nature of the rationalization is evidenced by the fact that the power to recognize foreign
governments has generally been treated as an executive prerogative. 1 Moorx, DIGEsT, at
244 et seq.; WRIGHT, Tam CONTROL OF A3IERIC.N FOREIGN RELATIONS (1922) § 194,
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that no future agreements should be consummated by treaties; 124 this
limitation was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court. 125
The full record of how the Congress throughout our history has
employed its various powers to promote, authorize, and sanction the
making of international agreements for securing the multitudinous
interests of our people is an impressive demonstration of how demo-
cratic procedures can be made to work for the national interest. Some
indication of this record will be given under functional sub-headings in
the next Section of this article. It may not be inappropriate, however,
to make specific reference here to one of the more important powers,
the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations." It has long
been considered by representatives of both parties that this particular
grant of power to Congress extends to the authorization of reciprocal
trade compacts, as well as numerous other types of agreements dealing
with commercial problems.'26 This interpretation of the Constitution
was upheld by the Supreme Court in Field v. Clark 127 and B. Altman &
Company v. United States.2 8 In the latter case, Mr. Justice Day stated:
"We think that the purpose of Congress was manifestly to per-
mit rights and obligations of that character to be passed upon in the
Federal court of final resort, and that matters'of such vital impor-
tance, arising out of opposing constructions of international com-
pacts, sometimes involving the peace of nations, should be subject
to direct and prompt review by the highest court of the Nation.
While it may be true that this commercial agreement, made under
authority of the Tariff Act of 1897, § 3, was not a treaty possessing
the dignity of one requiring ratification by the Senate of the United
States, it was an international compact, negotiated between the
representatives of two sovereign nations and made in the name
and on behalf of the contracting countries, and dealing with impor-
tant commercial relations between the two countries, and was
proclaimed by the President. If not technically a treaty requiring
ratification, nevertheless it was a compact authorized by the Con-
gress of the United States, negotiated and proclaimed under the
authority of its President." 129
It fieeds no emphasis that the area within which Congress may use
its expressly delegated powers to authorize or sanction the making of
international agreements is very broad. The contemporary judicial
constructions of the compass of such Congressional powers as those
125. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94 (1884).
126. For excellent general discussion, see [Congressman] Kefauver, The Trade Agree-
ments Act and the Constitution (1943) 17 TENN. L. REV. 846; Hackworth, Legal Aspects of
the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 (1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 570.
127. 143 U. S. 649 (1892).
128. 224 U.S. 583 (1912).
129. Id. at 601.
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over war and commerce are matters of common knowledge.",2 It is
also of common knowledge that it is becoming increasingly difficult to
130. The present scope of the war power is reflected in the First and Second War Powers
Acts. 55 STAT. 838 (1941), 50 U.S. C. A. app. § 601 (1944); 56STA r. 156 (1942), S0 U. S. C.A.
app. § 631 (1944). In Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 b. S. 81, 93 (1942), Mr. Chief
Justice Stone speaking for the Court said:
"The war power of the national government is 'the power to wage war suc-
cessfully.' See Charles Evans Hughes, WVar Powers Under the Constitution, 42
A. B. A. Rep. 232, 238. It extends to every matter and activity so related to war as
substantially to affect its conduct and progress. The power is not restricted to the
winning of victories in the field and the repulse of enemy forces. It embraces
every phase of the national defense, including the protection of wr materials and
the members of the armed forces from injury and from the dangers which attend
the rise, prosecution and progress of war. Since the Constitution commits to the
Executive and to Congress the exercise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and
conditions of warfare, it has necessarily given them wide scope for the exercise of
judgment and discretion in determining the nature and extent of the threatened
injury or danger and in the selection of the means for resisting it. Where, as they
did here, the conditions call for the exercise of judgment and discretion and for the
choice of means by those branches of the Government on which the Constitution
has placed the responsibility of war-making, it is not for any court to sit in review
of the wisdom of their action or substitute its judgment for theirs." (Citations
omitted.)
Cf. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146 (1919); Bowles v.
Willingham, 321 U. S. 503 (1944); Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944); Shreveport
Engraving Co. v. United States, 143 F. (2d) 222 (C. C. A. 5th, 1944); Ken-Rad Tube &
Lamp Corp. v. Badeau, 55 F. Supp. 193 (W. D. Ky. 1944); CoRvN, TIE PREsmEi., at
191; Notes (1944) 20 N. Y. U. L. Q. REy. 102, (1941) 41 COL. L. RE%. 1039; Dodd, The
Constitution-1787 and Today (1944) 20 IND. L. J. 55.
Yet these interpretations do not extend materially beyond that given to the Constitu-
tion by Lincoln. See RANDALL, CONSTrrfxoNAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (1926) espe-
cially c. 2.
The present scope of Congress's power over domestic commerce is indicated by the
decision in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942), which sustained "federal power to
regulate production of goods" not "intended in any part for commerce but wholly for con-
sumption on the farm." Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for a unanimous court, rid:
"Whether the subject of the regulation in question was 'production,' 'con-
sumption,' or 'marketing' is, therefore, not material for purposes of deciding the
question of federal power before us. That an activity is of local character may help
in a doubtful case to determine whether Congress intended to reach it. The same
consideration might help in determining whether in the absence of Congressional
action it would be permissible for the state to exert its power on the subject mat-
ter, even though in so doing it to some degree affected interstate commerce. But
even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as com-
merce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a sub-
stantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether
such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or
'indirect.' "
Cf. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U. S. 533 (1944); Powell,
Insurance as Commerce, in Constitution and Statute (1944) 57 HARv. L. Rav. 937; Note
(1944) 44 CoL. L. REV. 772; Comment (1942) 42 COL. L. Rav. 1333.
The recent decisions are within the tradition as to the proper scope of the clause estab-
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divide effective control over foreign and domestic affairs if we are to
have more prosperity and less depression, or to divide effective control
over war and peace if we are to have less war and more peace. Striking
recognition of these interdependences of contemporary life was em-
bodied in the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941,131 empowering the
President to make agreements, in accordance with Congressional
policies, of the most far-reaching effect for both war and peace and for
both domestic and foreign affairs. It can confidently be expected that
when the exigencies of the unforeseeable future demand analogous
fusions of the legislative and Presidential po-;&ers, for vital national pur-
poses, the language of the Constitution will be found sufficiently flexible
to meet the needs of government.
The Powers of the President.
Under the Constitution the powers of the President to make impor-
tant international agreements other than treaties are twofold. He has
lished by Chief Justice Marshall [see FRANKFURTER, Tm COMMERCE CLAUSE (1937) c. 1],
and preserve the definition of "commerce" current in the days of the "Founding Fathers."
See HAMILTON AND ADAIR, THE POWER TO GOVERN (1937).
131. 55 STAT. 31 (1941), 22 U. S. C. A. § 411 (Supp. 1944), renewed by 57 STAT. 20
(1943) and 58 STAT. 222 (1944), 22 U. S. C. A. § 412 (Supp. 1944).
In Executive Agreements at 672, n. 32, Professor Borchard has suggested that the Con-
"gress in its 1944 renewal of the Lend-Lease Act "voted unanimously for the Wadsworth
Amendment to prohibit the President from making post-war economic or millitary commit-
ments to any nations in the final Lend-I ease settlements 'except in accordance with estab-
lished constitutional procedure.' " Section 3(b) of the Lend-Lease Act as approved by the
House, in its renewal, read as follows.V(Wadsworth Amendment in italics):
"The terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government receives
anlr aid authorized under subsection (a) shall be those which the President deems
satisfactory, and the benefit to the United States may be payment or repayment in
kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems
satisfactory: Provided, however, That nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to
authorize the President in any final settlement to assume or incur any obligations on
the part of the United States with respect to post-war economic policy, post-war military
policy, or any post-war policy involving international relations except in accordance
with established constitutional procedure."
As Professor Borchard indicates, the Senate later struck out the .words "in any final settle-
ment" and the House concurred.
These words of the Congress must be read with some care. The only "commitments"
by the President that they prohibit are those that "assume or incur any obligations on the
part of the United States" with reference to the three stated policies and which are not "i
accordance with established constitutional procedure." In its classic 1943 report on the
extention of the Lend-Lease Act, H. R. REI'. No. 188, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 14, tile
Foreign Affairs Committee of the House offers clear explanation of what it meant by the
Wadswbrth Amendment:
"The proposals for forward action in the economic field . . . must be handled
in accordance with the normal course of our constitutional procedure, by statutes,
treaties, or executive agreements, as may prove proper. The powers of the Senate
in the field of treaties are unimpaired, as are those of the Congress in the field of
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his own powers, independent of those of the Congress, as "the Execu-
tive," "the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy," and "the sole
organ of the government" in the conduct of international negotia-
tions.132 He may also act under the authorization of Congress within
the scope of its powers. Under his own powers, the President may con-
legislation. Section 3(b) of the act clarifies the President's essential Esecutive
powers in the administration of the lend-lease program."
From a long-term perspective the important point is, however, that, whatever the
meaning of the Wadsworth Amendment, the constitutional power that can decree the policy
and the procedures for the making of the Lend-Lease agreements can also decree the policy
and the procedures for their settlement.
132. See generally MCCLURE, EXECUTIVE AGRF!IENrs, cc. 9, 10; Corwnw, ThE PPreS-
DENT, c. 6; CORWIN, THE CONsTrION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION (1944) 38; Wright, TI:e
United States and Intermulional Agreements (1944) 33 Am. J. Is-r. L. 341; BERn.um,, Tnu
WAR PowERs OF THE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES (1921) 2; Jon(-, Thc President,
Congress, and Foreign Relations (1941) 29 C,%LIF. L. REv. 565; Foley, Same Aspects of Mle
ConstitutionidPowers of the President (1941) 27 A. B.A.J. 485.
Two clear and definitive summaries have been made by Mr. Justice Sutherland. The
first is from the opinion of the Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U. S.
304,319 (1936):
"It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an
authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with
such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the Presi-
dent as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international rela-
tions-a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress,
but which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in
subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution. It is quite apparent
that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassmeht-
perhaps serious embarrassment-is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved,
congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and
inquiry within the international field must often accord to the Preident a degree
of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible
were domestic affairs alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congrcss, has the better
opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and espa-
cially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He
has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials. Secrecy in
respect of information gathered by them may be highly necessary, and the pre-
mature disclosure of it productive of harmful results."
The second is from the opinion of the Court in United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324,330
(1937), and refers to direct Presidential agreements:
"The recognition, establishment of diplomatic relations, the aZaignment, and
agreements with respect thereto, were all parts of one transaction, resulting in an
international compact between the two governments. That the negotiations,
acceptance of the assignment and agreements and understandings in respct
thereof were within the competence of the President may not be doubted. Govern-
mental power over internal affairs is distributed between the national government
and the several states. Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed,
but is vested exclusively in the national government. And in respect of what was
done here, the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of that govern-
ment. The assignment and the agreements in connection therewith did not, as in
the case of treaties, as that term is used in the treaty making clause of the Con-
stitution (Art. II, § 2), require the advice and consent of the Senate."
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duct negotiations with other governments upon all subject matters,
and upon a subject matter within the scope of his own powers he may
conclude agreements, in accordance with his own policies, and make
these agreements the law of the land, implementing them to the full
extent that his powers permit.'33 It has been suggested by distinguished
scholars that this power of the President is "plenary," 134 and "that he
can make international agreements on any subject whatever, limited
only by the qualification that he ought not to engage the good faith
of the United States to something which may not be carried out." "I
It is not necessary, however, in order to make it clear that the United
States possesses a completely adequate procedure, independent of the
treaty-making procedure and more responsive to democratic control
and to the national interest, for making important international agree-
ments, to come to a conclusion on this point. What is completely cer-
tain is that the powers of the Congress can be 6uperadded to those of
the President, and that the two sets of powers taken together are
plenary.
It may be helpful to review the specific powers of the President and
to note some of the more important instances in which he has acted
under authorization of Congress. With respect to specific agreements,
it is often impossible, of course, to tell under which of his specific pow-
ers the President was acting or even whether he was acting under his
own powers or those of the Congress. A more complete review of the
precedents will, accordingly, be presented under functional sub-
headings in the next Section.
1. "Commander-in-Chief." As the Supreme Court has pointed out
the President's expressly granted power to act as Commander-in-Chief
of the Army and Navy 136 necessarily includes authority to make agree-
133. Professor Borchard concedes that "History provides numerous examples of the use
of the Presidential prerogative through executive agreements with foreign governments."
Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 673. "It is only," he insists, "agreements of a more im-
portant character, involving future commitments, that encroach upon the treaty-making.
power of the Senate." (Id. at 674.) Lesser "examples of the President's exercise of the
power" are either explained as "illustrations of the day-to-day activities of the govern.
ment" or found justifiable "in so far as they touch questions which properly are the subject
of treaties .. .on the ground that the Senate has acquiesced . . . ." (Id. at 674.) One
wonders again, on Professor Borchard's theories of constitutional interpretation, whence
comes this Senatorial power of '"acquiescence."
134. MCCLURE, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, at 330.
135. Wright, supra note 132, at 348. See also Wright, Constitutional Procedure in the
United States for Carrying out Obligations for Military Sanctions (1944) 38 Am. J. INT. L.
678; Wright, The Lend-Lease Bill and International Law (1941) 35 AM. J. INT. L. 305.
136. U. S. CONST. Art. II, § 2, par. 1. See generally BERDAHL, op. Cit. supra note 132,
cc. 1, 2. See also White, The War Powers of the President [19431 Wis. L. REV. 265, Gilmore,
War Power-Executive Power and the Constitution (1944) 29 IowA L. REV. 463; Franklin,
War Power of the President: An Historical Justification of Mr. Roosevelt's Message of Septem-
ber 7,1942 (1942) 17 TULANE L. REV. 217.
[Vol. 54 :181
TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
ments with foreign nations to protect the military security of the
United States, both in time of vwar and of peace.", Thus, in time of
peace, Presidents have assumed power to make compacts providing for
the limitation of armaments, 13 for joint activity with other nations in
providing for common defense,'3 9 and for the passage through the
United States of foreign troops.10 The Boxer Protocol of 1900 141 in_
dicates that once it has been found necessary to send military forces
overseas to safeguard American interests, the President acquires broad
powers to enter into agreements which may avert the necessity for
future armed intervention.
It needs no emphasis in the days of Yalta and its predecessors that
during war-time the necessity for utilization of the President's pow-
ers to make agreements is obviously increased. In addition to purely
military arrangements, this authority subsumes the consummation
of armistice provisions-which in the case of the preliminary peace
protocol with Spain of 1898 resulted in an immediate transfer of
suzerainty over Puerto Rico and an agreement to relinquish all claims
to Cuba' 42-and the settlement of financial claims against hostile or
allied powers. 143
2. To "Receive Ambassadors and Other Public Ministers." The power
to determine when to recognize foreign governments 14a is supported by
the corollary power to make agreements settling outstanding griev-
ances at the time of recognition. The most important example is the
Litvinov assignment of 1934, by which the United States acquired
Russian-owned assets located in this country. The Supreme Court has
137. See Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424,435 (1901).
138. The most famous example is the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 limiting naval
armaments on the Great Lakes. President Monroe did not think Senatorial approval of the
Agreement was requisite, but six months after its execution, when inquiries had been made
by Great Britain, submitted to the Senate the question of whether its advice and consent was
needed. The Agreement was approved by the Senate by a two-thirds majority. However,
most commentators have treated it as an executive agreement, since ratifications were never
exchanged. See generally H. R. Doc. No. 471, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (1900).
139. Two important recent examples are the Canadian-American defense agreement of
August 1940 (see N. Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1940, p. 1, col. 3; N. Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1940, p. 1,
col. 1) and the bases-destroyer deal with Great Britain of September 1940. N. Y. Times,
Sept. 4, 1940, p. 1, col. 5. Attorney-General Jackson's opinion as to the legality of the agree-
Xnent is reprinted in N. Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1940, p. 16.
140. See Simpson, Legal Aspects of Execulire Agreements (1938) 24 Iow, L. REv. 67,
81-2;1 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 1144.
141. Seeinfra, pp. 280-1, and Part II, Section VIII.
142. See BERID.m., op. cit. supra note 132, at 233-4.
143. See infra, pp. 269,278-9.
144. U. S. CoNsT. Art. II, § 3. In 1794 Washington made the classic statement of the
traditional position that the President's powers in this field are not subject to Congrcssional
control. See CoRwiN, THE PRESIDENT, at 213; see also 7 Ors. ArT'Y GEN. 189,209 (Cushing,
1855); 4 MooRE, DIGEST, at 484-549.
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twice upheld the validity of the assignment in language which em-
bodied a broad recognition of the President's capacity to make execu-
tive agreements. 145
' 3. "He Shall Take Care That the Laws Be Faithfully Executed." 140
Early in the nineteenth century,. Attorney General Wirt interpreted
this clause as referring not only to the Constitution, statutes, and
treaties, but also to. all "those general laws of nations which govern the
intercourse between the United States and foreign nations." 147 This
interpretation appears to have been sanctioned by dicta of the Su-
preme Court in the Neagle case in 1890.148
An important aspect of the President's powers under this clause
is the authority. to enter into agreements which supplement or mod-
ify treaties;"4 " but *the clause equally sanctions agreements which
are necessary to fulfil other, international obligations of the United
States.'&'
4. "The Executive Power Shall Be Vested in a President of the United
States of America." At the very first session of Congress, a controversy
arose as to whether the vesting of "the executive power" in the Presi-
dent was an affirmative grant of power or mere introductory language.
The controversy was precipitated by the debate as to the power of the
President to remove officers who, under the Constitution, could be
appointed only with the consent of the Senate. 151 The controversy
broke out again-this time with reference to the international powers
of.the President-in 1793, when Washington issued a proclamation of
neutrality at the outbreak of war between England and France. 1 2
The Congressional participants in these debates displayed the
common political dexterity at shifting their ideologies in response to
immediate political objectives. Thus Madison who had argued strongly
in 1789 that the opening clause of Article II was a great reservoir of
. 145. United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U. S.
203 (1942). The dissenting opinions in these cases are not concerned so much with the
authority of the President to enter into agreements of this general character as with the
.correctness of the majority's interpretation of the Litvinov assignment.
.146. U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 3.
147. 1 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 566,570-1 (1822).
148. Jnre Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64.
149. See supra, p. 205.
150. Thus this clause furnishes an alternate source of authority for the Boxer Protocol of
1900. Seeinfra, pp. 280-1, and Part II, Section VIII.
151. See 1 ANNALs OF CONG. 462-3, 474, 481-2, 497, 515-9 (1st Cong., 1st Ses., 1789).
152. See CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1917) 7-32;
6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON (Hunt, ed., 1906) 138 el seg.
The 1793 proclarhation had threatened that citizens violating its provisions would be
subject to criminal prosecution. One such conviction was sustained by a United States
circuit court. onwhich sat Justices Wilson and Iredell of the Supreme Court. Henfield's
Case, 11 Fed. Cas. 1099, No. 6,360 (C. C. Pa. 1793).
[Vol. 54: 181
TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
executive power held in 1793, when his desire to befriend the French
Republic impelled him to look with disfavor upon Washington's
Neutrality Proclamation,' 53 that it was mere tautology."'
These constitutional tergiversations were not matched in executive
deportment. When in power, both the Federalists and the Democrat-
Republicans found it essential that the President should exercise
powers which are nowhere granted in the Constitution and which
can be justified only by acceptance of Madison's original theory as
to the proper construction of Article II. The initial examples are
furnished in the administration of George Washington. The same
section of the Constitution which contains the permissive authority
to make treaties provides that the President "by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls . . . ." There is no provision in the Constitu-
tion authorizing the President to appoint envoys without Senatorial
approval. 55 Yet at least four times during his tenure of office Presi-
dent Washington on his own initiative appointed "commissioners
plenipotentiary" or "agents" to negotiate treaties."' The first of these
"extra-constitutional" appointments was made as early as October
1789. In at least two of these instances, Congress subsequently in-
dicated its approval of the President's construction of the Constitution
by appropriating funds to defray the expenses of the executive agents.
John Adams, the second President of the United States, carried the
process of broad construction of the "executive power" a step further
in 1799 when he authorized his Secretary of State to enter into a con-
vention with the Dutch minister, to settle private American claims
against the Netherlands. 5 7 When a member of the House of Repre-
sentatives in 1800, John Marshall indicated the constitutional basis for
153. For general background see 1 lOSON .AND COu AGER, GROWtxx OF TIM AMetI-
CAN REPUBLIC (1937 ed.) 249-50; FIsH, A, sErac DiPLOmICY (1938 ed.) 99-103.
154. MuADisoN, loc. cit. supra note 152. Jefferson thought the proclamation xwas con-
stitutional although disagreeing with some of the arguments by which Hamilton substan-
dated this exercise of executive power. See CoRvN, THE PRESME.T, at 211; 6 WMurz;GS
oF THomAS JEFFERSON (Ford, ed., 1899) 33S.
155. True, Article II, Section 2, clause 2 authorizes Congress to vest the appointment of
"inferior officers" in the President alone, or in the heads of departments, but no act au-
thorizing general Presidential appointment of envoys to foreign governments has even been
passed, nor are such emissaries generally considered to be "inflrior officers."
156. In 1789 Gouverneur Morris as designated special envoy to negotiate a commercial
treaty with Great Britain. 1 RICHARDSON, MrESSAGES, at 96. In 1791 Colonel Humphreys
was sent to ladrid and Lisbon on a similar mission. Id. at 9Z-8. In 1792 Admiral John
Paul Jones was appointed special envoy to the Bey of Algiers. See WhiuouT, THE CONnoL
OF AimsscAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1922) 328. In 1795 Colonel Humphreys and Jozeph
Donaldson were appointed agents to negotiate vith the Algerian government. See also
speech of Senator Livingston of Louisiana, in 1831. 11 BEnNoNABRwmG!=ET at221-2.
157. 5 MILLER, TREATIES, at 1075. Negotiations for the adjustment of these claims
had been commenced during Washington's administration.
19451
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the consummation of direct Presidential agreements, in language
echoed 136 years later by the United States Supreme Court: 165 "The
President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and
its sole representative with foreign nations." 169
In discussing domestic problems, the Anti-Federalist Presidents
continued to espouse the thesis that the Executive (like the Federal
Government as a whole) possessed only limited powers. 10 But their
views as to the control of foreign relations were cut from a different
pattern. When Secretary of State in 1793, Jefferson had declared that
"the transaction of business with foreign nations is executive alto-
gether," 161 and the historical record indicates that few Presidents have
expanded the notion of executive leadership as much as Jefferson and
his disciples and immediate successors. 1 2 In addition to retaining in
the Presidential domain the various powers claimed by Washington
and Adams, 163 the Democrat-Republican administrations pre-empted
for the Executive authority to deal with numerous novel problems
which arose in the first decades of the nineteenth century. One exam-
ple came in the first year of Jefferson's first term.
Article I, Section 8, clause 11 of the Constitution authorizes Con-
gress "to declare war"; while the President is made the Commander-
in-Chief of the Army and Navy, he is given no authority to embark
upon any sort of offensive operations. Yet in 1801 President Jefferson
dispatched a naval squadron to the Mediterranean to protect American
shipping from Tripolitan depredations; 164 several engagements were
fought before Congressional approval was solicited or obtained,16
Upon this cornerstone was erected the doctrine that the Executive has
authority on his own initiative to use diplomatic pressures or military
forces to protect the extraterritorial interests of American citizens.
There are more than 100 examples of the use, on direct Presidential
responsibility, of limited American military or naval contingents out-
side the territorial borders of the United States to protect American
interests.'66
158. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,320 (1936).,
159. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800).
160. See SMALL, SOME PRESIDENTIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY (1932) 20-5.
161. Quoted in CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1917)
203; see also 4 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Washington, ed., 1854) 84,90.
162. See SMALL, loc. cit. supra note 160.
163. Thus Monroe resumed Washington's practice of appointing direct Presidential
envoys to foreign governments. 4 MOORE, DIGEST, at 452-3.
164. See 3 McMaster, HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES (1897) 201
el seg.; 1 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES, at 326 el seq.
165. 2 STAT. 129 (1802).
166. See statements by Senator Austin and Professor Wright in U. S. News, Nov. 3,
1944, pp. 37-8.
Incomplete lists of uses of our forces in Latin America without Congressional authoriza.
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During this same era the arbitration of claims against other nations
was pre-empted as an executive function. Thus in 1835 President Jack-
son-conventionally considered to have been a strict constructionist-
vetoed an act authorizing composition of claims against the King of
the Two Sicilies on the grounds that the President was authorized to
proceed on his own initiative.6 7
As previously intimated, in Monroe's first administration one of the
most important executive agreements in American history was con-
summated: the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 providing for perma-
nent limitation of naval armaments on the Great Lakes.1t3 The enun-
ciation of the Monroe Doctrine-extending the protection of the
United States to almost a score of other republics and constituting in
part a limited alliance with Great Britain "0 -is a more dramatic
example of Presidential leadership. We are thus furnished by the con-
duct of the first and immediately succeeding Presidents with a con-
sistent "contemporaneous construction" 1"0 that Article II of the Con-
stitiition vested in the Executive a general power to make agreements
or in other ways take independent action in the field of international
affairs.
Subsequent Presidents have continued to act on the theory that
they were charged with the responsibility of representing the interests
of the United States in international affairs and of enforcing the inter-
national obligations owed to the United States even in the absence of
explicit constitutional or statutory grants of power. We have already
referred to the protection of extraterritorial property and interests of
American citizens,' 7 ' which has been judicially described as an execu-
tive function. 72 To this may be added the action of various Presidents
in granting commercial rights to foreign enterprises 17- in the absence of
statutory authorizations.
tion are contained in 2 MooRE, DIGEST, at 202 el seq. (covering period before 1905) and in 2
HAcKo RTH, DIGEST, at 282 el seq. (covering 1905 to 1940).
For general discussion of this topic see CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTIrOL OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS (1917) 131-63; NVRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AmERIca FOREiG!. RLATIO.-S
(1922) §§ 151, 209-10,214-24; BERDAUL, op. cit. supra note 132.
The relevance of this power of the President will appear more clearly in the dicu sion
in Section VIII of the proposed world security organization.
167. 3 RicHARDSON, MESSAGES, at 146. The notion that the Executive has ePxcluzive
control over the settlement of international private claims has, however, yielded in favor of a
doctrine of coordinate control, with primary Presidential responsibility. See WRIGHT, op. Cit.
supra note 166, at §§ 143-8.
168. See note 138 supra.
169. See PERKINS, HANDS OFF: A HIsTORy OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE (1941) 38-47.
170. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the high exegetic value of such
uniform "contemporaneous constructions." See Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens of Phil.
adelphia, 12 How. 299 (U. S. 1852); Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299 (U. S. 1803).
171. See supra, p. 250, and Part II, Section VIII.
172. Durand v. Hollins, 8 Fed. Cas. 111, No. 4, 186 (C. C. S. D. N.Y. 1860).
173. See CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, at 244-5.
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The construction of the first clause of Article II as a broad grant of
residual power to the Executive ",4 was given the imprimatur of judicial
approval in 1926 in Myers v. United States.'75 Dismissing the assertion
that the presence later in the Article of specific grants of power to the
President precludes interpretation of the opening clause as a general
investiture of power, Chief Justice Taft concluded that the specific
grants merely lend emphasis "where emphasis was regarded as ap-
propriate." "I
The President as Agent of Congress.
One of the most important functions of the President in the conduct
of American foreign relations has always been his role as agent of
Congress to effectuate the purposes and administer the details of legis-
lative policy.' The antecedents of this beneficial policy of cooperation
between the arms of government are located in the first years after the
ratification of the Constitution, and many of these early delegations of
authority were phrased in the broadest conceivable language. Thus, by
an act approved on June 4, 1794, during Washington's first administra-
tion, Congress authorized the President "whenever, in his opinion, the
public safety shall so require, to lay an embargo on all ships and vessels
in the ports of the United States, or upon the ships and vessels of the
United States, or the ships and vessels of any foreign nation, under
such regulations as the circumstances of the case may require, and to
continue or revoke the same, whenever he shall think proper." 178
The statute of 1799 suspending commercial intercourse with France
authorized the President "if he shall deem it expedient and consistent
with the interest of the United States, by his order, to remit and dis-
continue, for the time being, the restraints and prohibitions afore-
said . . . and also to revoke such order [i.e., reestablish the restraints],
whenever, in his opinion the interest of the United States shall re-
quire." 17s
Analogous delegations of authority in the field of foreign relations are
contained in statutes enacted during the early Democrat-Republican
incumbencies. Numerous embargo and non-intercourse acts were
passed during the administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James
174. These actions can also be rationalized on the theory that the Federal Government
possesses "inherent" powers.
175. 272 U. S. 52 (1926). See also In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1 (1890).
176. 272 U. S. at 118.
177. For a convenient summary see CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, C. 1, and pp. 126-36.
178. 1 STAT. 372 (1794); see also 1 STAT. 401 (1794); Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 683
(1892). The Act was effective only during a stated term of years and when Congress was
not in session.
179. 1 STAT. 615 (1799). See also 1 STAT. 444 (1795); 1 STAT. 566 (1798); 2 STAT. 9
(1800).
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Madison with caveats authorizing the President to impose, modify, or
suspend their provisions. The conditions of exercise of this power were
cast in the broadest terms. Thus, by the Act of March 3, 1805,13 the
President was permitted to act "if he shall think it proper" and, by the
Act of February 28, 1806, "if he shall deem it expedient and con-
sistent with the interests of the United States." I,' In the Brig Avrora
case in 1813, the Supreme Court held that Congress had not trans-
gressed its power in authorizing the President to suspend or revive
the operation of an embargo act, in response to the degree of retal-
iatory trade policy pursued against the United States by England and
France.1 12 An almost identical decision had been rendered by a district
court five years earlier, with respect to a similar statute.133
Statutes passed in subsequent years dealing with foreign commerce
or other aspects of international relations continued to vest broad dis-
cretionary powers in the President. Mr. Justice Sutherland sum-
marized this cumulative historical record succinctly in the Cvrliss-
Wright case:
"Practically every volume of the United States statutes con-
tains one or more acts or joint resolutions of Congress authorizing
action by the President in respect of subjects affecting foreign
relations, which either leave the exercise of the power to his un-
restricted judgment, or provide a standard far more general than
that which has always been considered requisite with regard to
domestic affairs" 184
Although delegation of authority to executive officers for the express
purpose of negotiating international agreements dates back as far as
the Postal Act of 1792,185 perhaps the earliest example of the use of
broad discretionary language in such a statute came in the Postal Act
of 1872, providing that "the Postmaster-General, by and with the
advice and consent of the President may negotiate and conclude postal
treaties or conventions ...between the United States and foreign
countries." 1l Section 3 of the Tariff Act of 1897 extended the princi-
ple of broad delegation of power to make agreements to the field of
reciprocal trade arrangements; 17 in 1912, the Supreme Court found
that such compacts, "authorized by the Congress of the United States,
180. 2 STAT. 341 (1805).
181. 2 STAT. 351 (1806). See also 2 STAT. 411 (1806); 2 STAT. 490 (180S); 2 STAT. 605
(1810); 3 STAT. 361 (1817); 4 STAT. 3 (1824).
182. 7 Cranch382 (U.S. 1813).
183. United States v. The William, 28 Fed. Cas. 614, No. 16,700 (D. Mass. 1808).
184. United States v. Curtiss-Wright E~xport Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 324 (1936). For lists
of such statutes see this opinion and the earlier one in Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892).
185. 1 STAT. 239 (1792).
186. 17 STAT. 304 (1872).
187. 30 STAT. 203 (1897).
19451
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
negotiated and proclaimed under the authority of its President" were
constitutional."" The extension to the Executive of broad discretionary
powers to modify Tariff Act provisions was also specifically approved
by the Court sixteen years later in J. W. Hampton, Jr., 6 Company v.
United States.89
The declaration of the Curtiss-Wright decision that the permissible
scope of delegation in the field of foreign relations exceeds that in the
domestic sphere echoes an old doctrine of constitutional law.90 Thus
the distinction was emphasized by Chief Justice. Hughes in Panama
Refining Company v. Ryan-one of two cases in judicial history in which
a delegation of power to the Executive was held to be excessive. 9' The
greater toleration of vague standards of delegation in the field of for-
eign relations has been justified by reference to the overlapping in the
powers of the Congress and the President, Mr. Justice Sutherland com-
menting that such statutes merely confide to the President "an author-
ity which was cognate to the conduct by him of the foreign relations of
the Government." 192 Wholly apart from this not unnatural recogni-
tion of the President's independent power in the same premises, it
should be clear that the Congress can grant the broadest possible dis-
cretion to the President without running afoul of the doctrines of
Montesquieu. "The Constitution," Mr. Justice Stone has recently
observed, "viewed as a continuously operative charter of government,
is not to be interpreted as demanding the impossible or the imprac-
ticable. The essentials of the legislative function are the determination
188. B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 601 (1912).
189. 276 U. S. 394 (1928), in reference to Section 315(a) of the Tariff Act of 1922, 42
STAT. 858. A similar decision referring to the Tariff Act of 1890, 26 STAT. 567, had been
rendered in Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892). The extent of the discretion conferred by
the flexible provisions of the 1922 Act is realistically discussed in LARKIN, Ture PREsIDENT'S
CONTROL OF THE TARIFF (1936); see also McGowen, An Economic Interpretation of the
Doctrine of Delegation of Governmental Powers (1938) 12 TULANE L. REV. 179.
190. For recent reaffirmation see United States v. Boreno, 50 F. Supp. 520, 23-4
(D. Md. 1943):
"The contention is made that this unlimited power given to the President to
prohibit or curtail the exportation of anything, regardless of whether it has any
relation to the War effort, constitutes a delegation of legislative power which is
impliedly forbidden by the Constitution as expressly announced by the decisions
of the Supreme Court....
"In considering this question as to the character and extent of the delegation
of legislative power to the Executive, we must take into account the distinction
that exists between the right to challenge the delegation where it relates solely to
internal affairs and where it relates to foreign affairs, and more especially, where,
as in the present case, it relates to the powers and function of the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy in the prosecution of the war in
which our country is engaged."
191. 293 U. S. 388,421-2 (1935).
192. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 318 (1936), quoting
with approbation from Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388,422 (1935).
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of the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct." 113
It should not be difficult for the Congress to perform these "essentials
of the legislative function" on specific problems without impairing the
ability of the President to adjust the details of the nation's foreign
policy to meet the changing realities of international politics.
The Completely Comprehensive Powers of the Federal Government.
It should be obvious that the express powers of the Congress and of
the President, in terms of their contemporary construction, are broad
enough to cover the making and honoring of international agreements
on most, if not all, of the important problems of peace and war. If,
however, the occasion should ever arise when these powers are found
'not to be ample for effecting an agreement of importance, there is at
the disposal of statesmen and courts another doctrine, the doctrine of
"inherent powers" in the field of international relations, which has
had a long and honorable history of effective work in the national
interest.19 4 This doctrine has, furthermore, been expressly invoked
by the United States Supreme Court to sanction the President's mak-
ing of international agreements other than treaties. In the opinion in
the Curtiss-Wright case, that arch constitutional conservative 15 Mr.
Justice Sutherland used unwontedly blunt language to describe the
extent to which the powers of the Federal Government with respect to
international affairs transcend the specific grants of the Constitution:
"It will contribute to the elucidation of the question if we first
consider the differences between the powers of the Federal govern-
ment in respect of foreign or external affairs and those in respect of
domestic or internal affairs ...
"The two classes of powers are different, both in respect of their
origin and their nature. The broad statement that the Federal gov-
193. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of the Vage and Hour Divson, 312
U. S. 126, 145 (1941). Cf. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503 (1944); Yakus v. United
States, 321 U. S. 414; Shreveport Engraving Co., Inc. v. United States, 143 F. (2d) 222
(C. C. A. 5th, 1944); Notes (1937) 50 HARv. L. REv. 691 (1936), 36 COL. L. REV. 1162;
Comment (1935) 48 HARV. L. REv. 798; Brief for United States, Currin v. Wallace, 306
U. S. 1 (1939) as reprinted in GELLHORN, AnmixmsRATvm LAW: CASES AND ConzoiuEs
(1940) 278.
194. CoRwiN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION (1944) 17: "In the field of
foreign relaions, on the contrary, the doctrine of Enumeratpd Powers has ahays had a
difficult row to hoe, and today may be unqualifiedly asserted to be defunct." Cf. Corwin,
THE PRESIDENT, at 202; Culp, Executire Power in Emergencies (1933) 31 ,MxcH. L. REv.
1066, 1077.
Professor Borchard writes, in Book Review (1944) 4 LAWYERS GUILD REv. 59, 60, that
"the doctrine of inherent powers has been shot to death so often that it ought to have little
life left. . . ." Yet he himself, as we have seen, invokes the doctrine in an effort to dis-
tinguish the annexation of Texas by joint resolution. Commerce Comrmitlee Hearings at 134.
195.: See Mason, The Conserratire World of Mr. Justice Sutherland (1938) 32 At. PoL
Sci. REv. 443.
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ernment can exercise no powers except those specifically enum-
erated in the Constitution, and such implied powers . . is
categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs ... "
"It results that the investment of the Federal government with
the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the
affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and
wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplo-
matic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been
mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the Federal
government as necessary concomitants of nationality. Neither
the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any
force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens (see
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347, 356); and
operations of the nation in such territory must be governed by
treaties, international understandings and compacts, and the prin-
ciples of international law. As a member of the family of nations,
the right and power of the United States in that field are equal to
the right and power of the other members of the international fam-
ily. Otherwise, the United States is not completely sovereign. The
power to acquire territory by discovery and occupation (Jones v.
United States, 137 U. S. 202, 212), the power to expel undesirable
aliens (Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 705 et seg.),
the power to make such international agreements as do not con-
stitute treaties in the constitutional sense (Altman & Co. v. United
States, 224 U. S. 583, 600, 601; Crandall, Treaties, Their Making
and Enforcement, 2d ed., p. 102 and note 1), none of which is ex-
pressly affirmed by the Constitution, nevertheless exist as in-
herently inseparable from the conception of nationality." 196
It has been sought by several critics to stigmatize Mr. Justice Suther-
land's language as "dangerous,". "novel," or "unprecedented." 107 To
196. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 318 (1936). It is
surely significant in a court noted for the freedom with which its members wrote dissenting
and concurring opinions that only Mr. Justice McRejnolds dissented and that none of the
Justices expressed a separate view on the legal doctrine.
197. See Patterson, In. re The United States v. The Curtiss-Wright Corporation (1944)
22 TEx. L. REv. 286, 445; Quarles, Federal Government: As to Foreign Affairs Are Its Powers
Inherent as Distinguished from Delegated? (1944) 32 GEo. L. J. 375; Borchard, Exectlve
Agreements, at 680-1. The latter article also cites BEARD, ThE REPUBLIC (1943) 217-8 as
criticizing the Citrtiss-Wright opinion, but the objection by Beard is to the discussion of the
President's powers and not to the assumption that the Federal Government possesses
inherent powers to handle international problems. For a strong defense of Justice Suther-
land's position see CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION (1944) 7-20.
In so far as Patterson is concerned lest the Curtiss-Wright decision trench into the
domain of state powers, his latter-day revival of doctrines of coordinate power is indeed a
lost cause. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the powers of the states constitute
no restriction on the power of the Federal Government to enter into international agree-
ments. Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199 (U. S., 1796); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.,S. 483
(1879); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920); University of Illinois v. United States,
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a considerable extent these criticisms seem to be based on nothing
more than an objection to the verbal characterization of the powers
of the Federal Government with respect to international affairs as
"inherent" attributes of "sovereignty." Thus, Judge Quarles vigor-
ously disputes the assertion that the United States possesses any
"inherent" powers, but concludes that the Federal Government may
enter into any sort of international arrangement deemed appropriate
or necessary.193 When an argument or controversy evolves itself into a
quarrel over terminological predilections, it is difficult to see its signifi-
cance save for rhetoricians. Constitutional power by any other name
is just as sweet.
Similar criticism has been made of Mr. Justice Sutherland's his-
torical delineation of the source of "sovereignty." By analogy to the
medieval property lawyer's concept of seisin, Justice Sutherland argues
that "Sovereignty is never held in suspense . . . . As a result of the
separation from Great Britain by the colonies . . . the powers of
external sovereignty passed from the Crown not to the colonies sev-
erally, but to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as
the United States of America." 1 This analysis-which had been
made in 1795 by Justice Patterson of the Supreme Court and later by
Justices Story and Miller 5 00-unquestionably involves certain meta-
phorical elements and considerable differences of opinion about his-
289 U. S. 48 (1933); United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (1942). IMore recently, the Tenth
Amendment has been held not to constitute an independent limitation on the powers of the
Federal Government in the exercise of its domestic powers. United States v. Darby Lumber
Co., 312 U. S. 100, 124 (1941): see Feller, The Tenth Amendment Retires (1941) 27 Amr. B,%R
Ass'N J. 223.
198. Quarles, supra note 197, at 3S0.
Similarly, Willoughby denies the doctrine that the United States has "inherent pow-
ers" in the field of foreign relations but insists that the Federal Government has plenary
power by implication from ex-press grants, singly and collectively considered. Cf. §5 57 and
58 of 1 WILLOUGHBY, CoNsTiTUTioNAL LAw. There is, however, no provision of the Con-
stitution which vests the Federal Government with plenary authority in this field. The
conclusion-which we believe correct-that the Federal Government must have a large
measure of discretion in this field is a shrewd perception of political and economic realities;
but the choice of a rationale to justify this course is of little consequence. Cf. ProfezZor
Willoughby's remarks on the power of the United States to acquire territory. Id. at § 236.
With respect to the powers of the President, Berdahl has made succinct summary:
"Altho the weight of authority upholds the contention that executive power in the United
States is limited definitely to the powers enumerated in the Constitution, or clearly implied
therefrom, the interpretation of those enumerated powers is frequently such as to give to the
President an extraordinary and practically undefined range of authority." BERDL.=, NVn
PowExs oF THE EXEcUtrrE IN THE UNITED STATES (1921) 14.
199. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,317,316 (1936).
200. Justice Patterson's views were expressed in the decision in Penhallow v. Doane, 3
Dall. 54, 80-1 (U. S. 1795). See also 1 STORY, C01MaErArES ON THEm CONSTITUTiON (5th
ed. 1891) 151-60; MILLER, LECTURES ON TiE CONSTITUTION (1891) 122; Rufus King's
remarks in the Convention, 1787,5 ELLIOT, DnBATES, at 212.
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torical facts. 20 ' It is, of course, completely fruitless to dispute about
whence the legal wousin "sovereignty" came to settle on the Federal
Government. The important fact is that the imperatives of survival
have required the Federal Government to exercise certain powers.
It may be recalled that the concept of seisin served many useful pur-
poses in both England and America for several centuries. Someone
has aptly said that a fiction acted upon comes very near to the simple
truth. Mr. Justice Sutherland may have been expressing a thought
more profound than any involved in quarrels about the naming of
powers.
One of the main weaknesses of the Continental Congress and the
Congress under the Articles of Confederation was, it is true, its inability
to enforce treaties in the face of recalcitrance by the individual states
or to prevent the separate states from conducting negotiations with
foreign governments behind its back.22 But this was a reflection of the
general absence of enforcement machinery. The fact is that prior to
the ratification of the Constitution, strong efforts were made to cen-
tralize the management of foreign affairs in the hands of the Congress
or its agents. In November 1775 the Second Continental Congress
designated a Committee of Correspondence to conduct overseas nego-
tiations.20 3 The names of the erstwhile separate colonies appear no-
where in the Declaration of Independence; 204 in at least two early
Suprem6 Court cases, it was unqualifiedly declared that even before the
issuance of the Declaration "congress properly possessed the great
rights of external sovereignty" as a revolutionary central govern-
ment.20 5 That this recital was not a mere retrospective speculation is
demonstrated by the fact that prior to the proclamation of the Articles
of Confederation in 1781, the Congress, to which no agreement-making
power had then been formally delegated by the states, had entered
into two agreements formally ratified and had approved the action of
its emissary in modifying one of these by an exchange of notes."' These
201. See Levitan, Recent Developments in the Control of Foreign Relations under the Con.
stitution of the United States (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation in University of Chicago
Library, 1940) 55.
202. See 1 BUTLER, TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES (1902) § 156; 1
MCMASTER, HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES (1897) cc. 3-4.
203. 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 392 (1775). Prior to the Revolution,
the Colonies had entered into agreements with foreign governments only through the British
Crown. 1 BUTLER, Qp. cit. supra note 202, §§ 120-1.
204. See 1 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION (5th ed. 1891) 153-5; 1 BUTLER,
op. cit. supra note 202, § 137. The Articles of Confederation, however, were drawn as an
agreement between the states.
205. Mr. Justice Chase in Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 232 (1796); see also Chief Justice
Jay in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419,470 (U. S. 1793).
206. As to the treaties see 2 MILLER, TREATIES, at 3, 29 et seg.; as to the executive agree-
ment see 2 WHARTON, REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES (1889) 569.
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arrangements, it has been urged, were "wholly illegal and inoperative"
if Congress did not possess inherent powers to control international
relations.2 11
Article VI of the Articles of Confederation vested Congress with the
exclusive right to make treaties with foreign governments. During the
life of the government under the Articles, six treaties, four agreements
not formally approved, and numerous contracts were consummated
with foreign governments.21 3 The Supreme Court subsequently held
that these compacts overruled contrary state legislation, although the
Articles of C6nfederation had not contained a supremacy clause akin
to that embodied in the Constitution. -13 When the Constitution was
drafted, the supremacy clause was specifically worded so as to make all
previously ratified treatiesthe "law of the land." 210
There are, furthermore, numerous cases prior to the Curtiss-Wright
decision in which the Supreme Court has spoken of the Federal Govern-
ment as possessing inherent powers in the field of foreign relations,
transcending any express or directly inferrable constitutional grants.
Thus, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Court remarked that the
power to exclude aliens, absolutely or conditionally, belonged to the
Federal Government as an "inherent and inalienable right of every
sovereign and independent nation." 211 In the more recent case of
Burnet v. Brooks, it was observed that as a "nation with all the at-
tributes of sovereignty, the United States is vested with all the powers
of government necessary to maintain an effective control of interna-
tional relations." 212
207. 1 BUTLER, op. cit. supra note 202, at 260. The scholarly character of this work is
avouched in Borchard, Executire Agreements, at 679. The treaties were not submitted to the
states for approval.
For other action by the Congress under the Confederation, justifiable only under
an "inherent power" doctrine, see 1 HocKEr, THE CONSTITrUTIONAL HISToRy OF TuE
UNITED STATES (1939) 177-8; BUTLER, supra, § 161.
208. The treaties and some of the contracts are listed in 2 MILLER, TREAiEs, at Lx. The
same source lists three agreements not formally approved; a fourth is dercribed in %CCLuRE,
ExEcUTivE AGREEMENTS, at 36-7.
209. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199 (U. S. 1796); Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 DalI. 1
(U. S. 1794); Clerke v. Harwood, 3 DalI. 342 (U. S. 1797); Fairfax's Devisee -. Hunter's
Lessee, 7 Cranch 603 (U. S. 1813); Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242 (U. S. 1830).
210. Article IV; see Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259, 271 (U. S. 1817); Carneal v. Banks,
10 Wheat. 181 (U. S. 1825).
211. 149U.S.698,705elseg. (1892).
212. 288 U. S. 378, 396 (1933). See also Church of Jesus Christ v. United States, 136
U. S. 1 (1890); Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1870); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299
(1915); Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202,212 (1890).
It is also possible to cite a list of cases [see, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907) 1
in which the Supreme Court has repudiated the doctrine of inherent powers, but thec2 al-
most all concern the domestic powers of the Government. Moreover, even in this field, the
inherent power rationale has frequently been utilized; see United States v. Jones, 109 U. S.
513 (1883); In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1 (1890); Knox v. Lee, supra; and, since the Darby
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When attention is focused upon the occasions which have elicited
these sweeping asseverations rather than upon the rhetoric itself, the
imperative policy of the doctrine becomes apparent. The exclusion of
aliens, the acquisition of territory outside the North American con-
tinent otherwise than by treaty or conquest, the exercise of the power
of eminent domain, the establishment of tribunals in foreign countries,
the punishment of counterfeiting of foreign coins, are but a few of the
problems which have arisen in the course of United States history as to
which the Constitution was silent. Indeed, the fundamental notion
that the Federal Government is bound to observe the accepted rules of
international law is not sustainable by any language in the Constitu-
tion. 213 When direct Presidential action is involved, the opening clause
of Article II, as previously indicated, is capable of indefinite expansion;
but there are obvious objections to vesting control of every problem not
otherwise mentioned in the Constitution in the hands of the President.
It is also often possible by invocation of the doctrine of resultant pow-
ers to spell out a constitutional rationale for legislation dealing with
any aspect of international relations.214 The inherent powers doctrine
has, however, certain advantages-in addition to its well-established
historical position-in its relative freedom from cant and in its sim-
plicity. But whatever the rationale used, it is perfectly clear that in the
conduct of our international relations, the powers of the Federal Gov-
ernment are ample to deal with any problem, because they derive not
only from the Constitution, but "from the necessities of the case."
It may be suggested that this completely comprehensive power of
Lumber case, 312 U. S. 100 (1941), the Tenth Amendment has lost its potency as a limitation
on the expansion of federal power.
Certain writers (see, e.g., Quarles, supra note 197) have objected to the doctrine on the
ground that the cases state that all governmental powers must be exercised subject to the
Constitution. But this merely means that the express prohibitions of the Constitution, e.g.,
the ban on ex post facto legislation, may not be circumvented and that the due process and
similar clauses are limitations on Congressional and executive action, whether predicated on
express clauses of the Constitution, implied, or inherent powers. Cf. CowLEs, TREATIES
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PROPERTY INTERFERENCES AND DuE PROCESS OF LAW (1941)
cc. 1, 10, 13, 15.
213. Various Presidents have taken the position that the President as final diplomatic
agent of the Government is bound t6 make reparation for any international delinquencies
committed by the Government, even where the Supreme Court, as final arbiter of domestic
law, had held the acts in question to be valid. See Part II, Section VIII.
214. The doctrine of resultant powers (i.e. that an inference may be drawn from a
group of express powers that authority to perform another function was conferred on the
Government) was expounded by Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (U. S. 1821);
see also United States v. Gettysburg Elect. Ry., 160 U. S. 668 (1896). It is instructive to
note, however, that applications of this doctrine usually are bottomed upon a philosophic
notion as to the type of powers which ought to be exercised by a central government a
species of reasoning which appears to end in the position presumably sought to be avoided,
i.e., in the bosom of the inherent powers theory. See, e.g., 1 WILLOUGHBY, CO4STITUTIONAL
LAw, § 57.
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the Federal Government over foreign affairs can exhaust itself through
the operation of the treaty-making procedure. There are, however, no
constitutional or policy reasons why this power should be forced into a
single channel. The word "treaty," to summon up remembrance of
things past, is neither self-defining nor defined within the Constitution;
the present broad scope of the treaty-making power, once bitterly
contested, is itself a product of the long and slow process of constitu-
tional construction. "As a matter of history," Professor Corwin has
written, "the notion of the indefinite scope of the treaty-maling power
is itself reflective of the concept of the National Government's plenary
powers in the field of foreign relations and was not always conceded in
earlier days." 211 In several recent cases, completely consistent with a
long tradition, the Supreme Court has put the executive agreement
entirely upon a par with the treaty.21G It would be a surpassing paradox
if the statesmen and justices of the future should find themselves
unable, in the light of the conditions and interests of their time, to
infuse as much meaning into the combined powers of the Congress and
the President as has been put into the one word "treaty."
IV. THE INTERCHANGEABLE USE OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AND
TREATIEs IN THE CoNDucT OF OuR FoREIGN AFFAiRs*
To ascertain the full extent to which Congressional-Executive and
Presidential agreements have become interchangeable with the treaty
it is necessary to look, not at the vague evaluative judgments of sec-
ondary writers, but at the actual record of how these instruments have
been used in our diplomatic practice. It is this record that completely
refutes all suggestions that the treaty-making clause is exclusive or
that the executive agreement is confined to matters of "inherently
minor and unimportant character" 1 or that the use of the executive
agreement is a comparatively novel and dangerous instrument of
governmental policy.2
The temporal pattern of the historical record is especially instruc-
tive. Although, as has been previously shown, executive agreements
have been used since the first decades of the Government, beginning in
the 1830s there has been a consistent trend towards increasing reliance
215. CORWIN, THE CONSTTUTXION AND VORLD ORG.NIZTIO. (1944) 19.
216. See infra, Sections IV and VI.
* In preparing this Section, we have been greatly aided by McCLuraE, Irrm.,%Tio:.AL.
EXECUTIVEAGREEMENTS (1941) (herein cited as McCLuan, ENEcuT1,AGlEonnrl-s).
1. Borchard, Against the Proposed Amendment as to the Ratification of Treaties (1944)
30 A. B. A. J. 608, 609, n. 12.
2. See Borchard, Executire Agreements, at 664, and Borchard, The Two-Thirds Rule as
to Treaties: A Change Opposed (1945) 3 EcoN. CouNcu. PAPaPas, No. 8, p. 7 .
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on such agreements in lieu of treaties. This trend is summarized by
McClure:
"During the first fifty years of government under the Constitu-
tion the President is known to. have entered into some 27 inter-
national acts without invoking the consent of the Senate, while 60
became law as treaties; for the second half century the figures ap-
pear to be 238 executive agreements and 215 treaties; and for the
third similar period 917 executive agreements and 524 treaties." 3
To explore the record, it will be easiest to proceed for the most part
by functional sub-headings.
Acquisition oJ Territory.
Few international compacts are more important than those pro-
viding for the acquisition of territory or the merger into an existing
nation of previously independent States. Yet in consummating the
first of these transactions, the United States Government has used
agreements at least as frequently as treaties approved by two-thirds of
the Senate; the second transaction has been accomplished only by
joint resolutions.
Indeed, at the very beginning of our national history, when con-
sidering modes of effecting the Louisiana purchase of 1803, President
Jefferson first thought that it would be necessary to adopt a constitu-
tional amendment to permit the United States to add to its national
domain. 4 Dissuaded by his cabinet from this narrow construction of
the Constitution, Jefferson veered to the opinion that the agreement
which had been negotiated by his plenipotentiaries should be sub-
mitted to both houses of Congress. Finally, because it seemed desirable
to ratify the agreement as quickly as possible before Napoleon changed
his.mind, he decided to secure its ratification under the treaty clause.I
An analogous problem arose in 1811 when it was feared England or
France might obtain the East Florida territory from Spain. Accord-
ingly, Congress adopted a joint resoldtion providing that if this danger
seemed likely to materialize, President Madison could proceed to
3. McCLURE, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, at 4. The totals include Congressional-
Executive as well as direct Presidential agreements. Our reason for handling Congressional-
Executive and Presidential agreements together here has been explained supra, p. 246.
4. For Jefferson's original opinion as to the necessity of a constitutional amendment
see Jefferson to the Secretary of State, Aug. 25, 1803, and Jefferson to Levi Lincoln, Aug. 30,
1803,4 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Washington, ed., 1854) 500-5.
5. For accounts of the circumstances under which it was ultimately decided to submit
the Louisiana purchase treaty only to the Senate see JOHNSON, JEFFERSON AND IllS COL-
LEAGUES (1921) 80-1; HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES, 1789-1817 (1920) 139 el seg.
Of course, the appropriation bill necessary to effectuate the treaty was passed by both
houses.
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acquire the territory on his own initiative., American military forces
entered Florida on several occasions pursuant to this resolution, and
in 1819 the territory was acquired by treaty.7
The alternative procedure for the acquisition of territory, indicated
by Jefferson and Madison, was actually utilized for the first time in the
administration of President Tyler. During the 1830s and- 1840s, many
statesmen in the southern and western states sought to have the
United States annex Texas, a position supported by the leaders of that
then independent republic. A. treaty of annexation was signed in
April 1844; 8 however, motivated in large measure by partisan opposi-
tion to Tyler, the Senate rejected it two months later.0 President Tyler,
who had often been "extravagantly solicitous about constitutional
restraints," 10 then invited Congressional action in a message declaring:
". .. while I have regarded the annexation to be accomplished
by treaty as the most suitable form in which it could be effected,
should Congress deem it proper to resort to any other expedient
compatible with the Constitution and likely to accomplish the
object I stand prepared to yield my most prompt and active co-
operation. The great question is not as to the manner in which it shall
be done, but whether it shall be accomplished or not." 11
By January 1845 it became apparent that Texas, despairing of the
possibility of American annexation, might elect to continue its exist-
ence as an independent nation; negotiations were already being ini-
tiated to secure British and French guarantees of its independence and
territorial integrity.12 At this juncture, the House of Representatives
6. 3 STAT. 471 (1811). The general background of this resolution is explained in
BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1942 ed.) 186-8; Vyllys, The East
Florida Revolution of 1812-1814 (1929) 9 HISPANIC AMER. HIST. REV. 415.
7. 2 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 1651.
8. The treaty is reprinted in 4 MILLER, TREATIEs, at 697; see also 5 WOREs o" JoHn C.
CALHouN (1856) 322 et seq.
9. The treaty was defeated, 16-35. 4 MILLER, TREATIES, at 699. Most of Tyler's
fellow Whigs opposed the treaty since it was believed that Clay, their nominee for President
in the 1844 election, would oppose the anne.ation of Texas during the campaign. On the
other hand, many Democrats voted against the treaty in an apparent attempt to make
political capital out of the Whig failure to consummate the annexation. Tyler's personal
unpopularity also impelled certain Senators to vote against the treaty. See CnITWOOD,
JoHN TYLER (1939) 336 et seq.; J. H. SMITH, ANNEXATION OF TEXus (1911) 272 et seq.;
McCoRamAc, JAMES K. POLrE (1922) 262; GARRISON, WESTWARD EXPANSxON (1906) 120-1.
From the beginning Senator Benton opposed the treaty, urging that the acquisition be
accomplished by a joint resolution. See STEPHENSON, TExaS AND THE MExICAN, WARs (1921)
164.
10. McLAUGHLIN, CONSTITrrTIONAL HISTORY, at499.
11. 4 RICHARSON, MESSAGES, at 327 (emphasis supplied).
12. See CHASE, NAGOCIATIONS DE LA RAPUBLIQUE DE TEXAS EN EUROPE (1932) 154-82;
REEVES, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK (1907) 128-33, 181; 2 Am. Hisr.
Ass'x, ANNUAL REPORT: 1899 (1900) 614-5; AD.mS, BRrrIs IN rEREsrs AND AcriViTvES wN
TEXAs (1910) 155-97.
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accepted Tyler's invitation and adopted a joint resolution, closely
paralleling the language of the defeated treaty, authorizing the annexa-
tion and admission to the Union of Texas on certain conditions.13 As
a concession to the jealousies of some of its members, the resolution was
amended in the Senate to permit the President to submit the resolution
to the Republic of Texas as an "overture" to an offer to join the United
States or, in the alternative, to negotiate a new treaty.14 The amended
resolution was passed by both the Senate and the House." Tyler, then
almost at the end of his tenure of office, chose the alternative of sub-
mitting an "overture" to Texas; 16 his course was accepted by his suc-
cessor, James K. Polk.17 Secretary of State Calhoun-an inveterate
strict constructionist-approved the joint resolution method in the
forthright language quoted at the head of this article:
"It is now admitted that what was sought to be effected by the
Treaty submitted to the Senate, may be secured by a joint resolu-
tion of the two houses of Congress incorporating all its provisions.
This mode of effecting it will have the advantage of requiring only a
majority of the two houses, instead of two-thirds of the Senate." 18
The Republic of Texas then assented to the proposal that it join the
United States on the terms stipulated in the Congressional resolu-
tion. 9 Congress thereafter ratified the procedure by adopting a formal
resolution admitting Texas as a State.20 In the words of Hunter Miller,
former Director of the Treaty Division of the Department of State, the
exchange of resolutions constituted "an international agreement." 21
In contrast, the acquisition of territory at the end of the Mexican
War was ratified by the Treaty of Guadalupe. It should be noted
that, in 1868, the method of acquisition of Texas by joint resolution
was held by the Supreme Court to have been constitutional. 2
On several other occasions during the nineteenth century Congress
and the Executive acted to increase the territorial domain of the United
States by means other than formal treaties. In 1850, on his own
13. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. (1845) 194.
14. 4 MILLER, TREATIES, at 689-90. See McLAUGHLIN, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY,
at 501-2.
15. 5 STAT. 797 (1845); 4 MILLER, TREATIES, at 689.
16. Tyler transmitted the resolution to the American charg6, Donelson, with instrtuc-
tion to submit it to Texas as a proposal which the Republic was invited to accept. 4 MILLER,
TREATIES, at 707-10.
17. 4 RIca'RDSON, MESSAGES, at 385, 386-7; see also FisH, AMERICAN DiPLOMACY
(1938) 265-6.
18. Quoted in Garner, Acts and Joint Resolutions of Congress As Substitutes for Treaties
(1935) 29 Am. J. INT. L. 482,486;'see also 1 MOORE, DIGEST, at 453-4.
19. See 4 MILLER, TREATIES, at 691, 693, 696-737.
20. 9 STAT. 108 (1845).
21. 1 MILLER, TREATIES, at 8.
22. Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700 (U. S. 1868); see also Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall.
475, 500 (U. S. 1867).
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authority, President Fillmore made an e-xecutive agreement vith
England whereby the United States acquired Horseshoe Reef.2 3 In
1856, Congress adopted an act providing that the President might
assert American sovereignty over any guano islands discovered and
occupied by American. citizens which had not previously been claimed
by other nations.24 Numerous Pacific islands were claimed for the
United States by Presidential proclamations issued pursuant to this
statute; 25 the procedure was subsequently upheld by the Supreme
Court.2 18
Subsequently, treaties and executive agreements were used inter-
changeably at various times as methods for asserting American sov-
ereignty over portions of the Samoan Islands. In 1879, the United
States, Great Britain and Germany negotiated an agreement with
several native chiefs providing for joint administration of the island of
Apia.2 This condominium, which lasted until 1887, was never approved
as a treaty or ratified by Congressional action.2- In 1889, another
agreement was entered into between the three powers and various
native chiefs providing for extension of the condominium; this time
the agreement was referred to and ratified by the Senate as a treaty.0
In 1899, a compact was entered into between the United States,
Germany and Great Britain providing for allocation of spheres of
influence over the Samoas between the three powers; the tripartite
agreement was submitted to the Senate and ratified as a treaty."
However, the actual agreements by which the native chieftains as-
sented to American annexation and by which a division of govern-
mental responsibilities, unique in our national history, was estab-
lished, 31 were not submitted to Congress for ratification by joint resolu-
tion until a quarter of a century after their negotiation.A2
23. See CRANDALL, TREATIES, at 114.
In Commerce Committee Hearings, at 134, Professor Borchard appropriately justifies
the annexations of Texas and Hawaii on "the inherent power of Congress," a concept which
he repudiates in Executire Agreements, at 681. For further repudiation see Book Review
(1944) 4 LAwYERs GuILD REvIEw 59.
24. 11 STAT. 119 (1856); 1 MooRE, DIGEST, at 556.
25. See AICCLURE, ExEcUTIVE AGREEMENTs, at 69.
26. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890); see also 34 Ops. ATT' Gr-. 507 (1925).
27. The document is reprinted in H. R. ExEc. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., lst Se.s.
(1888) 132-4 (encl. no. 92).
28. See RYDEN, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNrIED STATES IN RELtATION TO SA xOA
(1933) 233-5. However, 4 treaty had been ratified in 1S72 providing for American proteo-
tion of certain of the Samoan Islands, and several Presidents had taken steps to effectuate
this policy. See id. at 199-207, 217-33.
29. 2 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 1576. See also RDER, op. cit. supra note 28, at291-9.
30. 2 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 1595.
31. The relevant executive agreements were made by naval officers with various native
chieftains in 1900, 1902, and 1904 and ratified by President Theodore Roosevelt. See SrUN.
Doc. No. 984, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928) 2. See also McCLuRE, ExEcuTIvE AGRrEE.N;TS,
at 68-9.
32. 45 STAT. 1253 (1929), 48 U.S. C. § 1431a (1940).
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A more dramatic and important demonstration of the interchange-
ability of treaties and agreements authorized by Congressional resolu-
tion came in connection with the annexation of Hawaii. An agreement
providing for annexation of that republic was signed by representatives
of the two governments in June 1897 and submitted to the Senate for
approval the same month.3 3 Because of the almost unanimous opposi-
tion of Democratic Senators and extensive lobbying by sugar interests,
it became apparent that the treaty would receive a simple, but not a
two-thirds, majority; accordingly it was never brought to a vote.3 4 As a
similar treaty had failed of adoption in 1893, 31 the Republican leaders
apparently felt the requisite Senatorial vote could never be obtained.
Therefore, to quote Secretary of State John Foster, who had nego-
tiated the agreement:
"Owing to the opposition of many of the Democratic Sena-
tors to the Hawaiian Treaty and the facility of obstruction and
delay in that body, it was decided to attempt to bring about the
annexation by joint resolution, following the precedent of the
annexation of Texas." 36
The resolution accepting the offer of the Government of the Ha-
waiian Republic to cede the Islands to the United States was adopted
and signed by the President in July 1898.11 Since, as in the case of the
annexation of Texas, there was an offer by one nation and a formal
acceptance by the other, it is clear an international agreement was
33. See31 SEN. ExEc. J. 169-70 (1897).
34. See HOLT, TREATIES DEFEATED BY THE SENATE (1933) 163-4.
35. The treaty had been signed on Feb. 14, 1893, and was submitted to the Senate the
following day. 28 SEN. EXEC. J. 397-8 (1893). Although Democratic Senatorial leaders
had assured Secretary of State Foster, before the agreement had been signed, that they
would not oppose it, partisan opposition developed after its submittal, and the treaty never
came to a vote. See 2 FOSTER, DIPLOMATIC MEMOIRS (1909) 168; 2 MCELROY, GROVER
CLEVELAND (1923) 65-6; HOLT, op. cit. supra note 34, at 152-4. Subsequently, President
Cleveland withdrew the treaty because of his belief that the revolutionary Hawaiian govern-
ment which had negotiated it had come to power largely because of the maneuverings of
the American minister and the presence of American forces. This interpretation was con-
trary to that made by the majority of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. See
FOREIGN RELATIONS: 1894, app. II.
36. 2 FOSTERt Op. cit. supra note 35, at 174. President McKinley gave the same ex-
planation in a letter to Carl Schurz: "There seems to be some difficulty in getting the neces-
wary two-thirds vote in the Senate for the treaty. But if we fail there, we can annex the
Hawaiian Islands by joint resolution, as we annexed Texas. That will require only a ma-
jority in the two houses of Congress, which we can easily get." 6 SPEECHES, CORRESPOND-
ENCE AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF CARL SCHURZ (Bancroft, ed., 1913) 272; 1 OLCOTT, TiIe
LIFE OF WILLIAM McKINLEY (1916) 378-9.
37. 30 STAT. 750 (1898), 48 U. S. C. § 661 (1940). The resolution received an exact 2-1
majority in the Senate, but a recent student has intimated that, counting pairs and those
recorded not voting, more than a third of the Senate was opposed to annexation. MCCLURE,
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, at 68; see 31 CONG. REc. 6712 (1898).
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consummated. Although many of the opponents, and even some of the
advocates of annexation, thought the use of a joint resolution, in lieu
of the originally contemplated treaty, was unconstitutional, the
annexation was approved by the Supreme Court in Hawaii v. Man-
kichi.319 Moreover, Mr. (later Chief) Justice White implied, in one of
the Insular cases, that mere approval of a treaty by the Senate would
not suffice to authorize American annexation of territory outside the
North American continent, but that approval by both houses of Con-
gress was requisite.4
Although the major territorial acquisitions resulting from the
Spanish-American War were ratified by the Treaty of Paris, the United
States' right to continued possession of Puerto Rico had been estab-
lished by the terms of the Armistice Protocol of 1898, an agreement
negotiated by President McKinley as Commander-in-Chief and never
referred to Congress for approval.41 Moreover, territorial questions
arising as an aftermath of the war were handled interchangeably by
treaties and by executive agreements. On the one hand, the leasing by
long-term contracts of naval bases at Guantanamo and Bahia Honda
in Cuba was authorized by treaty in 1904.2 On the other hand, the
agreement between General Bates, representing the Governor of the
Philippine Islands, and the Sultan of Jolo ackmowledging American
sovereignty over the Archipelago of Jolo and providing for the reten-
tion of a considerable degree of local autonomy was approved by Presi-
dent Mctinley in 1899, but was never submitted to the Senate or
Congress for ratification. 43 In 1907, by executive agreement with
Great Britain, President Taft agreed to permit the British North
Borneo Company to administer certain islands lying along the undeter-
mined boundary between the Philippine Islands and Borneo. 4" In
1915, the Sultan of Sulu entered into an executive agreement with
representatives of President XVilson, acknowledging American sov-
ereignty over the Sulu archipelago. This amounted to a cesgion of
territory, as the Sultan had been recognized as a quasi-independent
38. Foster was among those who were dubious as to the constitutionality of the pro-
cedure adopted. See FOSTER, loc. cit. supra note 36. See also 31 ComG. REc. 6148, 6634
(1898).
39. 190 U.S. 197 (1903).
40. Concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 312
(1901). Justices Shiras and McKenna assented to this statement.
41. See 1 MooRE, DIGEST, at 285; FOREIGN RELATIONS: 1898 at lxv; FoREIGN RE.LA-
TONS: 1899 at. xii.
42. 1 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 362-3.
43. See H. R. Doc. No. 1, pt. 2, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (1899); FoREIGn RELATo.NS:
1899, app.
44. 3 MALLoY, TREATIES, at 2605. This agreement was kept in forcefor 23 years, until
the enactment of the Treaty of 1930. 4 id. at 4261.
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ruler by the Spanish and had retained this status during the early
years of American control of the Philippines. 41
A number of other relatively minor agreements affecting the out-
lying territories of the United States have been consummated by
direct executive agreements during the tventieth century. Thus, a
condominium of Colombia and the United States over three Pacific
Ocean guano islands was recognized by an exchange of notes between
the Colombian Minister and Secretary of State Kellogg in 1928.40 By an
exchange of notes in April 1939, the United States and Great Britain
provided for "use in common" of Canton and Enderbury Islands in
the Pacific for aviation facilities, leaving unsettled the question of
"sovereignty" over the islands.4 1
Settlement of International Claims.
International law and practice provide that claims by citizens of one
government against another government may be prosecuted only
through the foreign office of the claimant's government. 48 Assuming
that claims have been brought against other governments on behalf of
citizens of the United States or are being pressed against this country
by the plenipotentiaries of other States and appear, on preliminary
State Department investigation, to have some degree of validity, the
practice of this government has been to seek adjustment through
diplomatic channels or by reference of the dispute to an arbitral body
or other international tribunal. Through the course of American
diplomatic history, the compromis under which disputes, involving
claims in favor of the United States, have been referred to arbitration
have as often been the subject of executive agreements, consummated
by the Executive without Congressional authorization, as of treaties."
Indeed, the doctrine that the Executive had power to submit claims
against foreign governments to arbitration on his own initiative had
been enunciated by Secretary of State Jefferson as early as 1793.11
Perhaps the most important recent example of reference by an execu-
tive agreement was the establishment in 1938 of the Commission to
45. See 2 IV. CAMERON FORBES, THg PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (1928) 472-4. The author
was a former Governor-General of the Philippines.
46. See Orent and Reinsch, Sovereignty over Islands in the Pacific (1941) 35 Amu. J. INT.
L. 443,454.
47. U. S. ExEc. AGREEM'T SER., No. 145. See also Orent and Reinsch, supra note 46,
at 459-60.
48. See BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS (1915).
49. An incomplete list of arbitral agreements made by various Presidents without "the
advice and consent of the Senate" is printed in 79 CoNG. REc. (1935) at 969; earlier list$ are
contained in Foster, The Treaty-Making Power (1901) 11 YALE L. J. 69; Moore, Treaties and
Executive Agreements (1905) 20 POL. ScI. Q. 385, 408-17. See opinion by former State De-
partment Solicitor Scott quoted in 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST, at 403-4.
50. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS (2d ed. 1817) 174-5.
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adjudicate damages resulting from the Mexican expropriation of
American-owned oil properties during the 1930s.'
It has been customary, presumably because it would facilitate the
obtainance of requisite appropriations, to have the ccmpromis provid-
ing for arbitration or adjudication of claims against the United States
submitted to the Senate for ratification as a treaty. However, there is
not the slightest doubt that, as a matter of la, the President possesses
authority to refer to arbitration claims against the United States,' -
and that it would be a breach of good faith and, in the phraseology of
international jurists an "international delinquency," if Congress there-
after failed to appropriate funds to pay the award. 3 On several occa-
sions the referral of claims against the United States to arbitration was
arranged by direct Presidential agreement. The most important of
these agreements was that negotiated by President Coolidge with
Great Britain in 1927, whereby it was provided that "neither country
will make further claim against the other on account of supplies fur-
nished, services rendered, or damages sustained in connection with the
prosecution of the recent war." 54 Another precedent is furnished by
the action of President Hoover in referring to arbitration Canada's
claim to damages arising from the sinldng of the rum-runner Pm Alone
by an American revenue cutter in 1929.15 Needless to say, when the
arbitral tribunal rendered a verdict partly adverse to the United
States, Congress did not raise hypothetical constitutional objections,
but promptly appropriated funds to pay the award."5 Belonging in the
same general category is the 1942 agreement, approved the following
year by Congress as a joint resolution, whereby the United States
St. See PERSON, MExImAN rO. (1942) 1-6,77-83.
52. See the conclusive argument in McCLuRE, ExcuTrvr AGREEuE.NTs, at 340.
53. President Jackson considered that France was bound by a convention negotiated
with the United States in 1831 even though the Chamber of Deputies had failed to enact
necessary appropriation bills. The position of the United States was that the convention
bound "every department of the contracting government." Quoted in Brewer, Execrifire
Agreements [1943] 2 EDITORIAL REsE!Rcn REPoRTS 1, 12. See also S MooRE, IN'tl;A-
TIONAL ADJUmCATIONS (1933) 309 et seg.; 6 Ops. ATT's GEN. 296 (Cushing, 1854); WVrxloN,
INTERNATiONAL LAW (2d ed., Lawrence, 1863) 459.
54. See4 MALLOY, TPATIES, at 4256-61; 2 FOREIGN R ELATIONS: 1927 at 745 clsc,2.
55. See BRIGGS, THE LAW or N.TIoNs (1938) 358-61. The smuggling conventions of
1924 with Great Britain and Canada (U. S. TRE.Tr SER., Nos. 685 and 718 respectively)
had provided for arbitration of claims on behalf of citizens of those nations arising there-
under, pursuant to the Pecuniary Claims Convention of 1910 with Great Britain. 37 STAT.
1625 (1910). While the latter had provided for reference of future claims between the two
nations to an arbitral tribunal, it was provided that reference by the United States would be
conditioned upon Senate approval. However, the administration acted on its own initiative
in the !m Alone situation. But see 2 HDE, IWrERNATIO.AL LAW (2d rev. ed. 1945) 1410.
A Mexican claim was referred to arbitration by President Roosevelt in 1934. See
U. S. ExEc. AGREEM'T SER., No. 57.
56. See McCLURE, ExEcuTIVEAGREREEN-TS, at 14-15.
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transferred several million dollars of disputed assets to the Republic of
Panama.57 An earlier analogue is the 1896 agreement providing for
expulsion to Canada of a portion of the migrant Cree tribe, which
involved payment of transit expenses by the United States. Here "too
the arrangement was never ratified as a treaty or submitted for Con-
gressional approval, but no difficulty was experienced in securing
funds with which to meet this nation's commitments."8
Adherence to International Organizations.
As a matter of practical expediency, the executive agreement has
almost always been the procedure utilized for effecting American
adherence to international organizations. A most instructive example
is provided by consideration of the circumstances under which the
United States joined the International Labor Organization. The con-
stitution of the Organization was originally included in the Treaty of
Versailles, 59 to which the Senate refused assent in 1919. The Report
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1919 expressly dis-
approved of American adherence to this part of the Treaty but added
that American participation would be proper if arranged by Con-
gressional "act or joint resolution." 10 In June 1934, Congress adopted
a joint resolution authorizing the President to accept membership in
the International Labor Organization 1 on behalf of the United States.
An invitation to join was proffered by the ILO later in 1934 and ac-
cepted on behalf of the President by the American consul at Geneva. 2
Among the obligations incurred by adherence to the ILO was the agree-
ment to refer to the Permanent Court of International Justice "any
question or dispute relating to the interpretation" of any part of the
constitution of the Organization "or of any subsequent convention con-
57. See (1942) 6 DEP'T OF STATE BULL., No. 152, pp. 448, 452. The Department of
State apparently believed that the agreement was an implementation of the Treaties of 1903
and 1936, but there are no provisions of those instruments specifically authorizing transfer
of American-owned assets. Professor Borchard has observed that the agreement was con-
sidered by Panama to be a "treaty" (Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 675, n. 37); but this
merely exemplifies the conclusion of the Harvard Research Draft that the status of an inter-
national compact in any particular country is wholly a matter of domestic law and that
characterization in one country has nothing to do with either its international validity or its
constitutional characterization in another country.
For an attack on the legality of the procedure whereby this settlement was arranged,
see Briggs, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and the Panama Joint Resolution of 1943 (1943)
37 Am!. POL. SC. REV. 686.
58. See Brewer, supra note 53, at 10.
.59. Articles 387 to 427 inclusive.
60. See FLEmING, THE UNITED STATES AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIoNs, 1918-1920 (1932)
431.
61. 48 STAT. 1182 (1934), 22 U. S. C. § 271 (1940).
62. EIGHTEENTH INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
(1934) 463-9; Dep't of State, Press Release, Aug. 25, 1934.
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cluded by the members." 63 Thus, although the United States had re-
jected a treaty providing for membership in the League and subse-
quently rejected another providing for membership in the Permanent
Court,6 4 the joint resolution process was utilized as a means of securing
adherence to one of the important organs of the League and of agreeing
to give the Court compulsory jurisdiction over certain classes of dis-
putes.6 5
Transcending in importance the precedent set by American adher-
ence to the ILO is the record of American membership in the Pan-
American Union. Established after the first International Conference
of American States in 1889-1890 by an exchange of notes between
foreign ministers, the Pan-American Union has continued in existence
for the ensuing 55 years.6 Its structure and machinery are regulated
by resolutions adopted at periodic conferences.1 No treaty or joint
resolution has been enacted formally assenting to American member-
ship in the Union, but Congressional approval may readily be inferred
from the long series of acts appropriating funds to defray the United
States' aliquot portion of operating expenses. c This retention of the
"power of the purse," of course, furnishes Congress with an effective
means of preventing the United States from participatifig in any Union
activities of which it disapproves.
Numerous international compacts have been negotiated at the
conferences convened by the Union, some placing heavy obligations
upon the United States. Many of the important engagements-such
63. Article 422 of the Treaty of Versailles.
64. The treaty was defeated on Jan. 29, 1935, by a vote of 52 in favor of adherence
and 36 against. 79 CONG. REc. 1127 (1935).
65. See Hudson, The United States in the International Labor Orgarization (1934) 28
Am. J. IrT. L. 671.
66. See SCHMECKEBIER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES
PARTICIPATES (1935) 75-81; SCOTT, THE INTERNTIONAL CONFERENCES OF AMERICAN
STATES (1931) 3-51; SEN. Doc. No. 744, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. (1910) 9-11. The convocation
of the Conference by the President had been approved in advance by joint resolution. 25
STAT. 155 (1888). The organization was known as the Pan-American Bureau until 1910.
67. See SCHMECKEBIER, Op. cit. supra note 66, at 81-105; REINSCH, PUBLIC I.TEr!,A-
TIONAL UNIoNs (1911) 77-121. Until 1896, the organization was under the direction of the
Secretary of State of the United States. On the latter's initiative, a multi-national executive
committee n-s established in that year. See INTERNATIONAL UNION OF AMERICAN REPBE-
LIcs, ANNUAL REPORT: 1901, 17. This action was approved at the second Conference in 1902.
See ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 66 at 92-4. A mutilateral agreement providing for the gov-
ernance of the Union was drafted in 1928 and consented to by the Senate but has not yet re-
ceived sufficient assents to come into effect. For exposition of the recent expansion in the
Union's activities see ScoTr, THE INTERNATION, CoNFERENcEs OF A-MERICAN STATES,
FIRST SUPPLEMENT: 1933-1940 (1940).
68. The first of these bills were the 1888 and 1889 acts appropriating funds to defray
the expenses of the 1889 Conference. 25 STAT. 155 (1888): 25 STAT. 957 (1889). See aLzo 26
STAT. 272 (1890).
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as. the 1929 General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration 69 and the
Act of Habana of 1940 providing for joint provisional administration
of European possessions in the Americas in the event of an attempted
change of. sovereignty 70-have been treated by the Presidents who
appointed the plenipotentiaries of the United States as treaties and
referred to the Senate for approval. Other compacts of equal impor-
tance-such as the 1938 Declaration of Lima providing for consulta-
tion "in case the peace, security or territorial integrity of any American
Republic is . . . threatened," 71 the 1939 Act of Panama,72 modifying
pre-existing rules of international law by establishing a 300-mile
security zone in the territorial waters surrounding the American conti-
nent,73 and the Inter-American Radio Communications Compact "-._
have been treated as simple executive agreements. Conversely, some
relatively unimportant agreements-such as the 1936 multilateral
compact providing for exchange of all official documents-have been
submitted to the Senate for approval as treaties. 7
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, joint resolutions have
also been the technique for approving American membership in a large
number of other international organizations of varying importance,
including the Universal Postal Union,76 the International Penal and
69. 4 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 4756. However, the multilateral protocol permitting
States to change the conditions of their adherence to the arbitration treaty (4 id. at 4762)
was never submitted to the Senate. See McCLuRE, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, at 132.
70. See U. S. TREATY SER., No. 977 (1942). Apparently it had originally been con-
templated that the Act of Habana would be approved as an executive agreement [see U. S.
EXEC. AGREEM'T SER., No. 199 (1940) ], and it is erroneously labeled as such in McCLURE,
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, at 134-5.
71. See DEP'T OF STATE, CONFERENCE SER., No. 50 (1941) 189-90. Assistant Secretary
of State Berle called this Declaration a "solemn and binding covenant." Dep't of State,
Press Release, March 7, 1939.
72. See Fenwick, The Third Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Rio do Janeiro
(1942) 36 Am. J. TNT. L. 169.
73. In recent years, most nations have accepted the three-mile limit as the maximum
area adjacent to their coasts over which they might normally claim general jurisdiction.
Before the Habana Conference, no State had formally asked for more than an 18-mile limit
[see BRIGGS, op. cit. supra note 55, at 196-7] although in the Anti-Smuggling Act of 1935,
49 STAT. 517 (1935), 19 U. S. C. § 1701 (1940), the United States had asserted a limited
jurisdiction, which in some cases might extend as far as 100 miles from the coast.
74. U. S. EXEC. AGREEM'T SER., No. 200 (1940), 54 STAT. 2514 (1940). It should be
noted that many executive agreements, including some not authorized or saActioned retro-
actively by Congressional legislation, are now published in the second part of the Statutes
at Large volumes.
75. U. S. TREATY SER., No. 928 (1938). The resolution of consent, authorizing nego-
tiation of complementary bilateral exchange agreements, is contained at 84 CoNG. REC.
10703 (1936). At least one such agreement had been negotiated before the approval of the
treaty. See U. S. EXEC. AGREEM'T SER., No. 103, presumably negotiated compliant to 49
STAT. 1550 (1936), 44 U. S. C. § 139a (1940).
76. 17 STAT. 297 (1872); 19 STAT. 577; 49 STAT. 2741 (1934). For discussion of the early
activities of the Union see SAYRE, EXPERIMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION (1919)
19-25.
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Prison Commission,7 the Inter-Parliamentary Union,-a and the Inter-
national Technical Commission of Aerial Legal Experts.
More recently, the same procedure was used, pursuant to the so-
called "Green-Vandenberg-Sayre formula," to ratify American mem-
bership in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administra-
tion, in support of which the United States may appropriate upwards
of one billion dollars.80
International Commercial Agreements.
From the very beginning of the American Republic, executive agree-
ments have been used interchangeably with treaties as modes of enter-
ing into arrangements with other nations for the adjustment of com-
mercial and industrial problems. In 1939, Assistant Secretary of State
Sayre compiled a list, by no means all-inclusive, of 81 executive agree-
ments dealing with commercial questions; all but 15 had been nego-
tiated before 1933.81
One of the earliest uses of Congressional-Executive agreements in
this field is the series of agreements made after adoption of the Act of
March 3, 1815 and its successors, permitting repeal of discriminatory
duties against foreign vessels and foreign-carried cargoes, when equiva-
lent treatment was accorded by other nations to American foreign
commerce.8 2 In 1850, the Supreme Court clearly recognized the power
of Congress in the premises in Oldfield v. Marriott.83
Executive agreements have also been used with great frequency as
instruments for ensuring reciprocal trade policy between the United
States and other nations. We have already referred to their first use
for this purpose, the 1784 compact by which an "unconditional most
favored nation" clause was substituted for the "conditional favored
nation" clause in the 1778 Treaty of Commerce w\ith France.8" A series
of trade agreements was negotiated in the 1820-1840 period.5
After the failure of Congress to enact legislation to effectuate the
77. 29 STAT. 438 (1896).
78. 46 STAT. 790 (1930).
79. 46 STAT. 1162 (1931),49 U. S. C. § 231 (1940).
80. Pub. L. No. 267, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 28, 1944); see (1943) 9 DEP'T Or-
STATE BuLL., No. 229, pp. 317-9. Though no specific commitment vas made in the UNRRA
agreement, it has been the traditional policy of the United States to regard the failure of
another nation to appropriate funds with which to fulfil commitments made in international
compacts as an "international delinquency." See Moore, Treaties and Exectiik. A~rrcc, ents
(1905) 20 POL. Scr. Q. 335, 403-8.
81. Sayre, The Conslitulionality of the TradeAgrementsAc (1939) 39 COL. L. RI . 751,
770-5. The list did not include agreements negotiated under the 1934 Trade Agreements
Act.
82. See CaANDALL, TREATIES, at 121.
'83. 10 How. 155 (U. S. 1850).
84. See supra, p. 258.
85. See 3 MAILLER, TREATiES, at 256,269; 4 id. at 275,349.
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Mexican reciprocal trade treaty of 1883,1. Secretary of State Blaine
initiated the modem trend towards reciprocity agreements by securing
the insertion of provisions in the Tariff Act of 1890 87 authorizing the
President to impose penalty provisions upon nations levying "recip-
rocally unequal and unreasonable" imposts upon American exports.
In compliance with this act, trade agreements were consummated with
eleven nations without Congressional approval. 8 In 1892 the Supreme
Court held that this delegation of power to the President was constitu-
tional."9 The Tariff Act of 1897 contained an ambivalent provision
authorizing both Presidential reciprocal trade agreements and trea-
ties." However, the treaties negotiated under the act were expressly
made valid only if "approved by Congress" after consent by two-thirds
of the Senate. During the administrations of Presidents McKinley
and Roosevelt, numerous executive agreements were negotiated under
the provisions of this act; 91 however, not a single reciprocal trade treaty
became effective under it.92 In B. Altman & Company v. United States,
where the narrow question at bar was one of interpretation of certain
terms used in the 1897 act, the Supreme Court was emphatic that the
trade agreements had been constitutionally made and ratified.9 3
This pattern for facilitating the free flow of trade across international
borders has been continued in more recent years.94 In the 1920s, a
series of more than 30 reciprocal "most favored nation" agreements
were negotiated by successive Secretaries of State; 91 these compacts
were in harmony with, but not directly authorized by, the Tariff Act
of 1922.6 More significant have been the numerous reciprocal trade
agreements negotiated by former Secretary of State Hull pursuant to
86. See MCCLURE, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, at 83.
87. Section 3 of the Tariff Act of 1890, 26 STAT. 612 (1890).
88. See TARIFF COMMISSION, RECIPROCITY AND COMMERCIAL TREATIES (1919) 27,
145 et seg., 425.
89. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892).
90. Agreements were negotiated under Section 3 of the Act, 30 STAT. 203 (1897).
Section 4 authorized reciprocity treaties to be "ratified by the Senate and approved by
Congress." This accords with Jefferson's view as to the proper procedure for securing ap-
proval of commercial treaties.
91. See 1 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 158, 542, 558, 812, 987; 2 id. at 1275, 1463, 1718, 1721,
1775; TARIFF COMMISSION, op. cit. supra note 88, at 285-8.
92. See MCCLURE, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, at 87, n. 155.
93. B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U. S. 583,601 (1912).
94. See Willkie, Cowardice at Chicago, COLLIER'S, Sept. 16,1944, pp. 11, 79; cf. ScIIATT-
SCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES, AND THE TARIFF (1935).
95. A list of these agreements is given in MCCLURE, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, at 176,
nn. 253, 254.
96. 42 STAT. 858. See Sayre, supra note 81, at 763-4. These agreements were declared
to be constitutional in Hampton & Co. v. U. S., 276 U. S: 394 (1928). In fact, at least one of
the agreements had been negotiated before enactment of the statute. See MCCLURE, 1o. Cit.
supra, note 95.
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authority conferred by the Tariff Act of 1934 and its successors 7
Under these acts, Congressional approval was not necessary to permit
the agreements to go into effect; however, any particular compact
could be disapproved by simple resolution enacted within a stated
period after it had been signed by the President. The constitutionality
of these agreements has not yet been passed upon in any court. How-
ever, the tenor of recent decisions expanding the permissible scope of
delegation of authority to the President, the traditional Congressional
policy of extending extensive discretion to the President in handling
international problems," and the decisions sustaining reciprocal trade
agreements made under other statutes," render ludicrous any attempt
to cast doubt upon the constitutionality of the 1934 act.c ' Executive
agreements have also been the method of consummating numerous
bilateral trade agreements, such as the Russian-American pact of
August 1940.101
Another conspicuous example of the interchangeable use of treaties
and executive agreements for the resolution of commercial problems is
presented by the attempts to prevent pirating of trademarks and th'
unlicensed printing of literary works. In 1881, Congress enacted legis-
lation providing protection for the foreign owniers of trademarks if
reciprocal treatment were ensured American citizens by "treaty" or
"convention." 102 The first such bilateral convention, negotiated with
Italy in 1882, was submitted to the Senate for ratification as a treaty,0 3
and multilateral conventions were signed by the United States in 1883,
1911, and 1934, and ratified as treaties." 4 However, numerous ar-
97. 48 STAT. 943 (1934), 19 U.S. C. § 1351 (1940); 50 STAT. 24 (1937), 28 U. S. C. § 375a
(1940); 54 STAT. 107 (1940), 19 U. S. C. § 1352 (1940); 57 Stat. 125 (1943), 19 U. S. C. A.
§ 1351 (Supp. 1944). For a discussion of the procedures by which the agreements have been
negotiated see Hawkins, Administration qfthe Trade Agreenents Act [1944] i'is. L. Rsv. 1.
98. See supra, Section III, and Part II, Section VIII.
99. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892); Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S.
394 (1928).
100. But see Borchard, Executire Agreements, at 672. The leading authorities supporting
and attacking the constitutionality of the agreements are cited id. at 672, n. 29. The recent
Supreme Court decisions dealing with the delegation of power by the Congress to the Pres-
dent for handling domestic problems would appear, however, to remove the constitutionality
of the agreements from serious question. See, e.g., United States v. Rock Royal Coopera-
tives, 307 U. S. 533 (1939); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381 (1940);
Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, 312 U. S. 126
(1941).
101. U. S. ExEc. AGREEM'T SER., No. 179; 54 STAT. 2366 (1940). In return for an
agreement by the Commissioner of Foreign Trade of the U. S. S. R. to purchase at least
$40,000,000 of goods in the United States in the next twelve months, the President agreed
to admit 400,000 tons of Soviet coal free from the import tax provided in § 601 (c) (5) of the
Revenue Act of 1932.
102. 21 STAT. 502 (1881).
103. 1 MALLOy, TREATIES, at 984.
104. 2id.at1935;3id.at2953;4id.at5517.
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rangements for bilateral reciprocity in the protection of industrial
property have been made by executive agreement under the 1881 act
and its successors. 105 The United States failed to adhere to the Inter-
national Copyright Convention,' but, pursuant to legislation adopted
in 1891,107 numerous arrangements for bilateral extension of copyright
privileges have been made by executive agreements."0 ' More com-
monly, the President has followed the policy of issuing proclamations
extending copyright protection to nationals of stated countries upon
the basis of "formal official assurances" from their governments that
reciprocal rights were accorded American citizens.0 9 The Department
of State has taken the position that the assurances of the foreign
ministries constituted "contractual obligations of the governments
concerned." 110 More than 70 such agreements have been promul-
gated by the Presidents of the United States since 1891.1
The majority of the international arrangements for control of the
marketing of raw materials to which the United States has become a
party in recent years have been treated as executive agreements; the
same has been true of bilateral agreements for the trade of national
products." 2 Two of the most important examples are the 1941 coffee
agreement 13 and the 1933 wheat agreement." 4 Congress has retained
control over American participation in these commodity pools by
its power to withhold appropriations necessary to permit fulfilment of
American commitments or by its power to withhold. other appropria-
tions if its policies are not honored. An instructive example of inter-
changeable usage is provided by the arrangements governing American
fishing rights off the Canadian and Newfoundland coasts. From the
mid-1880s to 1911, these rights were regulated by executive agree-
ment; 115 thereafter control was pursuant to the terms of the Treaty of
Washington.
105. See, e.g., lid. at 111,396, 778, 808; 2 id. at 1265, 1769; 3 id. at 2852.
106. The text is printed in [1885-1886] 77 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS (1893)
22. The latest version of the treaty is reprinted in the DEP'T OF STATE, TREATY INFORMA-
TION BULL. No. 26 (1931) 14.
107. 26 STAT. 1110 (1891); as modified by 35 STAT. 1075 (1909), 17 U.S. C. § 1 (1940); 55
STAT. 732 (1941), 17 U. S. C. § 8 (Supp. 1943).
108. See, e.g., 1 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 557; 2 id. at 1687, 1710; 3 id. at 2585,2705.
109. See Hyde, Constitutional Procedures for International Agreement by the United
States (1937) 31.PRoc. Am. Soc. INT. L. 45, 49.
110. Ibid.
111. Memorandum prepared for the authors by Treaty Section, Division of Research
and Publication, Department of State, Jan. 29, 1945.
112. See McCLuRE, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, at 157-62; INTERNATIONAL LAIIOR OR-
GANIZATION, INTERGOVERNmENTAL COMMODITY CONTROL AGREEMENTS (1944).
113. See (1941)4 DEP'T OF STATE BULL., No. 94, p. 4 61.
114. (1933) 141 LEAGUE OF NATIONS, TREATY SERIES 71. American participation was
pursuant to the terms of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 31 (1933),
7 U. S. C. § 601 (1940).
115. See5 MOORE, DIGEST, § 752.
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The Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Export-Import
Bank have, pursuant to statutory authority, entered into loan transac-
tions with various governments to finance purchase of American
agricultural products or manufactured goods.10
Control of International Communications.
In an earlier Section we have referred to the postal legislation enacted
during President WNashington's administration authorizing consumma-
tion of reciprocal conventions without submission to the Senate. 17
This general policy has continued throughout our national history;
of the more than 300 postal conventions entered into by the United
States, apparently only three have been submitted to the Senate."'
Except for the Pan-American Convention of 1928,111 which was
ratified by the Senate, the vital problem of control of air transportation
has hitherto been handled by the United States exclusively by means
of reciprocal agreements negotiated -with individual foreign nations,
providing for issuance of individual licenses, division of routes, the
right of "innocent passage" in commercial flights, and for mutual land-
ing privileges. 2 Authority to negotiate such agreements has been
inferred from Section 6(c) of the Air Commerce Act of 1926.121 Of the
five multilateral agreements drafted by the recent Chicago Inter-
national Aviation Conference, it is planned to ratify four as executive
agreements and to submit one, establishing an international regulatory
body, to the Senate as a treaty. 22 Instructively, the most significant
compact-that establishing rights of innocent passage across the
domains of the signatories-is treated by the State Department as an
executive agfeement since it effectuates the 1926 act.123
While the United States has adhered to two international tele-
communication conventions 124 which were submitted to the Senate for
116. See MICCLURE, Ex7Ecu~r~rv AGREEmENTS, at 59-61; DETRicu, WORLD TRADE
(1938) 76 (Chinese-American wheat and cotton sale agreements).
117. Seesupra, pp. 239-40.
118. M CCLuRE, EXECUTIvE AGREEmENTS, at 6. As to the legal status of thece agree-
ments seeinfra, p. 309.
119. U. S. TREATY SER., No. 840 (1928). The provisions of the Pan-American Conven-
don are discussed in LIssITZYN, INT ERN.ATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ,wD NATIONAL POLICY
(1942) 370-3.
120. See, e.g., U. S. EXEC. AGREEM'T SER., Nos. 24 (1931), 38 (1932), 47 (1933), S0
(1933), 54 (1933), 58 (1934), 76 (1935), 110 (1937), 129 (1938), 143 (1939), 152 (1939), 153
(1939), 159 (1939), 166 (1939), 186 (1940). See also LissiTzvm, op. cit. supra note 119, at
387-9.
121. 44STAT. 572 (1926), 49 U. S. C. 176c (1940).
122. See Van Zandt, The Chicago Cirl Atiation Conference (1945) 20 ForxI.GN POLICY
IEPORTS 290.
123. 44STAT. 568 (1926), 49 U.S. C. 171 (1940).
124. The Washington Convention of 1927, 4 MALLOY, TREATIrS, at 5031, and the Ma-
drid Convention of 1932, 4id. at 5379.
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approval, a large number of arrangements have been made with in-
dividual nations by executive agreements, imposing equally great
responsibilities upon this country. Thege agreements have generally
been negotiated by the Executive without specific legislative authoriza-
tion. 125 The 1937 Inter-American Communications Compact was
authorized as an executive agreement; 121 on the other hand, the 1941
six-power regional broadcasting pact was referred to the Senate.127
Similarly, in the field of ocean communications, reciprocal arrange-
ments regarding tonnage duties, inspection, and safety provisions have
been made by numerous executive agreements. 2 1 Pursuant to the
Merchant Marine Act of 1920,129 the United States delegated con-
siderable power to make loadline regulations to the American Bureau of
Shipping, representing various maritime nations in the western hem-
isphere; extending the principle of international delegation of power,
the' Bureau has in general elected to adopt the regulations of the
British Board of Trade. 130
International Financial and War Debt Agreements.
Probably the most important international financial arrangements
hitherto consummated by the United States were those providing for
refunding of the inter-Allied debts occasioned by the first World War.
Negotiations for settlement of these debts were conducted by a special
World War Foreign Debt Commission created by statute in 1922.131
Agreements negotiated by this Commission and approved by the
President were thereafter submitted to Congress for approval. 132 By
this process arrangements were made for disposition of American
claims amounting to more than ten billion dollars.'33 Governmental
claims against Germany, arising from American participation in the
joint occupation of the Rhineland, were settled by executive agree-
125. See, e.g., U. S. EXEC. AGREEM'T SER., Nos. 34 (1932), 62 (1934), 66 (1934), 72
(1934), 109 (1937), 136 (1938). For earlier examples see 3 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 2707, 2768.
126. U. S. EXEC. AGREENI'T SER., No. 200; 54 STAT. 2514 (1937).
127. U.S. TREATY SER., No. 962 (1941).
128. See, e.g., U. S. ExEc. AGREEM'T SER., Nos. 9 (1926), 21(1930), 23 (1931), 71 (1930).
Several statutes appear to contemplate consummation of such agreements. REV. STAT.
§4154 (1878), 46 U. S. C. §81 (1940); REV. STAT. §4228 (1878), 46 U. S. C. § 141 (1940);
REV. STAT. § 4400 (1878), 46 U. S. C. § 362 (1940); 45 STAT. 1492 (1929), 46 U. S. C. § 85
(1940). For an example of an earlier agreement see 1 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 386 (Agree-
ment of 1886 with Denmark).
129. 41 STAT. 998 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 879 (1940).
130. See MCCLURE, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, at 155-6.
131. 42 STAT. 363 (1922) as modified and extended by 42 STAT. 1325 (1922) and 43 STAT.
763 (1925).
132. See, e.g., 43 STAT. 20 (1924); 43 STAT. 136 (1924); 43 STAT. 719 (1924); 43 STAT. 720
(1924); 44 STAT. 376 (1926); 44 STAT. 378 (1926); 44 STAT. 386 (1926); 45 STAT. 399 (1928);
46 STAT. 48 (1929).
133. See SCHUMAN, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1941 ed.) 452-6.
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ment; Secretary of State Hughes declared that the agreements did not
need "the consent of the Senate." 114 Private citizens' claims against
Germany arising subsequent to 1914 were referred to a mixed tribunal
by an executive agreement originally made in 1922 and extended in
1928.1"5 Our adherence to the Dawes refunding plan was also arranged
by executive agreement. 3 G When payment of interest on the war
debts became a financial impossibility in 1931, the negotiation of the
Hoover moratorium took the pattern of Congressional authorization
by joint resolution," 7 followed by the negotiation of executive agree-
ments with the individual nations concerned.
In the realm of international finance, one of the most important
agreements to which the United States has thus far been a party, the
four-power consortium governing loans to China after 1921, took the
domestic constitutional form of an executive agreement.-' Also be-
longing in this category were the executive agreements of 1905 and
1911 whereby American customs administrations were established for
the Republics of San Domingo and Liberia respectively. 1' The Lib-
erian agreement was the product of negotiation with four other nations.
On the other hand, the establishment of a customs administration for
the neighboring Republic of Haiti in 1915 was the subject of a treaty.1 '4
In subsequent years a serids of executive agreements were concluded
both extending and terminating various phases of American interven-
tion and assistance in the financial, medical and military affairs of
Haiti. 14' After the adoption of the Revenue Act of 1920,112 a large
number of reciprocal tax-exemption agreements were negotiated by
134. See McCLuRE, EXECUTIV E AGREEMEN TS, at 115-6.
135. 3 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 2601; 4id. at 4213.
136. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,242,249 (1942).
137. 47 STAT. 3 (1931). Introduction of the resolution had been preceeded by informal
negotiation with the principal debtor nations. See Dep't of State, Press Release, July 11,
1931; MYERS AND NEWTON, THE HOOVERADMINISTRATION (1936) c. 6.
138. 3 MALLOY, TREATIES, at3822 elseq.
139. As to the Dominican agreement see 22 WORKs OF THEmODORE ROOSEVELT (Mem.
ed. 1925) 580-1; CORWIN, TEE PRESIDmENT, at 237. The agreement had originally been pre-
sented as a treaty but had been rejected by the Senate; after the Customs Administration
had been in operation for some years, a treaty -providing for its continuance was consum-
mated.
As to the Liberian agreement see FoREIGN RELATIOnS: 1910 at 695, 709-11; ForEIGr;
RELATIONS: 1911 at 342 el seg.; FOREIGN RELATIONS: 1912 at 667 el scq.
140. 3 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 2673. The treaty w.-as extended for an additional term of
ten years in 1917 by an executive agreement. 3 id. at 2677. Extension of the Customs Ad-
ministration for this term had been contemplated in Article XVI of the original treaty, but
no reference had been made in the Senatorial ratifying act to the mode whereby this could be
authorized on the part of the United States. See 39 STAT. 1654 (1915).
141. See, e.g., 3 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 2677, 2678, 2682; U. S. Exnc. AGREEW'T SEn.,
Nos. 117 (1938), 128 (1938).
142. 42 STAT. 239 (1921); see also 43 STAT. 269 (1924);44 STAT. 25 (1926).
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Presidents Coolidge, Hoover, and Roosevelt. 143 Another important
financial agreement was the Litvinov assignment of 1933-one of a
number of agreements attendant upon American recognition of Russia
in 1933-whereby American claims against the Soviet government were
adjusted. In the Belmont 144 and Pink 141 cases, the Supreme Court
held that this executive agreement overrode state policy and con-
stituted the supreme law of the land, under Article VI of the Con-
stitution.
The 1936 three- and six-power agreements providing for establish-
ment of stabilization of international exchanges 141 were negotiated by
the President under authority of 1934 monetary legislation. 47 The
five-power silver purchase agreement of 1933 is another examplb of a
Congressional-Executive pact. 148 The question of American adherence
to the International Monetary Fund and the International Recon-
struction Bank, proposed by the Bretton Woods Conference, has been
submitted to Congress for approval by statute. 141
Other Important Executive Agreements.
The list of compacts according to subject matter given in the preced-
ing subsections could, if persuasion required it, be supplemented by an
impressive array of additional agreements dealing with subjects less
susceptible to cataloguing. Many of these agreements have been of
transcerident importance in the evolution of American foreign policy.
In discussing the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief,
we have already referred to the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817, the
precursor of the famed 3000-mile unguarded froritier between Canada
and the United States.' Several executive agreements affecting rela-
tions with China were of equal significance. By ah 'exchange of notes
with diplomatic representatives of England, FranCe, Russia, Japan,
Italy, and Germany in 1900, Secretary of State John Hay concluded
an agreement whereby the various nations agreed to maintain condi-
tions of commercial equality in all areas of China in which they had
spheres of influence; thus the foundation was laid for the so-called
"Open Door" policy.' By the Boxer (or Peking) Protocol of 1901-
143. See McCLuRE, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, at 163-4.
144. United Statesv. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324 (1937).
145. United Statesv. Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (1942). See infra, Section VI.
146. See MCCLURE, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, at vii, 167-73; Dep't of State, Press
Release, Sept. 26, 1936.
147. 48 STAT. 341 (1934), 31 U.S. C. § 822a (1940); 48 STAT. 52 (1933),
148. The agreement, 48 STAT. 1723 (1933), was made by the President pursuant to the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 52 (1933). This portion of the Act was not
invalidated in United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
149. See Part II, Section VIII.
150. See supra, Section III.
151. 1 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 244-60; see also GRISWOLD, TEE FAR EASTERN POLICY OF
TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
adhered to by the United States on the direct responsibility of Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt-proision was made for temporary occupa-
tion of a number of Chinese ports by an international expeditionary
force, for modification of various subsisting treaties, and for payment
of a large indemnity by China. 15 2
In 1919, the United States -as one of a dozen nations which entered
into an agreement to restrict munitions shipments to China; the agree-
ment was never submitted to Congress. 153 One of the key instruments
in the formulation of American policy to Japan, the Lansing-Ishii
Agreement of 1917, was a mere executive declaration of policy; 154
later the policy embodied in this declaration was changed by the multi-
lateral Washington Treaty of 1922.111 Another important diplomatic
arrangement was the 1913 compact whereby the United States sur-
rendered its extraterritorial rights in Tripoli."', Visa agreements have
also been negotiated with many nations.15 7
In other Sections, we have already adverted to several important
executive agreements consummated by various Presidents pursuant
to their constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief, including
the armistice protocol of 1898.1rs The first significant compacts in this
field are the prisoner exchange "cartels" made by President Madison
during the War of 1812.111 Among the other significant precedents are
the five-power pact of 1919 providing for occupation of the German
Rhineland "I and the various agreements with Mexico, pursuant to
which troops of both nations were permitted to cross the borders of the
other in pursuit of Indian marauders.Y6' The Supreme Court com-
mented favorably upon the constitutionality of one of these military
agreements in 1902 in Tucker v. Alexandroff. 1 2
Pursuant to legislation first enacted in 1920 and 1926, numerous
agreements have been entered into with Latin American nations, the
Philippine Commonwealth, China, and Saudi Arabia, providing for
TE UNITED STATES (1938) 36-S6. The correspondence vs transmitted to the HouZe of
Representatives in 1900 for its information. 1 'MALLOY, TRATiES, at 244; H. R. Doc.
No. 547,56th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1900).
152. See SEN. Doc. No. 67, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. (1901); 2 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 2013;
FoRE GN RELATIONS: 1901, app.
153. See Brewer, _xecutke Agreenents [1943] 2 EDrIORMAL RESEARtc RPORTS 1, 18.
154. 3 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 2720-2. See also infra, p. 30S, note 1.
155. See infra, p.348.
156. 3 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 2698.
157. See DEP'T OF STATE, TREATY INFo iTioN BULL., No. 81 (1936) 22.
158. See also WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMIERICAN FOREIGN RELTIO-S (1922) 241
et seg.; Moore, Treaties and F. x uive Agreements (1905) 20 POL. SCI. Q. 385,391-2.
159. 2 IILLER, TREATIES, at 557,567,568-73.
160. See Brewer, lc. cit. supra note 153.
161. 1 MALLOY, TREATIEs, at 1144, 1145, 1157, 1158, 1162, 1170, 1171, 1177,1178.
162. Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U. S. 424, 435 (1902).
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establishment of American military or naval missions to assist in
modernizing the armed forces of these friendly States. 6 '
Numerous important executive agreements were consummated
.by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, during, and immediately prior
to American entrance into, the present World War. Among the more
important are the various mutual aid compacts authorized by the
Lend-Lease Act of 1941,164 once described as the most important
single blow struck by this country towards United Nations victory;
the Canadian-American defense agreement of 1940; 166 and the Carib-
bean bases-destroyer deal, 6  which protected our vital security in-
terests in the Panama Canal Zone and simultaneously kept the sea
lanes to Great Britain open in the desperate months after Dunkerque,
Usage in Domain Still Uncharted.
The wide range of the subject matters with respect to which Con-
gressional-Executive and Presidential agreements have been used
interchangeably with treaties is obvious. Indeed, this range is so wide
that it seems reasonable to conclude that there is no apparent reason
why the use of such agreements should not be extended to any other
matter, not yet encompassed, that may appropriately be the subject of
intergovernmental arrangement." 7 Following the earlier lead of Profes-
163. The basic statutes involved are 41 STAT. 1056 (1920); 44 STAT. 565 (1926), 10
U. S. C. § 540 (1940); 49 STAT. 218 (1935), 10 U. S. C. § 540 (1940); 52 STAT. 442 (1938), 12
U. S. C. § 264 (1940); 53 STAT. 652 (1939), 5 U. S. C. § 118e (1940). See, e.g., the United
States-Peru naval mission agreement of July 1940. U. S. EXEc. AGREEM'T SER., No. 177,
54 STAT. 2344 (1940).
164. 55 STAT. 31 (1941), 22 U. S. C. A. § 411 n. (Supp. 1944), extended by 57 STAT. 20
(1943), 22 U. S. C. A. § 412 (Supp. 1943).
Speaking of reciprocal lend-lease aid to the United States in 1943, Senator Vandenberg
declared the record was "tremendously impressive." Quoted in Kellock, Lend-Lease Settle.
.rnents [1944] 1 EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS 43, 52. For general discussion of the Act and
agreements made thereunder see STETTINIUS, LEND-LEASE: WEAPON FOR VICTORY (1944).
165. See (1940) 3 DEP'T OF STATE BULL., No. 61, pp. 154 -5.
166. See U. S. ExEc. AGREEM'T SER., No. 181 (1940). The advantages of the deal
to both participants are succinctly outlined in STETTINIUS, op. cit. supra note 164, at 38-42.
Attorney General Jackson's opinion (finding that the transaction complied with existing
statutes and could be consummated without reference to the Senate) is reprinted in MC-
CLURE, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, at 394, and (1940) 3 DEP'T OF STATE BULL., No. 63,
pp. 199-207. Even Professor Borchard admits that Congressional "acquiescence" may be
inferred from the Lend-Lease Act, Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 676.
For criticism of the transaction see Borchard, The Attorney General's Opinion on the
Exchange of Destroyers for Naval Bases (1940) 34 AM,. J. INT. L. 690; Briggs, Neglected Aspects
of the Destroyer Deal (1940) 34 Am. J. INT. L. 569.
167. "There is clearly no constitutional impediment whatever in the way of recognizing
the usage of the executive agreement as including instruments of all known subject matter,
whether or not actually utilized at the moment." MCCLURE, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, at
50.
"On the basis of these opinions it appears that the President alone, or the President
together with a majority of Congress can accomplish most anything in the field of foreign
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sor Charles Cheney Hyde, 6 3 Professor Borchard has, however, in-
sisted that "numerous subjects, like extradition, naturalization, con-
sular privileges, treaties of peace, arbitration of claims against the
United States, and compacts modifying acts of Congress are by 'con-
stitutional usage' embodied only in treaties and not in executive agree-
ments," and that "here 'constitutional usage' has no appeal" for an
author [Ir. McClure] who suggests complete interchangeability. 1c3
The notion seems to be that development of the constitution by usage,
like an absolutist's attempted interpretation of the words of the docu-
ment, stops short with a given time and cannot continue in accordance
with the changing conditions and the principles of policy that produced
its first manifestations. 70 Somewhat more precisely formulated, the
argument is that the treaty-making power can be extended to any
matter that is properly the subject of international negotiation since
the exercise of that power is not restricted to the express grants of
power in the Constitution, but that the agreement-making power, on
the other hand, is confined to a limited class of subject matters since
its exercise is restricted to the specific grants of power to the Congress
and the President.'7' Thus, Mr. Levitan, in suggesting that Presiden-
affairs." Levitan, Recent Dereloprnents in the Control of Foreign Relations under tlhe Constitu-
tion of the United States (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in University of Chicago Library,
1940) 144.
168. Hyde, Constitutional Procedures for International Agreement by the United States
(1937) 31 PRoc. Am. Soc. INT. L. 45. MCCLURE, EXECUT IV AGREEMEtrs, at 332-44,
provides a persuasive point-by-point refutation of the Hyde article.
169. Book Review (1942) 42 COL. L. REv. 887,890.
170. It may be supererogation to suggest that in constitutional development by usage,
as in constitutional development by precedent, it is the principle of policy that is important
and not the specific facts, reduced to lowest abstraction, of any particular instance of the
usage. One might as well argue that the principle of the Belmont and Pinb cases cannot be
extended beyond intergovernmental agreements made between men named Roosevelt and
Litvinov as to argue that development of the Constitution by usage must stop short with
the specific instances of any given day. The relevant question, when the discus-sion is cast in
terms of usage, is whether there are any differences in policy between what has been done
by way of executive agreement and what has not been done. So far no such differences have
been alluded to.
171. For discussion of the scope of the treaty-making power see CoRMwiN, NXTIOnAL
SUPR-.ACY (1913); Feidler and Dwan, Extent of the Treaty-Mfaking Power (1939) 28 GEO.
L. J. 184; Boyd, The Expanding Treaty Power (1928) 6 N. C. L. REv. 428; Kuhn, The Treaty-
Making Power and the Reserred Sorereignty of the States (1907) 7 COL. L. REv. 172.
It may be emphasized further that the present broad compass of the treaty-making
power is itself a judicial creation. In achieving this compass the courts on occasion have
found it useful to play on the variance in the language of the supremacy clause (Art. VI..
cl. 2) which provides:
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
,pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the author-
ity of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in
every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any
state to the contrary notwithstanding."
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tial agreements can be effectively used only on "international issues of
which the domestic counterpart is within the range of Congressional
authority," states: "It must be remembered, however, that this is a
federal state and that Congress has but limited authority. Many of
the. international problems are on the internal level beyond the com-
petence of Congress to legislate; these problems can only be dealt with
by treaty." 172
The only judicial authority which is cited in support of this proposi-
tion that there is a fundamental difference in the scope of treaties and
executive agreements is a dictum by Mr. Justice Holmes in Missouri v.
Holland.173 This decision sustained an act of Congress, adopted under
the "necessary and proper" clause, to implement a treaty made with
Great Britain for the protection of migratory birds traveling between
the United States ifid Canada. Two lower courts had held a previous
act of Congress, not in aid of a treaty but designed to secure the same
end, unconstitutional. "The only question" Mr. Justice Holmes found
in the case was "whether [the treaty] is forbidden by some invisible
radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment." 174 But
in the course of his opinion he remarked, "It is obvious that there may
be matters of the.sharpest exigency for the national well being that an
act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such
an act could . *.".." 176 This decision has been blown into such fan-
tastic proportions by both those who approve and those who disapprove
of it, that it may be appropriate to quote at some length the reasoned
summary of two recent commentators:
The verbal difference between "made under the authority of the United States" and
"made in pursuance" of the Constitution has been used as a judicial crutch to assist In
establishing the supremacy of treaties over state laws, despite the Tenth Amendment. There
is no reason to suppose that the courts will turn to it to give a minority of the Senate su.
premacy over the whole Congress, especially since the Tenth Amendment is no longer a
threat to the powers of Congress.
"As to the validity of Mr. Justice Holmes' observation concerning the difference in the
constitutional language regarding laws and treaties, that laws to be valid must be made
'in pursuance of the Constitution,' while treaties need not be made 'under the authority of
the United States,' the writer entertains serious doubt. The change in the language was
clearly intended to embody more than just a change of style. But Professor Farrand has
already pointed out that the difference between these two phases grew out of the desire of
the framers to guarantee the validity of treaties negotiated previous to the adoption of the
Constitution, especially the Treaty of Peace, 1783." Levitan, supra note 167, at 13. See
also 2 FARLmm, REcoRns, at 417.
172. Levitan, Executive Agreements, at 394, 395. The problem with which Mr. Levitan
is here specifically concerned, that of making executive agreements the "law of the land,"
is dealt with at length in Secti6n VI of the present article.
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"The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, did not
determine whether the federal district court was correct in ruling
that the first statute was unconstitutional, but assumed such un-
constitutionality arguenido. It ruled that the extent of the treaty-
making power could not be determined by determining what
the Federal Government could not do under other powers. In
final analysis, the case stands for only two propositions: (1) The
exercise of the treaty-making power is not limited by those mat-
ters with which the states may deal without interference from
the Federal Government under any other federal power. (2) The
treaty-making power may be exercised so as to control the killing
of birds which by themselves fly to Canada and back and in the
return of which both Canada and the United States have an in-
terest. The first proposition was already well established and
has been reaffirmed since the .Afissouri case. The second proposi-
tion is no more than a finding that the conservation of birds that
migrate from one country to another and back again is a subject
properly pertaining to foreign relations and a matter of inter-
national concern. It is of value only as an analogy in determining
whether other fact situations present a matter of international
concern properly a subject of foreign relations." 17G
To put Mr. Justice Holmes' broad dictum in a contemporary per-
spective, it may be recalled (1) that the Justice spoke before the Tenth
Amendment as a "doctrine of independent vitality" had received its
final interment in United States v. Darby Lumber Company an and vhile
that doctrine was still a threat to the ex-press powers of the Congress;
(2) that he spoke before the present broad construction, as old in some
respects as Chief Justice Marshall, of some of the more important ex-
press powers of the Congress had received full acceptance; and (3)
that he spoke before a succeeding Supreme Court had extended his
other dictum in the second half of the same sentence, that "it is not
lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, 'a
power which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized
government' is not to be found," 178 to executive agreements. The
blunt fact is that no court has ever found an executive agreement on
176. Feidler and Dwran, supra note 171, at 196. Some indication of the controversy that
the case has aroused can be gleaned from Levitan, supra note 167, at 16.
In contrast with the careful summary of Feidler and Dwan, Profezzar Borchard inter-
prets Missouri v. Holland as having made a treaty "the practical equivalent of a constitu-
tional amendment." Borchard, The Two-Thirds Rule as to Treaties: A Change Opposed
(1945) 3 EcoN. CoUcNI PAPERS, No. 8, p. 6 .
177. 312 U. S. 100 (1941). The quoted words are from Feller, The Tenth Amendment
Retires (1941) 27 A. B. A. J. 223.
178. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 433. This is, as we have seen, the principal
theme of Mr. Justice Sutherland's opinion for the Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936). See also United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324 (1937);
United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (1942).
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any subject matter invalid, 79 and that any gap between what can be
'done under the combined powers, whether "enumerated" or "inher-
ent," of the whole Congress and of the President and what can be done
under the treaty-making power must be a judicial creation of the
future. In view of the traditibnal tendency of the Supreme Court to
put executive agreements and treaties on a par in every respect,18 and
in view of the fact that the Congressional-Executive agreement is more
responsive than the treaty both to democratic control and to the in-
terests of the whole country, it is permissible to doubt whether such a
gap ever will be created.
It may be advantageous to examine in more detail the alleged excep-
tions to the possible ise of executive agreements. The most important
item in Professor Borchard's list of subjects to which, he claims, usage
has not yet extended is "treaties of peace." The phrase "treaty of
peace," when bereft of the reification which makes it some mysterious,
special kind of an agreement, comprises merely an accumulation of
separate arrangements-with respect to territorial transfers, settle-
ment of claims, reparations, re-establishment of normal relations,
modification of pre-existing treaties, etc.-each of which, taken sepa-
rately, has been the subject of Congressional or executive or combined
action.' 8' The accumulation of such arrangements into a single docu-
ment would not appear to affect the question of constitutional power. 182
As previously indicated, the multi-nation invasion of Peking in 1899
was terminated by the so-called Boxer Protocol-in language, impor-
tance, and multiplicity of content indistinguishable from numerous
treaties of peace '8 3-which was never referred to the Senate. The hos-
tilities with Mexico in 1914 were terminated by an exchange of notes.18
179. See Catudal, Executive Agreements, at 665.
180. See infra, Section VI.
181. Accord: Corwin, The Power of Congress to Declare Peace (1920) 18 Mica. L. REV.
669, 671:
"The mere fact that Congress is not specifically authorized to make peace does
not prove that it does not possess powers in the exercise of which, on proper occa-
sions, it may bring peace about."
In his concurring opinion in United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203, 240-1 (1942) Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter makes interesting references to the President's power to settle claims and to
establish "normal relations with a foreign country."
182. The effort to distinguish executive agreements and treaties on some basis other
than the source of validating power is hard put when it has to turn to the size or length of a
document and the number of articles it contains. Professor Borchard, in Executive Agree-
ments at 670, n. 23, writes: "In respect to form it may also be questioned whether the multi-
articled agreement with Canada effected by exchange of notes August 18, 1939, as revised
later, providing for reciprocal air transportation service, should not have been incorporated
in a treaty."
183. See supra, 280-1.
184. See LATANA AND WAINHOUSE, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (2d rev.
ed. 1941) 659; CALLAHAN, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN MEXICAN RELATIONS (1932) C. 12;
FOREIGN RELATIONS: 1914 at 443 el seq.; FOREIGN RELATIONS: 1915 at 643 el seg.
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More significant is the experience after the last World War. By joint
resolution adopted in July 1921, the pre-existing "state of war" was
declared "at an end"; 185 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia subsequently held unqualifiedly that as of the date of enact-
ment of the statute, "the state of war between the United States and
the Imperial [sic] German government was terminated." I It is true
that treaties relating to the termination of the war were subsequently
negotiated with Germany, Austria, and Hungary.'17 But there would
appear to be no constitutional reason why every provision of these
treaties could not have been incorporated in executive agreements
authorized by act of Congress,Is' just as were numerous other important
aspects of the peace settlements."9 There is no necessary constitutional
paradox that the whole Congress should be able to declare war by
majority vote and yet not be able to approve the terms of a peace
settlement by the same procedure.
The other items on the list of supposed exceptions to the possible
use of executive agreements may be disposed of more summarily.'
The Congress is given the express power "to establish an uniform rule
of naturalization"; "I1 there is no reason why this grant should not be
construed as have other express powers (such as those over commerce
and postal affairs) to permit the authorization or sanctioning of inter-
national agreements. With respect to the extradition of criminals
there ate several instances--one dating from Lincoln's administration-
185. 42 STAT. 105 (1921). The resolution also terminated the state of war with Austria
and Hungary.
186. In re Stoffregen, 6 F. (2d) 943 (App. D. C. 1925).
187. 3 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 2493,2596,2693.
188. In 1 W ILOUGHBY, CoNsTruTIoNL LAW, at 535-6, the author writes.
"In support of the view that Congress, as distinguished from the Senate and
President acting as the treaty-making power, might, by its action, bring the war
to a legal close, it was argued that, since to that body belongs exclusively the con-
stitutional power to declare war, it should logically be held to have the implied
power to do what will, in effect, amount to a repeal of such a declaration. Such an
argument is absolutely valid, provided it be understood that such congressional
action can have no further than a municipal effect, that is, to bring to an end those
municipal legal consequences which follow from the existence of a status of war.
In other words, such a legislative act is not competent to determine the interna-
tional legal relations of the United States with the other belligerent Powers. These
can be fixed only by means of international agreements negotiated by the President
and approved by the Senate of the United States, and agreed to by the other States
concerned."
This distinction between the "municipal" and the "international" effect of an act of Con-
gress appears to stem from the semantic confusion, discussed above, that the whole.Congress
cannot authorize the making of international agreements.
189. See McCLuRE, ExEcuTnv AGREEMENTS, at 112-6.
190. For more detailed disposition see McCLURE, EXrCUTIVE AGREElIENTrS, at 249
et seq., 332 et seq.
191. U.S. CONsT. Art. I, § 8.
1945]
THE YALE.LAW JOURNAL
of such agreements made by the executive department and not referred
to the Senate. 92 Chief Justice Taney once suggested, moreover, that
the states, with the approval of Congress, would have the power to
make extradition agreements with foreign nations; 193 it would take a
strange logic to hold that the President, when authorized by the Con-
gress, would have less power.'94 The practical difficulty in subsuming
"arbitration of claims against the United States" under the President's
power as Executive is that the Congress may not make available the
funds necessary to satisfy any adverse awards. This is a difficulty that
the President shares with the President and the Senate when treaties
are used to resolve such claims; palpably the safest procedure in case of
claims against the United States is to arrange for their resolution by
Congressional-Executive agreements. In any case, as previously in-
dicated, there are several examples where claims against the United
States were settled or referred to arbitration by executive agreement. 11
The Pink and Belmont cases would seem to dispose of all doubts about
the scope that can be given to consular privileges, especially when
there are added to the powers of the President those of the Congress.
"Compacts modifying acts of Congress" present no difficulties for
Congressional-Executive agreements; what the Congress has done it
can undo. Whether Presidential agreements can modify acts of Con-
gress is a matter of more complexity which will be discussed in detail
below. Even if it be assumed that by some strange freak of future
judicial whim some of the above analyses may be proved wrong and
that a procedure which has been used for the annexation of territories,
for the conduct of wars, for the control of important peace-time eco-
nomic affairs, and for entering international organizations of various
192. During the Civil War, President Lincoln entered into an agreement with Spain to
extradite a Cuban official. See 4 MOORE, DIGEST, at 249; 1 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw, at 546. Reciprocal extradition provisions were contained in the 1903 agreement with
Cuba for leasing of naval or coaling bases, 1 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 360, 361; the 1913 agree.
ment with Great Britain applying to North Borneo, the Philippines, and Guam, 3 id. at
2637, 2639; and the 1899 agreement with the Sultan of Sulu, 2 W. CAMERON FORES, THe
PHILIPPINE ISLAMDS (1928) 470, 471. See also CRANDALL, TREATIES, at 117 el seg. But see
5 HAcKWORTH, DIGEST, at 406-7. In his discussion in Book Review (1942) 42 CoL. L. REv.
888, 891, Professor Borchard chides McClure for falling back on the first of these examples.
193. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 Pet. 540,578 (U.S. 1840).
194. At least two nineteenth century Attorneys General thought Congress could enact
statutes regarding the extradition of criminals. See 1 Ors. ATT'" GEm, 509, 521 (Wirt, 1831);
3 id. at 661 (Legar6, 1841). Several acts have been enacted providing for extradition of
criminals from foreign territory when odcupied by American military forces. 1 STAT. 302
(1793), 31 STAT. 656 (1900). See Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80 (1885); Neely v. Henkel, 180
U. S. 109 (1901). This would clearly seem to sanction use of Congressional-Executive agree-
ments for this purpose. On the other hand, it has been established that the President may
not require extradition of alien criminals from the United States on his own initiative.
Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U. S. 5, 9 (1936).
195. See supra, pp. 269-70.
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purposes, cannot be used for some of the items that Professor Borchard
lists, one may still conclude in accord with practical wisdom and sound
tradition de minimis non curat lex.
In support of this conclusion there is, in addition to the usage and
judicial benediction described above, distinguished academic authority.
The late Professor James XV. Garner, Reporter for the Harvard Research
Draft of the Law of Treaties, put into apt words-reminiscent of the
position taken by Presidents Tyler, Polk, and Mclinley-the view
which a considerable number of authoritative scholars have achieved
after surveying the relevant records of our history:
"The delegation by the Constitution to the President and the
Senate of the power to make 'treaties' does not exhaust the power
of the United States over international relations. The will of the
nation in this domain may be expressed through other acts than
'treaties' and such acts do not necessarily need to be ratified by
the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate
in order to be valid and binding, unless they so expressly provide
by their own terms. In short, the power of the President and the
Senate to regulate foreign relations is not an exclusive power; it is
only when an agreement takes the form of a 'treaty,' as that term
is used in the Constitution, that this power belongs exclusively to
them. There is no inconsistency between the authority of the
President and the Senate to regulate foreign relations through
agreements in the form of 'treaties' and the power of the President
and Congress to deal with matters of foreign policy through legisla-
tive action. Which of the two procedures shall be employed in a
given case is a matter of practical convenience or political expe-
diency rather than of constitutional or international law. If the
procedure of treaty regulation proves ineffective in a particular
case because of the constitutional impediment relative to ratifica-
tion, there is no reason of constitutional or international law why
recourse to the easier alternative of legislative action cannot be
had, if the President and a majority of the two Houses of Congress
so desire, as has been done with success on various occasions in the
past." 12
196. Garner, Acts anZd Jont Resoltions of Congress as Sitbsitues for Treaties (1935) 29
Am. J. INT. L. 482, 488. Compare CoRwnI, THE ConsTrrUno AD WorLD ORG.%,=ZATIOx
(1944). Professor Quincy Wright in The United Slates and Internalional Agreements (1944)
38 Am. J. Ixr. L. 388 and Mr. McClure in INTEnA.tTio.N E.rEcUTIV AGREEE ;TS (1941)
are inclined to prefer the Presidential agreement to the Congressional-Executive, but reach
substantially the same conclusion on interchangeability. Walter F. Dodd conclude-, in
International Relations and Mke Treaty Power (1944) 30 A. B. A. J. 360, 361, that the "execu-
tive agreement authorized or approved by Congress may serve the -same purpose as a treaty,
with respect to all matters within the power of Congress. Congressional power in all casas
may be used in place of the treaty power, except where the power to act is itself derived
from the treaty power," but makes no commitment as to the extent to which the power to
act may have to be derived from the treaty power. See also Todd, The President's Pow -r to
Make Internalional Agreenents (1927) 11 CoNST'L REv. 160, 164; FLE,= G, Tim UxaTm
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V. ADAPTATION OF THE CONSTITUTION .BY USAGE*
The historical record-outlined in the preceding Section of this
article-demonstrates clearly that executive agreements have come to
be used interchangeably with treaties in the conduct of the foreign
relations of the United States. In Section III it was shown that it is
impossible to ascertain from the express wording of the Constitution or
from the available shreds of evidence as to the latent intentions of some
of the Framers what differentiation, if any, was intended between the
scope of the treaty-making power of the President and Senate and that
of the agreement-making powers of the Congress and the President and
of the President alone. It is as impossible, therefore, as it is unneces-
sary, to state dogmatically whether the practice of interchangeability
which has in fact developed represents an effectuation or a supple-
mentation of the Framers' "real" intentions.
In the light of the Marshall-Holmes adaptive, instrumental theory of
constitutional interpretation, previously summarized,1 any appeal to
STATES AND THE WORLD COURT (1944) 177-83; statement of David J. Lewis, Judiciary
Committee Hearings at 114, quoting other writers, including Professor Burdick of Cornell.
In the recently published second revised edition of his treatise on international law,
Professor Hyde gives an elaborate description of the extent to which executive agreements
have been used as instruments of foreign policy but concludes that the record "fails to show
that the Government has in fact acted on the theory that the President, with or without the
aid of Congress, may conclude in behalf of the United States any arrangement which could
be concluded through the instrumentality of a treaty. There have been, moreover, instances
where a Secretary of State has felt that for purposes of agreement the use of a treaty was
obligatory." 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d rev. ed. 1945) 1416-7. In support of this
statement, Professor Hyde quotes Secretary of State Hughes' remarks regarding agreements
negotiated at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922. Ibid. With this should be con-
trasted President Harding's view that if the Senate minority balked ratification of treaties
embodying these international agreements, they could be submitted for validation by
majority vote of both houses. See infra, Section VIII.
* In preparing this Section, we have been greatly assisted by MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL
EXECUTIvE AGREEMENTS (1941) 193-255, and HORWILL, THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1925). However, the concept of adaptation of the Constitution by usage
was explicitly recognized as a sighificant means of conforming the document -to changing
political and economic problems many years before. See TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN
CONsTrruTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1890) and 1 BRYcE, THE AMERICAN COMMON-
WEALTH (1888) c. 34.
Comparison of certain of the "usages" described by these writers with the facts of mid-
twentieth century politics furnishes a significant insight into the extent to which the "living
Constitution" changes from era to era.
1. See supra, pp. 212-6.
In United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459 (1915), the Court was confronted
with the question as to whether the President was empowered to withdraw public land
from private acquisition, although Congress had authorized homesteading thereon in
general statutes. The President argued that his powers were established by long continued
usage if not by necessary implication from the executive clause. On this point the Court
said:
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the absolute artifacts of verbal archaeology can scarcely be of decisive,
or even of persuasive importance today. For even if the widespread
use of executive agreements in dealing with all Idnds of problems was
not within the conscious contemplation of the statesmen who fore-
gathered at Philadelphia 158 years ago, the continuance of the practice
by successive administrations throughout our history makes its con-
temporary constitutionality unquestionable. "The law of the Con-
stitution," wrote John Bassett Moore some forty years ago "is not
more to be found in the letter of that instrument than in the practice
under it . . " 2
In innumerable respects: the division of functions between the dif-
ferent branches of the Government and the scope of federal authority,
as clearly contemplated by the Framers, have been altered by usage and
"We need not consider whether, as an original question, the President could
have withdrawn from private acquisition what Congress had made free and open to
occupation and purchase. The case can be determined on other grounds and in the
light of the legal consequences flowing from a long continued practice to make
orders like the one here involved ...
"It may be argued that while these facts and rulings prove a usage they do not
establish its validity. But government is a practical affair intended for practical
men. Both officers, law-makers and citizens naturally adjust themselves to any
long-continued action of the Executive Department-on the presumption that
unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to be so often repeated as to
crystallize into a regular practice. That presumption is not reasoning in a circle
but the basis of a wise and quieting rule that in determining the meaning of a
statute or the existence of a power, weight shall be given to the usage itself--even
when the validity of the practice is the subject of investigation.
"This principle, recognized in every jurisdiction, was first applied by this
court in the often cited case of Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299, 309. There, answering
the objection that the act of 1789 was unconstitutional in so far as it gave Circuit
powers to Judges of the Supreme Court, it was said (1803) that, 'practice and
acquiescence under it for a period of several years, commencing with the organiza-
tion of the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the
construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most forcible nature. This
practical exposition is too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled.'"
Id. at 469,472-3.
2. Moore, Treaties and Executive Agreements (1905) 20 PoL. SCi. Q. 385, 417. We do
not mean to imply, however, that Professor Moore supports our view as to the proper roles
of treaties and agreements. See Borchard, Book Review (1942) 42 COL. L. RE%. 887.
For other statements of the importance of adaptation by constitutional usage see
McBAiN, THE LIVING Co NsTuTIoN (1927) c. 1; BENTLEY, PROCESS OF GovaE ?u T (1903)
285, 305 et seq.; HORWiLL, THE USAGES OF THE A-ERICAN CoNsTITUrrz.c (1925); 1 BnvcE,
THE AmmcCN COMMONwEALTH (1888) c. 34; SCHLESINGER, NEW VIEWOIN-S i; AMRa-
itAN HISTORY (1922) 81 et seq.; Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution (1934) 34 COL.
L. REV. 1; Corwin, The Constitution as Instrument and as Symbol (1936) 30 Au. PoL. SCi.
REV. 1070; Hamilton, Book Review (1943) 52 YALE L. J. 186. Professor Willis has recently
prepared a long list of clauses of the Constitution whose original connotations have been
altered or supplemented by the continuous constitutional conventions of the Supreme Court.
Willis, The Part of the United States Constitution Made by the Supreme Court (1938) 23 IoWvA
L. REV. 165.
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prescription, without resort to formal textual amendment. "For every
time that the Constitution has been amended," as Justice Byrnes has
pointed out, "it has been changed ten times by custom or by judicial
construction." I This process of constitutional evolution has by no
means been restricted to the numerous phases of government which
the draftsmen deliberately left ambiguous or unsettled; in many in-
stances the very words and phrases of the written Constitution have
been given operational meanings remote from the intentions of their
,original penmen. 4 For example, there are at least three important
instances where usage has grafted provisions into "the living Consti-
tution," which the Philadelphia Convention expressly declined to
include in its text. 5
The principal enzymes of change have been the emergence of a more
democratic philosophy of government, leading to replacement of some
of the patrician institutions devised by the statesmen of 1787,6 and a
continuous reinforcement of the belief that national survival and
growth are dependent upon the maintenance of an effective central
government.7 It is obvious that had the Constitution been unable to
"stretch itself to the measure of the times," it would, as Woodrow
Wilson observed, have been "thrown off and left behind, as a by-gone
3. Quoted in Hogan, Associate Justice James F. Byrnes (1941) 27 A. B. A. J. 475, 477.
4. George Washington was characteristically blunt in discussing the point: "Time
and habit are necessary to fix the true character of governments." Quoted in MUNRO, T1n
MAKERS OF THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION (1930) 14.
5. Seeinfra, pp. 296-8,299-302,303.
6. ". . . the general object [of his draft of the Constitution] was to provide a cure for
the evils under which the U. S. laboured; that in tracing these evils to their origin every man
had found it in the turbulence and follies of democracy. . . ." Edmund Randolph, speak-
ing during the first week of the Constitutional Convention. MADISON, DEBATES, at 34.
"The Constitution as it was framed by the Convention was well calculated to keep the
plain people in a subordinate place. . . .The more powerful branch of Congress, the
Senate, was to be chosen by the state legislatures, acting on behalf of the people. The Presi-
dent was to be selected by a small group of men in each state, who were presumably wiser
than ordinary men and who should be chosen in any manner that the state legislature might
specify." SCHLESINGER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 81. See also BEARD, THE RE PUnLIC (1944)
279; BEARD, ECONOmic INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1935 ed.); MUNRO, op. cit. supra note 4, c. 1.
"... the general tendency of the body of usage that has grown up has been in the
direction of a greater and more direct popular control of the government. The net result
has been to make the American political system more democratic than it was at the begin.
ning or than it was originally intended or expected to be." HORWnL, op. cit. silpra note 2
at 210.
7. "Among these formal additions to the original document only one enlarges the
powers of Congress. . . . Were there no other channels of federal expansion than that
which the process of formal amendment has provided, the national government would now
be relatively weaker than it was when it started. It has gained virtually the whole of its
political and economic hegemony of today from statutes, from judicial decisions, and from
usages." MUNRO, op. cit. supra note 4, at 3. See also BRYCE, lo. cit. supra note 2.
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device." 8 This process of continual adaptation is common in all gov-
ernments. When, as has proved to be the case in most of the American
states, the process of amendment is a relatively simple political prob-
lem, adaptation frequently proceeds by -ay of formal change; when,
as has proved to be the case in the Federal Union, the process of amend-
ment is politically difficult, other modes of change have emerged., To
quote Voodrow XX~lson again:
"There has been a constant growth of legislative and administra-
tive practice, and a steady accretion of precedent in the manage-
ment of federal affairs, which have broadened the sphere and
altered the functions of the government without perceptibly affect-
ing the vocabulary of our constitutional language .... "
"... We have been forced into practically amending the Con-
stitution without constitutionally amending it. The legal processes
of constitutional change are so slow and cumbersome that we have
been constrained to adopt a serviceable framework of fictions
which enables us easily to preserve the forms without laboriously
obeying the spirit of the Constitution, which will stretch as the
nation grows." 10
The infrequency of resort to formal amendments as a method of
modifying the Constitution is itself a striking example of the extent to
which the national government has developed along channels unfore-
seen by the founding fathers. Most historians and political scientists
have glossed over the fact that the Framers "intended to makze the
process of constitutional amendment an easy one. That is why they
provided four alternative ways of putting an amendment through."
They made it possible to initiate amendments in Congress, or vith-
out action by Congress. They provided for ratification by the state
legislatures or without action by these legislatures if the occasion re-
quired. ... The framers of the original Constitution anticipated,
moreover, that from time to time a national convention would be
S. WILSON, CONGRESSiONAL GoVERNMENT (1890) 9. See also stPra, pp. 215-6.
9. As intimated in the text, the important factor is not the relative simplicity of the
legal procedure by which a Constitution may be "amended," but the question of whether,
as a matter of practical politics, that process is responsive to democratic prezsures. Thus
there have been great discrepancies in the number of amendments adopted in states whoze
Constitutions contain identical amending procedures. See McBIN, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 21-3.
10. ViLsoN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 7,242.
11. Amendments may be proposed by: (1) two-thirds of both houses of Congrezs, or
(2) a convention convened by Congress at the request of the legislatures of two-thirds of the
states. Amendments may be ratified by: (a) the legislatures of three-fourths of the states, or
(b) conventions in three fourths of the states. U. S. CoNsr. Art. V.
The procedure used has always been the combination of steps (1) and (a), ex.cept in
the case of the Twenty-First Amendment which was submitted to state ratifying conven-
tions. See ANDERsON, APERICAN GoVruwmNT (1938) 109-10.
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called for the purpose of undertaking a general revision." 12 Con-
temporaneously Jefferson urged that the Constitution be amended to
provide for a general revision every twenty years. 13 These views were
not confined to the realm of speculation. Before the Constitution had
passed its third anniversary, ten amendments had been adopted; before
the Constitution had passed its 16th anniversary, more amendments
had been adopted than have been enacted in the ensuing 140 years. 1
In preferring to alter the Constitution by informal adaptation, the
American people have also been motivated' by a wise realization of the
inevitable transiency of political arrangements. The ultimate ad-
vantage of usage over formal textual alteration as a method of con-
stitutional change is that, while it preserves the formal symmetry of
the document, it reduces the danger of freezing the structures of gov-
ernment within the mold dictated by the expediencies or political
philosophy of any given era. A formal amendment may be outmoded
shortly after it is adopted, but usage permits continual adjustment to
the necessities of national existence. Thus the Constitution is enabled
to fulfil its role as a symbol of national unity and continuity, while
nevertheless being ceaselessly adapted, as its Framers intended, to the
problems of "ages to come."' 5
12. MUNRO, op. cit. supra note 4, at 4, 5-6; see also 2 FARRAND, REcORDS, at 557-63;
WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1928) 672-84, and letters of George Wash-
ington quoted in id. at 735-9.
Thus the Fifth Article provides that upon the request of the legislatures of three-
fourths of the states, Congress may convene a federal convention. The stated purpose of
such a convention is merely the consideration of amendments to the Constitution, However,
it is clear that such a convention could redraft the entire document. The Convention which
met in Philadelphia in 1787 had been convened for the limited purpose of devising "such
further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the constitution of the Federal
Government adequate to the exigencies of the Union ... " COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN HISTORY (1934) 132-4.
13. See Jefferson's letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, 15 WRITINGS OF THoMAS
JEFFERSON (Mem. ed. 1905) 40-3. Jefferson's general comments in this letter on the de-
sirabillty of constitutional flexibility are of enduring interest: "Some men look at con-
stitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the ark of the covenant, too
sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than
human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment. I knew that age well; I be-
longed to it, and labored with It. It deserved well of its country. It was very like the
present, but without the experience of the present; and forty years of experience in govern-
ment is worth a century of book-reading; and this they would say themselves, were they to
rise from the dead."
14. The first ten amendments came into force in 1791. The eleventh was ratified in
1798 and the twelfth in 1804. ANDERSON, op. cit. supra note 11, at 1063-4. Only nine
amendments have been adopted since 1804.
15. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 415 (U. S. 1819); see also Corwin, The
Constitution as Instrument and as Symbol (1936) 30 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1070; Lerner, The
Constitution and Court as Symbols (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1290, 1299 el seq.; c.f. Hamilton,
Constitutionalism (1931) 4 ENCY. Soc. ScI. 255: Borgese, Primitivism (1934) 12 id. at 398:
WHITEHEAD, SYMBOLISM. ITS MEANING AND EFFECT (1927).
[Vol. 54: 181
TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
Realization of the pervasiveness of adaptation by usage has been
somewhat retarded by the timidity of judicial semantics. In the
judicial forum, usage has generally been described by the more ortho-
dox verbal criteria of "long-continued . . .practice" or "legislative
interpretation."' 6 On occasion, however, there have been more forth-
right statements; thus, in Ware v. United States, the Supreme Court
declared:
"When weighed in connection with the immemorial usages of the
department, those acts of Congress recognizing the existence of the
power, may well be regarded as a legislative interpretation of the
provision [of the Constitution] authorizing the Postmaster General
to establish post-offices, and as sanctioning a construction in con-
formity to that well-known usage." 17
In Myers v. United States,'8 Chief Justice Taft jumped the final hurdle
by declaring that when "long practice" had established the propriety
of executive independence in a situation, where the language of the
Constitution might have been interpreted to dictate coordinate con-
trol, Congress could not thereafter seek to curtail the Executive by
enactment of restrictive legislation.19
The best evidence of the importance of usage is furnished by a sum-
mary of a few major examples in which the Constitution has been thus
modified or supplemented. This summary plainly demonstrates that
the growth of the interchangeable use of treaties and executive agree-
ments-if such growth does represent a departure from the foresight
of the Framers-is by no means of unique importance in the catalogue
of unwritten modifications of the Constitution. Moreover, if this
practice is an example of constitutional modification by usage, it
16. See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 691 (1891); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S.
244, 288 (1900); The Laura, 114 U. S. 411, 416 (1885); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 327-8 (1936); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 36 (1892).
See also McCLuRE, ExEcUTIvE AGREEMETS , at 211 el seq.; BRYCE, lot. di. supra note 2.
17. 71 U.S. 617, 633 (1866).
18. 272 U. S. 52 (1926). The question involved was whether the President had the
exclusive power of removing executive officers of the United States. Since Article II, Sec-
tion 2 of the Constitution empowered the President to appoint officials only "by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate" or, in the case of minor officials, pursuant to statute, it
would seem logical to assume that Congress could impose conditions on the exercise of the
removal power. However, usage and the importance of preserving the President's control of
the executive departments were held to preclude Congressional control of removals.
The doctrine of the M11yers case was not overruled in Humphrey's Executor v. United
States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935), which merely held the President's remo-al power was limited
in the case of members of independent regulatory commissions with quasi-judicial functions.
See Morgan v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 28 F. Supp. 732 (D. Tenn. 1939), aff'd, 115 F.
(2d) 990 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940), cert. denied, 312 U. S. 701 (1941). See also Comment (1942)
51 YAL.E L. J. 1358,1367-4; Notes (1939) 2 LA. L. REv. 183, (1940) 88 U. or P.%. L. Rnv. 357.
19. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 174-6 (1926).
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clearly proceeds in the main stream of such development-towards
democratization of our fundamental political institutions and protec-
tion of imperative national interests against any neo-mercantilistic
views as to temporary sectional interests.
Revision of the Procedure for Electing the President.
One of the most revolutionary glosses written by usage into the
original Constitution is the alteration of the procedure whereby the
President of the United States is selected. 0 The twin aims of the
draftsmen of the Constitution were to prevent the designation of the
chief executive by any sort of direct popular vote2' and to avoid domi-
20. The relevant provisions of the original Constitution are contained in Article Ii
Section 2. Paragraph 2 thereof provides that "each state shall appoint" the appropriate
number of electors "in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct." Paragraph 3
provides that:
"The electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for two
persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with
themselves. And they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the
number of votes for each; which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed
to the seat of government of the United States, directed to the President of the
Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House
of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted.
The person having the greatest number of votes shall be the President, if such
number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if there be
more than one who have such majority, and have an equal number of votes, then
the House of Representatives shall immediately choose by ballot one of them for
President; and if no 'person have a majority, then from the five highest on the list
the said House shall in like manner choose the President. But in choosing the
President the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state
having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members
from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary
to a choice. In every case, after the choice of the President, the person having the
greatest number of votes of the electors shall be the Vice-President. But if there
should remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them
by ballot the Vice-President."
As a result of the 1800 election when the choice of the President passed to the House
because Jefferson and Burr, the Anti-Federalist candidates, received the same number of
votes, the Twelfth Amendment was adopted requiring the Electors to ballot separately for
the President and Vice-President.
21. James Wilson, one of the few delegates who advocated election of the President by
direct popular vote, declared his own apprehension that the method "might appear chineri-
cal." Quoted in CLEvELAND, PRESIDENTIAL PROBLEMS (1904) 9. The views of the majority
were well expressed by the delegate who thought that "it would be as unnatural to refer the
choice of a proper person for [President] to the people as to refer a trial of colors to a blind
man." fIdn. See also THE FEDERALIST, No. 10 (Madison); 2 BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENcM
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1891 ed.) 219; WooDROW WILSoN, DIVISION AND RrUNION
(1918 ed.) 12; TANSILL (ed.), DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF TE UNIo
OF THE AMERICAN STATES (1927) 395,412.
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nation of the electoral process by political parties.-- To attain the
first aim the initial power of selection was confided in the electors, who
were expected to vote, without prior commitments, for whomever they
thought best qualified. 23 To achieve the second desideratum the Con-
stitution provided that the electors would meet in separate state col-
leges, that the colleges should all meet on the same day, and that the
electors should be permitted to vote only once.24 Actually it was ex-
pected that the Electoral College would function primarily as a
nominating body; for once George Washington left the Presidency it
was assumed that the votes would be so scattered "in the great ma-
jority of cases" that no person would receive a majority.2 The House
of Representatives would then have to select one of the five persons
who had received the greatest number of electoral votes; as each state's
delegation is entitled to one vote in this election, the doctrine of ma-
jority control would be wholly subordinated in the interests of the
smaller states. Examination of the records of the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1787 and of the state ratifying conventions dearly reveals
that this scheme was the culmination of much painstaking thought as
to the proper method for designating a chief executive. Indeed, it was
stated in No. 67 of The Federalist: "The mode of appointment of the
Chief Magistrate" was almost the only provision of the Constitution
which "escaped without severe censure ... -.
The departure from this carefully devised plan for an indirect elec-
tion resulted from the emergence, in considerable measure because of
Washington's policies during his second term, of political parties. :r
Beginning in 1796, the Federalist and Anti-Federalist members of
Congress began to meet in caucuses to designate party candidates for
the Presidency. Continuously in and after 1796, the balloting for
22. See the speech given in the Senate on March 18, 1824 by Rufus King, who had leen
a delegate to the 1787 Convention. 3 FiRRxND, RlucoRDs, at 462; see also HORWILL, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 41.
23. See Hamilton's remarks in No. 67 of THE FEDERALIST; Zee also Mr. Chief Justice
Fuller's dicta in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 36 (1892); RAwLE, A VIr w or rHE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF A!IERICA (1829) 46; [Mr. Justice] S.,u m-MIuj rr,
LEcTruEs ON THE CoNsTrrrTIoN OF THE UNITED STATES (1891) 149-50.
24. U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 2, par. 3, quoted supra, note 20.
25. FARRANm, THE FRAI[NG OF THE CONSTITLtION OF TilE UNITED STTES (1913) 167.
George Iason, who had been a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, predicted during
the debate at the Virginia ratifying convention that the vote of the electors would be in-
decisive forty-nine times out of fifty. Id. at 169. See also the remarks of other delegatc- to
the Philadelphia Convention quoted in TAN xLL, op. cit. supra note 21, at 663; TuE FrDER-
ALIST, No. 66 (Hamilton).
26. It has generally been believed that Hamilton was the author of No. 67 of Tl:c
Federalist (see Earle Sesquicentennial edition, 1937, at 436), but doubt has been cast on
this assumption by the recent research, largely unpublished as yet, of Mr. DouglasAdair.
27. See White, Public Administration underthe Fcderalists (1944) 24 B. U. L. I'Rnv. 143,
183-4.
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electors-both in those states where the electors were chosen by the
legislatures and in those where popular suffrage was permitted-was
conducted on a frankly partisan basis;2 this practice continued after
1832 when the party nominees began to be selected by conventions.
Since the election of 1824--when the Congressional caucus broke down
and the Democratic Party, then the only organized political group of
any strength, was split between four candidates 29-there has only been
one occasion, and that a freak, when even a single elector has voted for
anyone but the party nominee. 10
Numerous proposals have been made since 1824 to abolish the
Electoral College by formal constitutional amendment; all have
failed to secure the requisite two-thirds majority in Congress.31 Yet a
usage has developed in the interests of party and popular and party
sovereignty, whereby, to quote Mr. Justice Story, ". . . in effect, the
whole foundation of the [electoral] system, so elaborately constructed,
is subverted" 32; for plainly the electors are now regarded as "ani-
mated rubber stamps" 33 and mere trustees "to carry out definite in-
structions." 14 Former President Benjamin Harrison put the matter
bluntly:
"An elector who failed to vote for the nominee of his party would
be the object of execration, and in times of very high excitement
might be the subject of a lynching." 31
28. See STANWOOD, A HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENCY (1898) 44-5, 58-9, 82-3, HORWILL'
THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1925) 43-5. The voting for Vice-President
in 1792 had been conducted on a partisan basis; John Adams was the nominee of most of the
Federalist electors and George Clinton of the Anti-Federalists. Id. at 32-6.
29. In the 1824 election, 10 of the 14 North Carolina electors voted for Crawford, al-
though the popular vote had gone to Jackson. The New York electors were all instructed by
the legislature, which had picked them, to vote for Clay; three turned maverick and voted,
one each, for John Quincy Adams, Crawford, and Jackson. See Huddle, The Electoral Col-
lege [1944] 2 EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS, 99, 107.
In the 1820 election, Elector William Plumer, Sr., of New Hampshire, although pledged
to vote for Monroe, prevented the latter's unanimous reelection by voting for John Quincy
Adams. See WILLIAM PLUMER JR., LIFE OF WILLIAM PLUMER (1857) 493.
30. Horace Greeley, the Liberal Republican-Democratic candidate in 1872, died after
he had been defeated in the popular election but before the Electoral College met. Three of
the 66 Democratic electors voted for the dead man; the other votes were split among four
persons, only 18 of them going to the official nominee for Vice-President. See HORWILL., OP.
cit. supra note 28, at 51-2. This situation has sometimes been mistakenly cited as an exam-
ple of independent conduct by the electors. See Huddle, supra note 20, at 107.
31. See Huddle, loc. cit. supra note 29.
32. 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION (1st ed. 1833) § 1457.
33. The phrase is former Vice-President Thomas R. Marshall's, quoted in HORWILL,
op. cit. supra note 28, at 41.
34. The description is that of James Russell Lowell, a Republican elector from Massa-
chusetts, urged in 1876 to vote for Tilden, the Democratic nominee who had received a
popular majority and possibly had his electoral majority stolen by party machinations, to
help avert a threatened civil war. Quoted in HAYNES, THE ELECTION OF SENATORS (1906)
132. A shift by Lowell would have elected Tilden.
35. HARRISON, THIS COUNTRY OF OURS (1897) 77.
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The Development of Judicil Review.
The allocation to the federal judiciary of the power to pronounce
ultimate judgment upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress is
another one of the many important structural changes grafted by usage
on to the anatomy of the Federal Government.-"
The contemporary belief that the power to pass upon constitutional
questions in the course of deciding a "justiciable case or controversy"
necessarily involves the power to issue an interpretation which is bind-
ing upon Congress and the President hinders recognition of the dual
aspect which the problem of judicial review assumed in the first seventy
years of the Republic. The first question was that of jurisdiction-
whether the courts were privileged to pass judgment upon the con-
stitutionality of acts of Congress in any situation; the second question
was that of the degree of finality which adhered to the Court's pro-
nouncements on constitutional questions. 7 The text of the Constitu-
tion does not confer upon the courts the power to pronounce acts of
Congress unconstitutional, and the question was never formally dis-
posed of at the Constitutional Convention. Only a minority of the
delegates discussed the problem at all during the course of debate; the
preponderant opinion was in favor of some form of judicial review, but
the position was never very boldly asserted, nor was any integrated
rationale of its desirability or necessity presented. While the propriety
of judicial review may reasonably be inferred from Section 25 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, 9 the ranguage of the Constitution itself indi-
cates the existence of Congressional power to limit or virtually abolish
the jurisdiction of the federal courts." Chief Justice Marshall's opinion
36. See generally CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION (1933) c. 1; 1 BOUDIN, GOVEmn-
MENT BY JUDicIARy (1932) 1-406. The emergence of executive leadership of CongreCa
during portions of the twentieth century is sometimes assumed to be a novel development
in American government. Actually, this is merely a return to the policy followed by Wazh-
ington, Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln. See MUNRo, MAKERS OF THE UNVWIUTrEN CON-
STITUTION (1930) C. 1; SMALL, SOME PRESIDENTIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PIESIDENCY
(1932) cc. 1, 5; THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1913) 388-9.
37. The distinction is developed at length in CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 36, at 1-17,
51-74.
38. See 1 FARRAND, REcoP s, at 21, 54, 97-8, 138-40, 150. 164-9, 337; 2 id. at 28-9,
73-80, 92-3, 245, 298-300, 390-1, 428, 440, 589. See also FARRAND, op. cit. supra note 25, at
154-7; BRETZNER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHAFF (1941) 147-52; 1 BOUDIN, Op. Cit. supra note 36,
c. 6. For somewhat contrary interpretations of the intent of the Framers see BEAR, Tnxs Sir-
PREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1912); HAINES, THE AlIERICA.N DocmR I.E OF
JuticiAL SUPREmACY (1932) 122-49.
39. 1 STAT. 85 (1789). This provided, inter alia, that in the event of a decision in a
state court of final jurisdiction purporting to rest on the invalidity of a federal statute or
treaty under the Federal Constitution, the decision might "be re-examined and reversed or
affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States upon a Writ of error." Id. at 86.
40. Thus the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction "with such exceptions, ahd
under such regulations, as the Congress shall make." U. S. CoNsr. Art. III , § 2, Par. 2.
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in Marbury v. Madison4l-generally treated as the cornerstone of the
doctrine of judicial supremacy-places the Court's power upon al-
legedly necessary inferences froim the very nature of a written constitu-
tion. But this argument ignored the written constitutions which
existed in the states before 178-all of which proceeded on Black-
stone's theory of legislative supremacy 4 -and was contrary to the
position taken by some of the ablest contemporary state judges. 43
When, after repeated assertions of authority by state and federal
judges, 44 there emerged a universal concession of the power of the
courts to pass upon constitutional questions, the question of finality
remained unsettled. Even Chief Justice Marshall never asserted that
In the leading case of Duncan v. The Francis Wright, 105 U. S. 381, 5 (1882), the Court
stated: ". . . while the appellate power of this court under the Constitution extends to all
cases within the judicial power of the United States, actual jurisdiction within the power is
confined within such limits as Congress sees fit to prescribe." In the early case of Wiscart v.
D'Auchy, 3 DalI. 320, 327 (U. S. 1796), Chief Justice Ellsworth declared: "If congress has
provided no rule to regulate our proceedings, we cannot exercise an appellate jurisdic-
tion . . . ." See also American Construction Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & X. W. Ry., 148
U.S. 372,378 (1893).
Original jurisdiction, except in cases affecting ambassadors or consuls or in which a
state is a party, can be exercised only by "such inferior courts as the Congress may front
time to time ordain and establish." U. S. CONST. Art. III, § 1, and § 2, par. 2. Thus Con-
gress has powei to set limits to, or completely withdraw, the jurisdiction of the inferior
courts. Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dall. 8 (1799); Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441
(1850); Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 234 (1922); but see Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304,328-30 (1816).
41. 1 Cranch 137 (U.S. 1803); see also THE FEDERALIST, No. 78 (Hamilton).
42. See THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS (1908) 3-5; CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 36, at 23;
1 BL. CoMM. *90.
Numerous European countries have adopted written constitutions without providing
for judicial review of legislation. See HAINES, op. cit. supra note 38, at 1-21, 573-662, This
had been the case under the French Republican Constitution of 1791, with which Marshall
must have been familiar. 1 BOUDIN, op. cit. supra note 36, at 222.
43. See dissenting opinion of Gibson, J., in Eakin v. Raub, 12 S. & R. 330 (Pa. Sup,
Ct. 1825); Preface, 1 Chipman's Vt. Rep. 22 el seq. (1824); see cases and legislative reports
discussed in THAYER, op. cit. supra note 42, at 5-6, and cases cited in HAINES, Op. cit. supra
note 38, at 261 ef seg. When Gibson, as Chief Justice, later changed his view as to the right of
judicial review, usage was qne of the factors emphasized as underlying the shift. Norris v.
Clymer, 2 Pa. 281 (1845).
Had Adams acted with less haste in appointing John Marshall as Chief Justice in the
last days of his term, the vacancy would have been left for Jefferson to fill. It seems clear
that Jefferson would have appointed Spencer Roane, Chief Justice of Virginia, in which case
the United States would have had a different Constitution-one where the institution of
judicial review, if it existed at all, would have had noticeably slighter contours.
44. See THAYER, op. cit. supra note 42, at 13-25; DODD, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw (1941 ed.) 14-15. Justices of the Supreme Court had discussed the constitutionality of
federal legislation in several cases antedating the decision in Marbury v. Madison. Hay-
burn's Case, 2 Dail. 409 (U. S. 1792); Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171 (U. S. 1796):
Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14, 18-19 (1800).
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the Supreme Court's opinions were binding upon Congress or the
President. Indeed, the Marbury case declared nothing more than the
refusal of the Court to exercise power conferred by a statute considered
to be void; as Professor Corwin has pointed out, this was merely judi-
cial self-defense. 45 Many of the most distinguished statesmen of the
young Republic-Jefferson, Madison, Gallatin, Sumner, Taney, Jack-
son, Van Buren, Benton--espoused the theory of coordinate construc-
tion,41 providing that "Congress, the Executive, and the Court must
each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution." 47
In reliance on this theory, President Jackson vetoed the National
Bank Act of 1832 on the ground that it was unconstitutional, although
the Supreme Court had rendered a contrary opinion in M1cCidloch v.
M4,aryland; this view was accepted as a correct interpretation of the
Constitution by Bancroft, the best known historian of the early Re-
public, and by George Ticknor Curtis, author of the first history of the
Supreme Court.43 In his First Inaugural Address, Lincoln reiterated
the doctrine of coordinate construction; -1 and the Republicans in
Congress acted on this principle in 1862 when they outlawed slavery in
the territories -0 in disregard of the decision in the Dred Scott case.
The emergence of judiciary supremacy is an aftermath of the Recon-
struction Period and a triumph of habituation and textbook indoctrina-
tion.51 In the first seventy years of its existence, the Supreme Court
repeatedly passed upon the constitutionality of Congressional legisla-
tion but only twice declared acts invalid. 2 Thus the Republic was
acclimated to the institution of judicial review without being made to
45. CoRwIN, op. cit. supra note 36, at 2-3; see also HMuES, THE ROLE OF THr Sy prJuE
CourT iNAMRmcAN GovEnrm.rr AND POLITICS, 1789-1335 (1944) 254; 1 Boun,, op. cit.
supra note 36, at 229-33. It is significant that Marshall never uses the term "unconstitu-
tional" in his opinion in Jfarbury v. .adison.
46. See 3 BEVERIDGE, LIFE OF JOHN MADSUALL (1920) 144; 1 BotrIn, op. cit. supra
note 36, at 466-S; 6 WRITINGS OF JA!Es MAiDiSO (Hunt, ed., 1906) 326; 9 id. (1910) at 443;
10 WRitinGs OF THomAs JEFFERSON (Ford, ed., 1S99) 141; M cLAvUGLIN, CONsnTUTo ,L
HISTORY, at 415-7. For a general discussion of the doctrine see Lans, A Study in the Tradi-
tion of the Constitution in the United States (Unpublished thesis in Columbia Univerity
Library, 1939) 50-7.
47. The quotation is from President Jackson's Bank Veto Message of July 10, 1332,
2 Ricm AnsoN, MESSAGES, at 576, 582. See also the statement of Leroy Lincoln, Jefferzon's
first Attorney General, 1 Ops. AnT'y GE. 122 (ISO).
48. See CuRTIs, CONsTiTrTrooX. HisroRn OF TE UTrD STATEs (1396 ed.) 69-70.
As to Bancroft's views, see CoRwIN, COURT OVER ConsTrrTION (1933) 76, n. SO. Jack-
son's veto message may be found in 2 RcIIARDsoN, MESSAGES, at 52.
49. 6 RicaARDSOn, MESSAGES, at 9-10; see also the comments of Seward and Chawe,
quoted in SA'NDuRG, ABRAAM LINCOLN: THE PRu.rE YEXns (1923) 363-76.
50. 12 STAT. 432 (1862).
51. See BENETT, Trm CoNsTTrro IN SCHOOL .,ND COLLEGE (1935); JacI:soN, THE
STRUGGLEFOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941) c. 2; Ians, supra note 46, c. 3.
52. In Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (U. S. 1803) and Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19
How. 393 (U. S. 1857). See HA=sS, op. cit. supra note 38, at 400 et scq.
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feel its impact. Simultaneously, the destruction of the states' rights
doctrine in the crucible of the Civil War placed on firm ground the
power of the Supreme Court to pass final judgment upon the validity of
state legislation under the Federal Constitution. 3 While this involved
different problems of policy and constitutional necessity,"4 it furnished
a persuasive popular analogy for the doctrine of judicial finality among
the organs of the Federal Government. Moreover, the coordinate power
theory was fatally defective in that it provided no means for the r~solu-
tion of conflicts on questions of constitutional interpretation. In the
post-Civil War era, when dissatisfaction with the quality of Presidents
and Congressmen was rife and laissez-faire was the predominant social
philosophy, 5 the triumph of the Court was well-nigh inevitable.
When the Supreme Court set aside a number of the Radical Republi-
can reconstruction acts immediately after the Civil War, Congress
promptly proceeded to curb its powers of review." The ultimate proof
of the triumph of the judiciary after 1870 and of the popular acceptance
of its position is the complete absence of any official attempt to reduce
the Court's powers during the 1935-1937 period, despite the recogni-
tion that Congress had authority under the Constitution to limit or
obliterate completely the jurisdiction of the federal courts."
Modification of the Structure of the National Government by Usage.
Adaptation of the Constitution by usage has been particularly useful
as a means of creating a strong executive department, competent to
deal with the manifold problems posed by our industrial society. Sev-
eral examples will serve to illustrate the nature and importance of these
modifications:
53. Immediately before the Civil War, the State of Wisconsin had echoed the nullifica-
tion doctrine of the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions in protests against the decision in
Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506 (U. S. 1859). See AMES, STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL
RELATIONS (1906) 304-5. For other examples of opposition to court decisions invalidating
state legislation in the immediate pre-war years see SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT (1943) 230-58; 1 BOUDIN, op. cit. supra note 36, c. 19.
54. See HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1921) 295-6.
55. See JOSEPHSON, THE POLITICOS (1938); 3 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY (1922) 545; VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
(1904) 269-304; Hamilton, The Path of Due Process of Law in READ (ed.), THE CONSTITU-
TION RECONSIDERED (1938) 167; 3 PARRINGTON,'MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT
(1930) 7-48; 2 BEARD, RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION (1927) cc. 20-22.
56. The validity of the Reconstruction Acts was involved in the McCardle dispute,
arising as a result of the incommunicado detention of a Southern editor. In 1868, tile
Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to review the lower court's denial of habeas
corpus. 6 Wall. 318 (U. S. 1868). Over President Johnson's veto, Congress enacted leglisla-
tion withdrawing the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over this class of cases, which
was specifically made applicable to pending appeals. 15 STAT. 44 (1868). The Court upheld
the constitutionality of the act. Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (1869). See generally 3
WARREN, op. cit. supra note 55, at 187, 195-210.
57. See note 40 supra.
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1. The Constitution provides that federal officers must be appointed
with the approval of the Senate, or according to alternate procedures
prescribed by Congress.A However, from the beginning of the Republic
there has been general recognition that the President possesses the
unfettered power to remove all but certain "quasi-judicial" officers. 0
As previously indicated,"0 the Supreme Court has held that Congress is
disabled from now altering this practice by legislation, except in certain
special situations.
2. It was the original expectation of the Framers that the Senate
would regularly advise the President in the conduct of executive af-
fairs.61 But clearly nothing akin to the present-day cabinet was within
the contemplation of the Framers; the various proposals made during
the Constitutional Convention for the creation of a formal council of
state had been'rejected. 62 The President, however, was empowered to
request written opinions from the heads of "each of the executive de-
partments." 63 Washington soon found it advisable to convene regular
meetings of the various Secretaries; 64 succeeding Presidents emulated
the practice, leading to the gradual emergence of the cabinet as an
"extra-statutory and extra-constitutional body." 65
3. If the emergence of the cabinet marked a parallel to British
experience, the relation of its members to Congress proceeded to
develop in a manner divergent from the relation of the British ministers
to the House of Commons. The Constitution itself precluded executive
officers from sitting in Congress although permitting Congressmen to
serve as heads of governmental departments provided they received no
additional compensation." In the early years of the Republic, pro-
cedures were established whereby the Secretaries could deliver oral
58. U.S. Co~sT. Art. II, § 2, Par. 2.
59. This was the opinion of the majority during the debate on the removal power at
the first session of Congress. Salmon, History of the Appointing Power of the President (1886)
1 Ams. HIsT. Ass'N PAPERS, No. 5. The view has generally prevailed, except from 1867 to
1887, when the Tenure of Office Act was in force. HoRtwuLL, THE USAGES OF THL AsmucArN
CONSTITUTION (1925) 142-5; Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 109-56, 164-72 (1926).
60. Note 18 supra. As a matter of fact, the usage had never extended to quasi-judicial
officials since Congress generally had placed express limitations on the power of the Presi-
dent to remove members of regulatory commissions in the acts establishing these agencies.
61. See HENRY CABOT LODGE, A FIGHTING FRIGATE AND OTHER ESSAYs (1902) 71; see
also the discussion of the gradual atrophy of the Senates consultative role in the negotiation
of treaties supra, pp. 207-S.
62. See 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 539-43.
63. U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 2, Par. 1.
64. See LEARNED, THE PRESIDENT'S CABINET (1912) 118-30.
65. WILLIAm HowARD TAFT, OuR CHIEF MAGISTRANTE AND HIS PowEns (1925 ed.) 30.
The office holders who comprise the Cabinet are selected by the President. At first the
Vice-President was generally excluded; when he was elected to this position, Jefferzon even
declared that, under the Constitution, he was entirely "confined to legislative functions."
8 WoRxs OF THoMAs JEFFERSON (Fed. ed. 1904) 284.
66. U.S. CONsT. Art. I, § 6, Par. 2.
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reports to Congress.67 These devices for cooperation soon fell into
desuetude, however, and a usage developed prohibiting cabinet min-
isters from speaking or even appearing on the floor of Congress, save
on ceremonial occasions.68
Usage and the Control of Foreign Relations.
The text of the Constitution dealing with the conduct of inter-
national affairs has been altered and supplemented by usage as fully
as have any of the other provisions of the original instrument. Most
of the more important examples have already been mentioned in the
analysis of the powers of Congress and the President. A short sum-
mary will serve to complete the discussion of the role of amendment by
usage in the American governmental structure:
1. End of the Senate's Role as Coordinate Director of Treaty Negotia-
tions. The expectations of the Framers that the Senate would continue
to play an active role in controlling the details of international negotia-
tions-as Congress had done under the Articles of Confederation--
have previously been indicated, and we have discussed the reasons why
President Washington and his immediate successors found it necessary
to abandon the practice." Thus the provision of the Constitution that
treaties would be made with the "advice and consent" of the Senate
has been greatly changed in meaning by a usage initiated by the very
man who had been the President of the Constitutional Convention.
2. Control of Diplomatic Relations by the Executive Department.
Corollary to the assumption of complete control over the negotiation of
international agreements by the President has been the emergence of
the State Department, under direct Presidential control. In the act
establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1789, it was pro-
vided that the Secretary would "perform and execute such duties as
shall from time to time be enjoined on or entrusted to him by the Presi-
dent." 70 Under the Articles of Confederation, the Secretary for Foreign
67. In 1789, Acting Secretary of State Jay and Secretary of War Knox attended the
Senate several times, both with and without the President, to discuss pending treaties; due
to Washington's dissatisfaction with the length and acerbity of the discussion, the practice
of formal consultation was abandoned. See HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES, 1789-
1817 (1920) 4-25; see also supra, pp. 207-8. The act establishing the Treasury Department
in 1789 provided that the Secretary should furnish any requested information to either house
"in writing or in person." Hamilton desired to deliver his reports orally, but was directed
instead to communicate in writing. See HORWLL, op. cit. supra note 59, at 114,
68. Abortive attempts were made to revive the practice of direct cabinet participation
in discussions in Congress late in Washington's second term; thereafter formal communica-
tion between cabinet members and Congressmen was confined to the transmission of written
messages. See HORwiLL, op. cit. supra note 59, at 114-5.
69. See supra, pp. 207-8.
70. 1 STAT. 28 (1789). By an act adopted later in the same year, the name of the De-
partment was changed to that of the Department of State. The official designation of the
Secretary was correspondingly changed. 1 STAT. 68 (1789).
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Affairs had been directly responsible to Congress;7' there is nothing in
the Constitution which precludes a similar practice.72 But as was the
case in the act establishing the War Department (although unlike that
establishing the Treasury 73) the new office of foreign affairs was ex-
pressly denominated an "executive department." A more important
contrast is provided by the fact that while the duties of the Secretary
of the Treasury were prescribed in the statute establishing his office and
in supplementary statutes, which further directed him to submit re-
ports to Congress upon request, his counterparts in the War and State
Departments were placed under the administrative direction of the
President and freed of obligation to report to Congress. With the
passage of time, the Treasury Department has increasingly come under
Presidential supervision.7 4 However, the Secretary of the Treasury is
still under a duty to report to Congress upon all matters,1 whereas the
State Department still declines to disclose confidential information to
Congress, save upon Presidential direction.
3. Appointment of Special Presidential Envoys. In discussing the
powers of the President, we have already adverted to the practice
initiated by George Washington and James Monroe of appointing
special envoys to negotiate treaties or to represent the United States in
foreign capitals.76 Thus usage, beginning in 1789, has furnished a Con-
gressionally sanctioned by-pass around the provision of Article II that
ambassadors and other public ministers can be appointed only with
the consent of the Senate.
4. Pre-emption by the Executhe of the Power of Recognition. The
Constitution makes no allocation of the power to recognize new govern-
ments or new States. At first, Congress and the President vied in
seeking to control this phase of foreign relations, but with the passage of
time, the legislature's role has become concededly advisory, and the
power of recognition has become an admitted executive function.-,,
5. Termination of Treaties. In view of the fact that treaties may be
made only with the consent of two-thirds of the Senate, the inference
would seem reasonable that they may be terminated only in the same
71. See 2 MILLER, TREATIES, at xii-xlii; 1 BEsns (ed.), ,A&racw Sicnrx-Anirs or
STATE am THEiR DinLomAcY (1927) passim.
72. See note 66 supra. But see BEms, A DirLomTIc HiSTORY or TrE UNrITD SrTrS
(1942 ed.) 86-7.
73. The act establishing the War Department is 1 STAT. 49 (1789), the Treasury, 1
STAT. 65 (1789).
74. Andrew Jackson is primarily responsible for the attainment of Presidential direc-
tion of the Treasury Department. See LEANED, op. cit. supra note 64, at 103-5; GOODNOW,
THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADiINISTRATIE LAW OF TIHE UNITED STATES (1MS3) 70 t Se2.
75. REv. STAT. (1878) §§ 233-44,5 U. S. C. § 241 (1940).
76. See supra, pp. 206-7. See also 11 BENTo, ABRUDGIcMN-, at 221-2.
77. See CoRwiN, THE PRESMENT, at 216-28; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253 (U. S. 1829).
See also Part II, Section VIII.
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manner. However, the alternate practices have developed of terminat-
ing treaties-at least as far as their internal effect is concerned-by
joint resolutions of both houses or by simple Presidential denunciation.
In point of fact these have been the procedures most commonly uti-
lized. The entire subject will be discussed in more detail in a subse-
quent Section.78
6. Appropriation of Funds to Effectuate a Treaty. Mere textual
analysis leaves unanswered the question of whether under the Con-
stitution a separate appropriation act is necessary to secure funds with
which to fulfil treaty obligations. While it is stipulated that "no
money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of ap-
propriations made by law," 71 this is hardly determinative since it
is later specifically provided that treaties are "the supreme law of
the land." 80 However, in Washington's administration, the practice
developed of seeking separate appropriation acts to defray expenses
incurred under previously ratified treaties; 81 this practice still prevails.
Numerous other examples could be cited of the manner in which the
structure of government or the allocation of povers contemplated by
the Framers of the Constitution have been significantly altered by
usage.82 The cumulative impact of these prescriptive changes is such
as to negate any belated contention that the Constitution may be
modified or developed in important respects only by formal amend-
ment; contrariwise, they furnish ample proof of the proposition that
the Constitution may be modified or supplemented by practice in any
desired manner, except where there are express prohibitions in the
text of the document.83 Hence, whether sanctioned by original intent
or by virtue merely of the practices of American statesmen since the
beginning of the Republic, the use of executive agreements and treaties
as interchangeable instruments for effecting international agreements
has an unimpeachable constitutional status and dignity.
78. Seeinfra, pp.333-8.
79. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 9, CI. 7.
80. U. S. CONST. Art VI, Cl. 2.
81. See HAYDEN, op. cit. supra note 67, at 44-51; McCLURE, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS,
at 230-3. For an early discussion of this problem see RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1825) 64-7.
82. See, e.g.: (a) with relatioff to the joint resolution, 7 CANNON, PRECEDENTS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1935) §§ 1036, 1040-1; (b) with relation to the amending
process, 1 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 329; 5 HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES (1907) § 7040; WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1928)
682-3; The National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 389, 396 (1919); (c) with relation to con-
current resolutions, SEN. REP. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2nd Sess.. (1897) 8; cf. U. S. CoNSY.
Art. I, § 7, par. 3; (d) with relation to patents, HAMILTON, TNEC Rep., PATENTS AM) FREE
ENTERPRISE, Monograph 31 (1941) 2; cf. U. S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8; (e) with relation to the
spending power, WILMERDING, THE SPENDING POWER (1943); Frothingham v. Mellon,
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
83. Thus Article I, Section 9 prohibits the enactment of bills of attainder, ex post facto
legislation, and export duties.
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VI. TEE IDENTICAL LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF TREATIES AND
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS*
Comparison of the consequences of effecting international arrange-
ments by treaties on the one hand or by executive agreements on the
other has frequently been characterized by abstract theorizing and a
curious obliviousness to the realities of diplomatic practice. Emphasis
has been placed upon the unsubstantiated remarks of scholars or
statesmen as to the limited effectiveness or uncertain duration of agree-
ments rather than upon how such agreements have actually been
treated in the conduct of foreign affairs and by the decisions of courts.
Thus many writers have loosely suggested that agreements, in as-
sumed contrast to treaties, constitute only moral obligations or are not
"binding," without bothering to examine their functional operation at
domestic or international law. There has also been a pervasive tend-
ency to lump all agreements together, without differentiating betveen
the effects of Congressionally authorized agreements and of those
negotiated by the President on his own responsibility. At times even
Presidents and State Department officials have been guilt, of un-
realistic over generalization in their public utterances.
The present Section seeks to eschew this proliferation of abstract
theories without foundation in practice or policy and to concentrate
attention on the behavioristic level and on a realistic legal analysis.
When the problem is approached in this manner, it becomes apparent
that the legal consequences of consummation of international engage-
ments by treaties or by Congressional-Executive agreements are all but
indistinguishable with respect to both binding effect and duration,
under either domestic or international law. Generalizations as to the
significance and effects of Presidential agreements are of limited value
without specification of the exact type of instrument under discussion.
Many instruments described by this catch-all title are actually intended
to be nothing more than short term vnodi vheendi or mere pious declara-
tions of intentions. In such cases-in accordance with their terms-
these designedly transient instruments are subject to speedy termina-
tion. It is certain, however, as will be demonstrated in detail, that
agreements rpade under the President's own constitutional powers,
and intended to be binding on the contracting States and to have a
reasonably durable life, share most of the characteristics and have
*In preparing this Section we have drawn heavily upon the comments on the various
Articles of the proposed Convention, prepared by the Reporter (Proj esor James IV. Garner)
of the RESEARCH IN INTERN,%.TIONAL LAW OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, LAW OF TREATIES:
DRAFT CONVENTION, WITH COMMENT (1935) (published as 29 Am. J. INr. L. SUPP., No. 4.
and herein cited as HARVARD REsEARCH, LAW OF TREATIES). We are not, however, in
accord at all points with the Views expressed in these comments.
1945]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
legal effects not very dissimilar from the Congressional-Executive
agreement and the treaty.'
Binding Effect of the Executive Agreement under Domestic Law.
1. The Case History. In discussing the binding effect of executive
agreements at domestic law, some recent writers,2 by failing to describe
Jully the previous course of judicial doctrine, have created the im-
pression that the Curtiss-Wright, Belmont and Pink cases' represent a
startling innovation in constitutional law. The actual fact is, of course,
that the binding effect of these agreements was established in a line of
decisions long antedating this new unholy trinity.
One of the first functional types of executive agreements to reach the
courts was that providing for the annexation of territory. In the
1860s, the Supreme Court declared that the joint resolution-Presiden-
tial agreement by which Texas had been annexed complied with con-
stitutional requirements; 4 the same result obtained in 1903 in Hawaii
v. Mankichi, dealing with another frank resort to the Congressional-
Executive agreement, in lieu of an unratifiable treaty.'
Another respectable line of cases deals with reciprocal trade agree-
ments. The first of this genre to come before the Supreme Court was
Field v. Clark in 1892.6 The narrow question sub judice was that of the
validity of Section 3 of the Tariff Act of 1890, in compliance with which
a series of reciprocal trade agreements had been negotiated by Presi-
dent Harrison. None of the agreements was directly before the Court,
but the argument was made that the statute invaded the treaty-making
power and invalidly delegated legislative authority to the President.
1. Professor Borchard has sought to impugn the binding nature of direct Presidential
executive agreements by proving that the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917 was, according
to the Secretary of State who negotiated it, "merely a statement of governmental policy,
revocable at will, and not binding on the United States." Borchard, Executive Agreements,
at 679. It is stretching the doctrine of precedent a little far to suggest, because one of our
diplomatic representatives once entered into a modus vivendi which all parties understood
to be revocable at will, that all other executive agreements willynilly acquire the char-
acteristic of unilateral revocability. It would scarcely convince lawyers that no contract
can be binding for more than a year to cite the fact that some contracts have been delib-
erately restricted to this duration.
2. See, e.g., Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 664 el seq.; except for a quotation from
Four Packages of Cut Diamonds v. United States, 256 Fed. 305 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919), the only
reference to the earlier apposite cases is at page 672, where two are cited in connection with
the discussion of the permissible scope of delegation of power.
3. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936); United States
v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (1942).
4. Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475 (U. S. 1866); Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700 (U. S.
1868).
5. 190 U. S. 197, 216 (1903). See also the discussion of the background of the joint
resolution of annexation in Section IV supra.
6. 143 U. S. 649 (1892).
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The Court overruled both objections and found that the statute was a
constitutional means of effecting a granted Congressional power-the
control of foreign commerce.7
Moreover, in at least seven reported cases the lower federal courts
gave the full force and effect of statute law to provisions of reciprocal
trade agreements negotiated by various Presidents pursuant to Sec-
tion 3 of the Tariff Act of 1897.5 The issue was presented to the Su-
preme Court in a procedural guise in B. Altman & Company v. United
States; the precise question was whether a compact negotiated under
the Act was a "treaty" for the purpose of the Court of Appeals statute.
The language of Mr. Justice Day (a former Secretary of State) assim-
ilating the Congressional-Executive agreement to a treaty for this
purpose has already been quoted.' 0
There are numerous cases in which the validity of postal conventions
negotiated by the Postmaster General, with the approval of the Presi-
dent, pursuant to general authorizing legislation has been passed upon
by the courts. In at least twvo-Cotzausen v. Nazro" (a Supreme Court
decision) and United States v. x8 Packages of Dental Instruments'--the
postal conventions were declared to be "the law of the land." 13
7. Id. at 691, 694. Chief Justice Fuller and Mr. Justice Lamar dissented from the
opinion but concurred in the judgment of the court. The gravamen of their hybrid poition
was that the Act (26 STAT. 612), although phrased as granting the President power only to
suspend legislation upon the ascertainment of a given state of facts (following a pattern
frequently used in the administrations of Jefferson and Madison), actually served a-, the
basis for negotiation of agreements. The majority-which must have been cognizant that
this was the real purpose of the Act-contented itself with a discussion of the concept of
delegation of legislative authority, insisting that there was not in these ca!Le- in any real
sense a delegation of such authority.
S. Nicholas v. United States, 122 Fed. S92 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1900); United States v.
Tartar Chemical Co., 127 Fed. 944 (C. C. A. 2d, 1903); United States v. Julius Wile Bro. &
Co., 130 Fed. 331 (C. C. A. 2d, 1904); United States v. Luyties, 130 Fed. 333 (C. C. A. 2d,
1904); Migliavacca Wine Co. v. United States, 148 Fed. 142 (C. C. W. D. Wash. 1905); La
Manna, Azema & Farnan v. United States, 144 Fed. 683 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906); Mihalovitch,
Fletcher & Co. v. United States, 160 Fed. 98S (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1908).
9. 26 STAT. 826 (1891), 2S U.S. C. § 213 (1940).
10. B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U. S. 533,601 (1912). See svpra, p.242.
11. 107 U. S. 215 (1882). The agreement sub judice was a protocol to the 1S74 Berne
Postal Treaty. From the standpoint of American constitutional law, the title "treaty" is a
misnomer since the agreement was never referred to the Senate for approval. See 19 STAT.
577 (1874).
12. 222 Fed. 121 (E. D. Pa. 1915). See also 19 Ors. ATr'Y GE,.. 513, 520 (Sol. Gen.
Taft, 1890).
13. In his article in the September Journal (53 YALE L. J. at 670, n. 23), Profezor
Borchard fails to mention the Colzhausen case, 107 U. S. 215 (1882), cited supra note 11,--
the only Supreme Court decision directly passing on postal conventions-and the Dental
case, 222 Fed. 121 (E. D. Pa. 1915), cited supra note 12, and quotes only a portion of the
opinion in Four Packages of Cut Diamonds v. United States, 256 Fed. 305 (C. C. A. 2d,
1919). In this case, Judge Ward did say: "[Postal] conventions are not treaties, lecause not
made by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and they are not laws, lsecauE2 not
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There are several cases antedating the allegedly novel decisions in
the Pink and Belmont cases in which the courts have given effect to
direct Presidential agreements. In fact, as one recent commentator
has observed, there is "no instance known where an executive agree-
ment had been judicially declared to be invalid or go beyond the
constitutional authority of the Executive." 14
Perhaps the earliest case in which this type of agreement was en-
forced is the decision of the Supreme Court of",the Territory of Wash-
ington in 1870 in which an executive agreement between Great Britain
and the United States ratified in 1859, with regard to jurisdiction over
San Juan Island, was deemed to modify the Organic Law of the terri-
tory, as enacted by Congress.15 In Tucker v. Alexandroff, in 1902, the
Supreme Court intimated by way of dictum that the President was
empowered to make agreements permitting passage of foreign troops
through the United States and could thereby divest all American
officials of jurisdiction over such a military force.1" The general powers
of the President to make executive agreements" seems to have been
first touched by the Supreme Court in 1933, in Monaco v. Mississippi
wherein Chief Justice Hughes stated: "The National Government, by
virtue of its control of our foreign relations is entitled to employ the
resources of diplomatic negotiations and to effect such an international
settlement as may be found to be appropriate, through treaty, agreement
of arbitration, or otherwise." '1
It is against this background that the Curtiss-Wright, Belmont and
Pink cases must be considered. In the first case, the Court intimated
that the powers of President and Congress to make international
agreements other than treaties were limited only by the necessities of
maintaining an effective control of foreign relations. The broad and
categorical language of Mr. Justice Sutherland on this point has been
quoted above. 19
enacted by Congress." Id. at 306. But he immediately added: "If we assume that as admin-
istrative regulations made by authority of Congress they have the force of law, the package
was imported contrary to law." Ibid. (The court went on to dispose of the particular case on
facts irrelevant to the present issue.) See also the earlier decision of the district court in
the same matter, 247 Fed. 354 (S. D. N. Y. 1911), where the court clearly believed postal con-
ventions were enforceable as part of the law of the land.)
14. Catudal, Executive Agreements, at 665.
15. Watts v. United States, 1 Wash. Terr. (N. s.) 288,294 (1870).
16. 183 U.S. 424,432-3,434-5, (1902).
17. In In re McCall's Estate, 28 Pa. Dist. 433, 448 (Phila. Orphans' Ct. 1919), it was
held that unless the Senate expressly refused to approve a "protocol" (Chilean-American
claims agreement) if and when submitted to it, "courts of equity may and will be bound by
all representations and proceedings under a protocol where equity and justice require it."
The court, however, found the protocol only pledged the good faith of the United States.
On this latter score, the Orphans' Court decision is clearly outmoded by the United States
Supreme Court's decisions in the Pink and Belmont cases.
18. 292 U. S. 313, 331 (1934) (emphasis supplied).
19. See supra, Section III.
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The dicta of the MAonaco and Curtiss-TVright cases were the capstones
of the decisions in the Belnwut and Pink cases, dealing with the validity
and interpretation of an assignment of Russian-owned assets in the
United States, which was one of several executive agreements nego-
tiated when the United States recognized the Soviet government in
1933.20 In both the Belvmnt and Pink cases it was squarely held that
agreements made under the President's independent constitutional
authority were binding on all courts under the supremacy clause, and
were superior to contrary state law or judicial doctrine, to the same
extent as treaties. While a dissenting opinion was filed in the Pink
case, the minority justices confined themselves largely to disagreeing
with the majority's interpretation of the particular agreement before
the Court. Though Mr. Justice Stone in his dissenting opinion (joined
in by Mr. Justice Roberts) indicates some uncertainty as to whether
the Litvinov assignment-as interpreted by the majority-was a
proper subject for an executive agreement, there is nothing in his
opinion which casts any doubt upon the basic question of the finality
of a direct Presidential agreement made within the scope of the Presi-
dent's powers.2
1
The breadth of the judicial imprimatur given to Presidential agree-
ments is best indicated in the following quotation from MIr. Justice
Sutherland's opinion in the Belmot case:
"The recognition, establishment of diplomatic relations, the
assignment, and agreements with respect thereto, were all parts
of one transaction, resulting in an international compact between
the two governments. That the negotiations, acceptance of the
assignments and agreements and understandings in respect thereof
were within the competence of the President may not be doubted.
Governmental power over internal affairs is distributed between the
national government and the several states. Governmental power
over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in
the national government. And in respect of what was done here,
the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of that gov-
ernment. The assignment and the agreements in connection there-
with did not, as in the case of treaties, as that term is used in the
treaty making clause of the Constitution, . . . require the advice
and consent of the Senate.
"A treaty signifies 'a compact made between two or more in-
dependent nations with a view to the public welfare.' . . . But an
international compact, as this was, is not always a treaty which re-
quires the participation of the Senate. There are many such com-
20. Seesupra, p. 28 0.
21. It should be noted, however, that in a concurring opinion in the Bedmonr cas2 he
found it "unnecessary to consider whether the present agreement between the two govern-
ments can rightly be given the same effect as a treaty" for overriding state law. 301 U. S.
324,336 (1937).
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pacts, of which a protocol, a modus vivendi, a postal convention,
and agreements like that now under consideration are illustra-
tions." 22
In testimony recently before a subcommittee of the Senate, Professor
Borchard has taken the position that the Pink and Belmont cases hold
only that executive agreements are superior to contrary state law
when made in connection with the recognition of a foreign govern-
ment. 23 Logically, one can of course run generalizations of any degree
of abstraction, high or low, through the facts of any case.24 Whether
one concludes, on a level of low abstraction, that the decisions in the
Pink and Belmont cases must be confined to agreements connected
with the recognition of another government, or even to agreements
made between the United States and Russia or made by men named
Roosevelt and Litvinov, or, on a level of a higher abstraction, that
these decisions can be extended to all agreements made by competent
constitutional authorities with any government on any appropriate
subject matter, depends not upon logic but upon policy. No principle
of policy has yet been suggested for making the constitutional validity
and legal effect of an international agreement made by appropriate
officers of this government dependent upon its being accompanied by
simultaneous formal recognition of the other government." The
Supreme Court itself cast its opinions in terms of the broader principle
applicable to all agreements made by competent constitutional author-
ity with any government on appropriate subject matter. The language
of the Court should be adequate answer to all quixotic efforts to narrow
22. 301 U. S. 324, 330-1 (citations omitted). The validity of the Litvinov-Hull agree-
meat of 1933 has been assumed in numerous other cases. See, e.g., Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v.
Bank of New York & Trust Co., 280 N. Y. 286, 20 N. E. (2d) 758 (1939), aff'd per curiam
sub nom. United States v. Moscow Fire Ins. Co., 309 U. S. 624 (1940), Petition for reh'g
denied, 309 U. S. 697 (1940); State of Russia v. Bankers' Trust Co., 4 F. Supp. 417 (S. D.
N. Y. 1933), aff'd sub nom. United States v. National City Bank, 83 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 2d,
1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 563 (1936).It has been noted that Justice Stone, with Justices Brandeis and Cardozo joining,
rendered a concurring opinion in the Belmont case which challenged the validity of the
majority's interpretation of the Litvinov assignment without finding it necessary to discuss
the scope and effect of executive agreements. 301 U. S. 324, 333-7 (1937).
For another recent case containing recognition of the President's powers of negotiation
with foreign governments see Pan American Airways v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 121 F.
(2d) 810, 814 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
23. See Commerce Committee Hearings at 194.
24. Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis (1928) 14A. B.A.J. 71,159.
25. In fact Professor Borchard appears to have been a strong proponent of the view
that formal recognition of another government should in general be regarded as of little
practical legal significance. Borchard, The Unrecognized Government in American Courts
(1932) 26 Abi. J. INT. L. 261. See also Note (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 848, 851, n. 23. Professor
John Bassett Moore has put this view of the efficacy of recognition into aphorism: "Recogni-
tion 'validates' nothing." Fifty Years of International Law (1937) 50 HARV. L. RwV. 395, 431.
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the principle of policy which it vwas seeking to establish. -! Thus, -wrote
Mr. Justice Sutherland in the Belmont opinion:
"Plainly, the external powers of the United States are to be exer-
cised without regard to state laws or policies. The supremacy of a
treaty in this respect has been recognized from the beginning. MHr.
Madison, in the Virginia Convention, said that if a treaty does not
supersede existing state laws, as far as they contravene its opera-
tion, the treaty would be ineffective. 'To counteract it by the su-
premacy of the state laws, would bring on the Union the just charge
of national perfidy, and involve us in war.' And while this rule in
respect of treaties is established by the express language of cl. 2,
Art. 6, of the Constitution, the same rule would result in the case of
all international compacts and agreements from the very fact that
complete power over international affairs is in the national govern-
ment and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or inter-
ference on the part of the several states. . . . In respect of all inter-
national negotiations and compacts and in respect of our foreign
relations generally, state lines disappear." -
In the absence of compelling policy reasons, it is scarcely likely that the
Court will in the future be more persuaded by Professor Borchard's
efforts to restrict its principles than by its own statement of those
principles.
2. Comparative Legal Consequences. Moving from an over-all exami-
nation of the case law to point-by-point comparison of the consequences
of consummation of an international arrangement by treaty or agree-
ment, it is necessary to bear in mind the distinction between agreements
authorized or ratified by Congress and those consummated solely on
the President's authority.
a. Enforceability. In some cases, treaties and Congressional-Execu-
tive agreements may furnish a direct basis for proceeding in-the federal
or state courts, assuming that a justiciable "case or controversy" e.xsts
26. Note the broad interpretation given by RorraTcHmFER, CONSUiTtoONAL LAW
(1939) 385 and the editorial approbation given to the Bdmont case by the Harr3rd Low
Review:
"Although the Constitution does not provide that such agreements, as distinguished
from treaties, shall supersede state power, yet in order to effectuate federal control of foreign
relations it seems necessary to regard any valid international compact as 'the supreme Jaw
of the land.' The result thus reached is desirable in avoiding national embarraszment because
of local refusal to enforce the acts of the recognized foreign government, and in insuring
uniformity in state decisions through a broadening of the field of federal power." (1937)
51 HAnv. L. R Ev. 163.
27. 301 U. S. 324, 331. See also the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203, 240 (1942): "The President's power to negotiate such a
settlement is the same whether it is an isolated transaction betwvecn this country and a
friendly nation, or is a part of a complicated negotiation to restore normal relations as was
the case with Russia."
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and that the agreement is "self-executing." 28 When an agreement has
been authorized by Congress with respect to a subject matter within
the scope of its legislative competence, there can be no question that the
act of Congress, like all its other constitutional acts, is binding upon
private parties. When an agreement has been negotiated by the Presi-
dent within the scope of his own independent powers, the Belmont and
Pink cases indicate that it is as readily enforceable as a treaty. 9 In any
situation in which additional legislation may be necessary to imple-
ment the agreement, the "necessary and proper" clause vests the
Congress with appropriate power in the case of both Congressional-
Executive and Presidential agreements, as it does in the case of trea-
ties." This clause reads that Congress shall have power:
"to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the foregoing powers [the granted legislative pow-
ers], and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." 31
b. Superiority to State Law. In the first decade of the Federal Gov-
ernment's existence, the Supreme Court gave effect to the provision of
the Constitution making treaties the supreme law of the land by hold-
ing that a contrary state statute could not be enforced.12 With respect
to Congressional-Executive agreements authorized by the Congress
within the scope of its powers, there would seem to be no doubt that
the statute of Congress prescribing, either expressly or by clear implica-
tion, that the agreements it authorizes are to be the law of the land is
no less effective than any other Congressional statute in overriding a
contrary state statute or common law doctrine. The leading case now
cited for the supremacy of treaties over state law is Missouri v. 1o-
land 11 which, as we have seen, sustained a treaty providing for the
regulation of a subject matter (migratory birds) assumed by lower
courts, under the constructions of the "commerce" clause then current,
to be reserved to the states, despite the strong urging of the Tenth
Amendment by opponents of the treaty. In the Belmont 31 and Pink 35
28. As to treaties see Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253 (U. S. 1829); as to Congressional-
Executive agreements see B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U. S. 583, 601 (1912).
29. Supra, pp. 312-3.
30. See 6 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 293, 295 (Cushing, 1854); CRANDALL, 'TREATIES, § 104;
Henry, When Is a Treaty Self-Executing? (1929) 27 MICH. L. Rxv. 776.
31. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8 (emphasis supplied). See also Neely v. Henkel (No. 1), 180
U. S. 109, 121 (1901). McClure has discussed the potentitlities of this clause in some detail.
McCLuRE, EXEcuTiVE AGREEMENTS, at 353.359 el seg.
32. Warev. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199 (U.S. 1796).
33. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920); see also The Trade Mark Cases, 100
U. S. 82,99 (1879); Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U. S. 30, 35 (1931).
34. 301 U. S. 324,331-2 (1937). See quotation supra, p. 313.
35. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
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cases the Supreme Court has expressly extended the doctrine of Mis-
souri v. Holland to Presidential agreements in language which is broad
enough, if it is needed, to cover Congressional-Executive agreements.
In the words of Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the Court in the
Belmont case,
"In respect of all international negotiations and compacts, and
in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As
to such purposes the state of New York does not exist. Within the
field of its powers, whatever the United States rightfully under-
takes, it necessarily has warrant to consummate. And when judicial
authority is invoked in aid of such consummation, State Constitu-
tions, state laws, and state policies are irrelevant to the inquiry and
decision. It is inconceivable that any of them can be interposed as
an obstacle to the effective operation of a federal constitutional
power. Cf. Missouri v. Holland ...Asakura v. Seattle...." :
This does not, hopvever, lead to the conclusion that executive agree-
ments, any more than treaties, are in some mysterious, unexplained
way above the Constitution. It can be taken for granted that the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment and other specific substantive
provisions of the Constitution constitute limitations on the provisions
which can be enforced as parts of approved and ratified treaties.37
There is no reason to suppose that these clauses will not be construed
to constitute identical limitations on the provisions which can be en-
forced as parts of Congressional-Executive or Presidential agreements.
There is a clear indication in Guaranty Trust Company v. United States,
one of the cases arising as an aftermath of the Litvinov assignment of
36. 301 U. S. 324, 331-2 (1937). Compare Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court
in the Pink case, 315 U. S. 203, 230 (1942): " 'All constitutional acts of power, whether in
the executive or in the judicial department, have as much legal validity and obligation, as if
they proceed from the legislature, . . .' The Federalist, No. 64. A treaty is a 'Law of the
Land' under the supremacy clause (Art. VI, Cl. 2) of the Constitution. Such international
compacts and agreements as the Litvinov Assignment have a similar dignity. United States
v. Belmont.... See Corwin, The President, Office& Powers (1940) pp. 228-240."
37. See Cherokee Tobacco v. United States, 11 Vall. 616 (U. S. 1870); Brown v.
Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 197 (U. S. 1856); Doe v. Braden, 16 How. 635, 656 (U. S. 1853);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 370 (1901); 2 BTrrLER, TRExTY-MA1.%O PowER (1902)
442. The perhaps contrary decision in Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dal. 199 (U. S. 1796) is dubious
law today. See 27 Ops. ATrT'" GEN. 327, 329 (\ickersham, 1909); COwLES, TRExrzTs AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PROPERTY INTERFERENcEs A.ND DuF PR OcESS oF LAW (1941) passim.
However, in view of the tenor of certain of the attacks on the Pink and Belnont cases
[see Borchard, Execuhire Agreements, at 682; Borchard, Exlraterritorial Confiscalions (1942)
36 Am. J. ,rr. L. 275, 282; Comment (1942) 30 GEo. L. J. 663], it is interesting to note
the cases holding that titles to land are invalidated when it is determined by interstate
compact that sovereignty over the area in question is to be yielded to another state. See
Poole v. Fleeger, 11 Pet. 185 (U. S. 1837); Coffee v. Groover, 123 U. S. 1 (1887).
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1933, that the scope of the agreement-making power is limited by the
Fifth Amendment."8
In holding that there are no "invisible radiations" from the Tenth
Amendment which limit the treaty- or agreement-making powers, the
Missouri and Belmont cases essentially give effect to Chief Justice
Marshall's original doctrine that within the ambit of its constitutional
powers federal authority is supreme.39 In the decision in 1941 in United
States v. Darby Lumber Company, 0 the Supreme Court analogously held
that the granted domestic powers of Congress were not subject to inde-
pendent limitation by virtue of the Tenth Amendment, and might be
effectuated by all means "appropriate and plainly adapted to the per-
mitted end." "The amendment states but a truism that all is retained
which has not been surrendered." 41 This interpretation is clearly in
accord with the general views of Madison, the proponent of the Amend-
ment, and of the majority of the vocal members of the First Congress.42
c. Relation to Federal Statutes and Treaties. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that in the event of a conflict between the provisions of
a treaty and those of a statute, the more recent ihstrument will pre-
vail.43 Accordingly Congressional-Executive compacts-as part of
"the law of the land" 4-would be given effect if they contain provi-
sions contrary to those included in an earlier treaty. As a matter of
practice, both kinds of executive agreements have been frequently
used to modify or clarify treaties. 45 The making of international com-
mitments by Congressional-Executive agreement would hppear to be as
free from the restraint of previously enacted legislation as is the treaty-
38. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126, 143 (1937); see also United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 320 (1936).
The decision in the Pink case has been criticised because the court did not find that the
particular facts of the case called for application of the Fifth Amendment. Jessup, The
Lit inoff Assignment and the Pink Case (1942) 36 Am. J. INT. L. 282; Note (1942) 51 YALr
L. J. 848. Clearly, however, Mr. Justice Douglas put the decision of the Court upon the
ground, not that the Fifth Amendment has no application to executive agreements, but
that it did not under the facts of the Pink case preclude the Federal Government from giving
itself priority over foreign creditors. See 315 U. S. at 228. With the merits of this particular
difference of opinion we are not now concerned.
39. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 372, 374 (U. S. 1819). See also Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 325 (U. S. 1816); 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON TnU-E CONSTITU-
TiON (1833) §§ 1900-1.
40. 312 U. S. 100 (1941). See Feller, The Tenth Amendment Retires (1941) 27 A. B. A. J.
223; dissenting opinion of Holmes, J., in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 277 (1918).
41. 312 U. S. at 124.
42. See, variously, 1 ANNALs OF CoNGRnss 457-8, 761, 767-8, 790-7 (1789),
43. Alvarez y Sanchez v. United States, 216 U. S. 167 (1910); The Chinese Exclusion
Case, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U. S. 581 (1889); The Head Money Cases,
Edye v. Robertson, 112 U. S. 580 (1884).
44. See Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215, 217 (1882), cited supra note 11:
45. See note 119 infra.
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making process. Plainly the Congress can remove any limitations that
are of its own creation-if the danger is realized in advance-by in-
cluding provisions in its authorizing statute, repealing inconsistent
previous legislation. 4 Thus the reciprocal trade agreement provisions
of the Tariff Acts allow the President to modify pre-existing statutes,
within prescribed limits. In the event that conflict between an agree-
ment and the terms of pre-existing legislation should become apparent
after the adoption of an enabling act that does not clearly establish the
primacy of the agreement, the Congress could easily establish the
primacy of the agreement by joint resolution incorporating its provi-
sions into the statute law. This is analogous to the procedure used to
secure approval of the inter-Allied debt settlement agreements during
the 1920s. 47 The agreement-statute would then have the effect of over-
ruling any inconsistent terms in earlier statutes."
The problem is less susceptible of succinct summarization in the
case of a direct Presidential agreement. It has long been established
that the President may modify a previously ratified treaty by an execu-
tive agreement with the obligee nation if the agreement is within his
constitutional powers. 9 A direct Presidential agreement vill not
ordinarily be valid if contrary to previously enacted legislation. It
may, as poirited out in the preceding paragraph, be validated in this
situation by adoption of a joint resolution. Even Professor Borchard
has recently conceded this point."t Moreover, if the subject of the
agreement is a matter within the President's special constitutional
competence-related, for example, to the recognition of a foreign
government or to an exercise of his authority as Commander-in-
Chief-a realistic application of the separation of powers doctrine
might in some situations appropriately permit the President to dis-
regard the statute as an unconstitutional invasion of his own power.51
The decision of the Supreme Court of Washington Territory in
46. The Congress can reserve an immediate control-as has been done in the Trade
Agreements Act of 1934 and its successors-by retaining the power to disapprove any
particular agreement within a stated period after its negotiation.
47. See supra, p. 278.
48. Various statements by past officials of the State Department suggesting that
specific undertakings could not be cast in the form of executive agreements becauE2 of
contrary statutes dearly relate only to limitations on the powers of the President, when
acting without the aid of Congress. See, e.g., Under-Secretary of State Castle's statement to
the Canadian linister in 1932, excerpted in 5 -LcKwoR, DIGrsT, at 399-400.
49. Compare infra, pp. 366-7.
50. Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 676. Professor Borchard was writing about the
destroyer bases deal of 1940 which he regards as contravening legislation restricting the
disposal of naval property [see Borchard, The Attorney General's Opinion on Mhe Exc:ange of
Destroyers for Naval Bases (1940) 34 Azi. J. INT. L. 690] but retroactively validated by the
enactment of the Lend-Lease Act or by the "votes authorizing appropriations for the bazs-."
51. Accord: CORWIN, THE CONSIUTION oN WoRLD ORM.UnMzATION. (1944) 42.
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Watts v. United States 52 involved just such a conflict between a Presi-
dential agreement and a Congressional statute, i.e., the Organic Act
of the territory. The Court gave effect to the agreement; however, it is
difficult to tell whether this was on the grounds that the subject matter
of the agreement, a boundary dispute, was under exclusive Presidential
control,5" or on the "political issue" doctrine. The decision of the
Supreme Court in Myers v. United States analogously sustained Presi-
dent Coolidge's contention that Congressional legislation limiting the
chief executive's power to remove postmasters was an unconstitutional
invasion of his independent powers.14
A wise President will of course ordinarily seek to avoid conflict with
the Congress by seeking legislative support for his actions; but this is a
question of statesmanship and not of constitutional authority."
Exactly the same sort of problem arises when the Senate and the Presi-
dent combine to consummate a treaty to which the House of Repre-
sentatives objects. 6
Binding Effect of the Executive Agreement at International Law.
As we have previously indicated, international tribunals and stu-
dents of international law 11 have long repudiated the shadowy distinc-
tion between treaties and other types of agreements suggested by
Vattel and certain other early writers." In the day-by-day conduct
of international relations, the foreign offices of the world use a variety
of instruments interchangeably.5 9 Thus Article 18 of the Covenant of
the League of Nations places "treaties" and "international engage-
ments" on the same footing. The authoritative Harvard Researcht
Draft of the Law of Treaties concludes, as noted above, that "for pur-
poses of international law [executive agreements] are not to be dis-
52. Watts v. United States, 1 Wash. Terr. (N. s.) 288 (1870).
53. The determination of the territorial boundaries of the United States is not vested
by the Constitution in any branch of the Government
54. Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926). See also Solicitor General Beck's
argument therein that Congress retained a check on the Executive without invading his
constitutional prerogatives by virtue of the power of the purse, a thesis whose relevancy to
the problem here under discussion is obvious. A portion of the Solicitor General's argument
is reprinted in GELLHORN, ADmINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS (1940) 83, 90-1;
see also SEN. Doc. No. 174,69th Cong., 2d Sess. (1926) 93-4.
55. Compare WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1922)
339-75. -
56. See supra, p. 306.
57. It is not clear whether Professor Borchard approves Vattel's attempted distinction
as useful in international law or whether he believes that, even assuming the distinction
to be relatively meaningless, the Constitution must be interpreted as if it had some signifi-
cance because certain of the draftsmen of the Constitution were familiar with Le Droit des
Gens. See Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 667-71.
58. See supra, Section II.
59. Ibid.
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tinguished from treaties." 1; Professors Hyde and Briggs are only two
of the many scholars who have taken the same position.0 ' As President
Searcy has stated:
"International law does not require that agreements between
nations must be concluded in any particular form or style. The
law of nations is much more interested in the faithful performance
of international obligations than in prescribing procedural require-
ments." 62
60. HARvARD RESEARcH, LAW OF TREATIFs, at 667; see also id. at 686.
61. "It is submitted, however, that the Altman ruling [B. Altman & Co. v. United
States. 224 U. S. 583 (1912) ] is correct; and that even postal conventions are treaties from
the point of view of international law." BIIGGs, THE L.w OF NATIoNs (1938) 409. Accord:
Hyde, Constitutional Procedures for Internalional Agreements by the United States (1937) 31
PRoc. Am. Soc. INT. L. 45; Levitan, Executire Agreements, at 370; McNWuR, THE LAw OP
TwEATIES (1938) 3; Searcy, The Use of the Congressional Joint Resolution in Matters Relating
to Foreign Affairs (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in Duke University Library) at 277. See
also 1 OPEN sm, INTEmATIONAL LAW (Sth ed., Lauterpacht, 1937) 707-$.
62. Searcy, supra note 61, at 277. See also McNAIR, Op. Cit. supra note 61, at 47-50;
OPIENHEn, loc. cit. supra note 61.
Professor Borchard has recently taken the position that "form plays an important part,
among other matters, in determining what is a treaty." Borchard, Executire Agreements,
at 670. In support of this proposition he cites:
(1) A decision by the German Reichsgericht stating a distinction between formal and
informal treaties based upon the method of securing domestic validation. Professor Borchard
refers only to the short summary in 5 HAcEwoRTii, DIGEsT, at 397; the fuller summary in
WNVILLIAMS AND LAUTERPACIET, ANNUAL DIGEST OF PUBLIC IN .RN,%TIONz,%L LA W Casrs:
1919-1922 (1932) 313-4, indicates that the "informal" agreement (i.e., one consummated
on the independent authority of the President of the German Reich) was enforced by the
court. However, German law under the Weimar Republic did appear to make form, rather
than content, determinative of whether legislative consent was constitutionally necesary..
See WILcox, RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONs (1935) 232.
(2) A decision by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 256 Fed. 305, 306
(C. C. A. 2d, 1919), analogously distinguishing between treaties and postal conventions on
the basis of the constitutional source by which they were given domestic effect. But see
notes 11-13 supra.
(3) An excerpt from the Harrard Research Draft of the Law of Treaties, 29 .4a. J. I. L.
Supp. at 691, to the effect that "there is no treaty apart from the instrument which records
its stipulations." It is difficult to know what is meant by this apparent primitive identifica-
tion of "legal obligation" with a piece of parchment, but the Reporter of the Research makes
it clear that there is no distinction at international law between American constitutional
treaties and executive agreements (id. at 667 and 686); that the Research was stating a series
of rules of interpretation applicable to all written agreements, treaties being defined as all
written and formal, i.e., dated, signed, and sealed, instruments of agreement between
States (id. at 689-90); that instruments lacking these characteristics (id. at 690) and purely
oral agreements have often been considered binding and been enforced by international
tribunals (id. at 728-32); and finally, that no "particular form" of language is nececzar. to
make an agreement, in general, or a treaty, as specially defined for the immediate purpoZes
of the Research, enforceable (id. at 722 etseq.).
If there is a fundamental difference of form between treaties and "executive" or other
agreements, with connotations affecting the use and legal significance of the different classes
of instruments, the domain of international relations still awaits a persuasive Emily Post.
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While constitutional usage generally requires that the President
ratify treaties before they come into effect as the "law of the land," this
does not mean that any particular form of ratification must be followed,
nor does it condition the international effectiveness of a treaty upon
the prior completion of an act of ratification. 3 Nor does our constitu-
tional law require that treaties be cast in any particular form in order
that they may be transmitted to the Senate for its consent and the
subsequent ratification by the President. Upon several occasions an
agreement reached by an exchange of correspondence has been sub-
mitted to the Senate and, upon consent and ratification, become a
constitutional treaty.14 Moreover, as Professor Reiff has pointed out,
there is no general requirement that treaties must be proclaimed before
becoming effective.65
It is not uncommon for executive agreements intended to be more
than mere modi vivendi to contain procedural requirements, compara-
ble to those found in treaties, that they will not go into effect until
they have been formally ratified or until they have been proclaimed. 6
Frequently, the negotiation of important executive agreements is
embroidered by inclusion of various formalities traditionally used in
the treaty-making process, including the issuance of "full powers" by
the President to the American plenipotentiary, the attachment of
seals, and the exchange of formal instruments of ratification, How-
63. As we have pointed out, there is a popular misapprehension that the Senate ratifies
treaties. Actually the Senate's role is limited to the giving of consent; the President can
refuse to ratify a treaty to which the Senate has consented. There are approximately fifty
instances where this has taken place. See U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 2; see also MATHEWS,
AMERiCAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1938) 522; CRANDALL, TREATIES, at 97-8; 2 HAYNES, TuE
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES (1938) 636-9, DAvIS, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER IN TUE
UNITED STATES (1920) 15.
64. A recent example is the exchange of notes between the American and Canadian
Governments in 1941 with respect to the diversion of water from the Niagara River. Execu-
tive G, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), reprinted in 87 CONG. REc. 9045-6 (1941). During the
debate on ratification of this treaty, Senator Connally maintained that "this is not a treaty
in the technical sense," but "it is the same as a treaty. . . ." Id. at 9047.
65. Reiff, The Proclaiming of Treaties in the United States (1936) 30 Am. J. INT. L.
63, 71. There are not a few instances of agreements ratified by the President, after Sena-
torial consent, which were never proclaimed.
The chief function of proclamation is, of course, to make definite and to publicize the
date on which the treaty becomes effective.
66. Sed, e.g., the Netherlands-American commercial agreement of 1907, 2 MALLOY,
TREATIES, at 1276-7; the Cuban-American naval base agreement of 1903, 1 id, at 360-1;
the 1929 battle*monuments agreement, 4 id. at 3965; the 1908 French parcel, post agree-
ment, S HACKWORTH, DIGEST, at 412-3; the eight-power silver pact of 1933, MCCLURE,
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTs, at 166.
Presidential proclamations have usually been issued in connection with postal con-
ventions, copyright agreements, and the trade agreements made under the Act of 1934 and
its successors. See 48 STAT. 943 (1934), 19 U. S. C. § 1351 (1940). See also Catudal, Execn-
live Agreements, at 663-4.
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ever, these formal trappings are not indispensable prerequisites to the
formulation of a binding executive agreement any more than to the
consummation of a binding treaty.0 7
Of course, in any case, where an agreement is negotiated by a pleni-
potentiary other than the head of state or perhaps the foreign minister,
insertion of a caveat conditioning its effectiveness upon prior ratifica-
tion by the head of state ordinarily serves an indispensable practical
function. A similar caveat is also necessary where domestic constitu-
tional law imposes a requirement that treaties or other types of agree-
ment be approved by a legislative body and desirable where advance
legislative approval is important to increase the probability that the
obligations imposed by the agreement will be complied with. However,
to repeat, international law does not impose any unalterable require-
ment that treaties must be ratified by the signatory powers, or that
there must be an exchange of ratifications or a formal proclamation
before a treaty can become effective.c3 A recent study has indicated
that 35% to 40% of the international agreements negotiated by the
major powers during the 1920s did not contain ratification provisions."
In the diplomatic quivers of almost all nations--save certain Latin
American countries whose constitutions expressly provide an exclusive
procedure--co-exist a series of separate methods for the perfecting of
international agreements.70 In numerous decisions, national and inter-
national tribunals have found that the most informal agreements are
binding upon the contracting States. In the Memel Territory case,
the Permanent Court of International Justice (the World Court)
found that formal language and the domestic constitutional characteri-
zation of a compact were irrelevant; an agreement intended to be
binding was enforceable. 7' The German Reichsgericht rendered a
67. See Catudal, Executive Agreements, at 665; Fitzmaurice, Do Treaties Need Ratifica-fio? (1934) 15 BraT. Y. B. INT. L. 113.
68. See Fitzmaurice, supra note 67; Book Review (1934) 15 Brr. Y. B. INT. L. 201;
Basdevant, La conclusion et la rZaction des traits (1926) 15 RECUEUL DES Courts (AcadC-
nie de Droit International) 513. For examples of treaties which came into effect without
ratification by signatories see [1859-1860] 50 BaTnisa AND FoREIGN STATE PARtrS (1867) 10;
4 HuDsoN, INTEIzRNATIONAL LEGISLATION (1931) 2848 (emigrant isa agreement); 1 OPP=-
HEn,, INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed., McNair, 1928) 721, n. 2. The Boxer Protccol of 1901,
one of the most important multilateral agreements of recent years, came into effect upn
signature by the plenipotentiaries of the various powers. See 2 MA .LLoY, TrEATiES, at 2006.
In such cases, of course, the head of state or foreign minister generally supervizse the nego-
tiations with especial care; often the very terms of the agreement have previously been
settled in correspondence. See 1 W rESTLu:E, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d cd. 1910) 292.
69. See WILcox, THE RATicoATiN OS INTERN,%TiONAL CoNVENTzoi:s (1935) 232. The
study was based on an examination of the treaties and other agreements registered with the
League of Nations during its first five years, totaling a thousand instruments. Many of
these agreements were, however, ratified.
70. Wicox, op. cit. supra note 69, at 231-3.
71. See Interpretation of the Statute of the Memel Territory, Permanent Court of
International Justice (herein cited as P. C. I. J.), Ser. AIB. No. 49, at 300 (1932).
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similar decision in the Paris Agreement case,72 and this position has been
taken by the British Foreign Office.71
Even unwritten agreements constitute, in the opinion of the over-
whelming majority of students of international law, enforceable ob-
ligations if it has been the intention of negotiators to make a binding
commitment and if their official positions are such as to give them in-
dependent power to bind their governments.7 4 Chief Justice Taney
expressed the same view in 1840 by way of dictum in his opinion in
Holmes v. Jennison.75 The 1936 agreement between Great Britain,
France, and the United States-whereby the contracting States agreed
to make gold available from their monetary stabilization funds for
purchase by one another-was made by telephone.7" In the Eastern
Greenland case,77 the Permanent Court of International Justice held
that an oral declaration by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
waiving an objection to the extension of Danish sovereignty over
Eastern Greenland was binding upon the Norwegian Government.7
72. See Paris Agreement Case, June 22, 1922, 105 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in
Zivilsachen 156, digested in WILLIAMS AND LAUTERPACIHT (eds.), ANNUAL DIGEST OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES: 1919-1922 (1932) 313-4. See also the decision in 1922 of the
Polish Supreme Court, Third Division, in Republic v. Just, Sept. 27, 1922, 2 Orzecznictwo
Sad6w Polskich, No. 294,' summarized in WILLIAMS AND LAUTERPACHT, supra, at 317-8;
Spanish Zone of Morocco Case, abstracted in WILLIAMS AND LAUTERPACHT (eds.), ANNUAL
DIGEST OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES: 1923-1924 (1933) 19-21; HALL, TREATISE
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th ed. 1924) 383.
73. See McNMAR, THE LAW OF TREATIES (1938) 48-50. The 1924 Franco-Russian agree-
ment providing for recognition of the Soviet Union and adjusting the status of treaties made
between France and previous Russian governments took the form of an exchange of tele-
grams between Prime Minister Herriot and Tchitcherine, Soviet Commissar for Foreign
Affairs. See (1925) 12 BULLETIN DE L'INSTITUT INTERMADIARE INTERNATIONALE 26 el seg.
74. See the lengthy citation of authorities in HARVARD RESEARCH, LAW O" TREATIES,
at 728-32; see also McNAIR, loc. cit. supra note 73. Of course, most authorities deplore use
of this form of agreement because of the difficulties of proof of the terms.
Article 2 of the 1928 Havana Convention on Treaties-in force for Brazil, Dominican
Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Panama-provided in part that "The written form is an
essential condition of treaties." HARVARD RESEARCH, LAW OF TREATIES, at 1205.
75. See Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540,572 (U. S. 1840).
76. See MCCLURE, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, at vii, 167-72. Subsequently, Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Switzerland adhered to this agreement. Id. at 171, n. 238. The sale
agreement was ancillary to the 1936 stabilization pact between the same powers, evidenced
by the simultaneous issuance of declarations. (The texts are included in BANK FOR INTER-
NATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT (1937) annex vii.)
Both agreements were in harmony with the purposes of the Gold Reserve Act of 1934,
48 STAT. 341; see also 48 STAT. 52 (1933).
77. See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, P. C. I. J., Ser. A/B, No. 53, at 71 (1933).
Judge Anzilotti, while dissenting from the decision on presently irrelevant grounds, also felt
that the oral agreement was binding. Id. at 91-2.
78. A minute of the declaration had been initialed by the Norwegian Minister (id. at
69-70), but the Court treated this as being of no greater significance than a mere verbal
declaration.
[Vol. 54 :181
TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
In a whole series of cases 9 before the Permanent Court, oral declara-
tions regarding the intentions of their governments made by the agents
appointed to represent various nations in the adjudications of con-
troversies have been declared by the Court to be "of binding charac-
ter." o
The chief attack upon the binding effect of executive agreements un-
der international law comes in the form of a curious, circular argument
that assumes as its major premise the very conclusion it sets out to
prove. There is a doctrine, accepted by a relatively large number of
writers, that a State is not bound by an agreement "made on its behalf
by an organ or authority not competent under its law" 81 to conclude
the agreement, and that governments are on notice of each other*s
constitutional limitations. To sustain his argument that executive
agreements do not have the "dignity" and "force" of treaties, Professor
Borchard accordingly writes: "Foreign countries are deemed to be
acquainted only with the Constitution, not with current rationaliza-
tions of the executive agreement." s2 It is upon this foundation that the
79. See The Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions, P. C. I. J., Ser. A, No. 5, at 37
(1925); Case concerning Certain German Interests in Upper Silesia, P. C. I. J., Ser. A, No. 7,
at 13 (1926); Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, No. 46, at
170-2 (1932).
80. The characterization is taken from the opinion in the Upper Silesia case, P. C. I. J.,
Ser. A, No. 7, at 13 (1926). Baron Lambermont, arbitrator in 1889 in a dispute between
Germany and Great Britain concerning the African Island of Lamu, found that an oral
agreement was binding, although deploring use of this form of compact. For the text of the
award see (1890) 22 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LGtISLATION COuPARLE 351; a
portion of the opinion is quoted in HERTSLET, MAP OF AFRICA 13Y TREATY (3rd ed. 1909) 894.
81. HARVARD RESEARCH, LAW OF TREATIES, at 992.
82. Borchard, Shall the Executire Agreement Replace the Treaty? (1944) 38 Au. J. ITT. L.
637, 641, n. 14b. Accord: Borchard, Er,ecutire Agreements, at 678, n. 48.
To support this proposition, Professor Borchard cites only one article: Fairman,
Competen=e to Bind the State to an International Engagement (1936) 30 A,s. J. IN T. L. 439.
But Professor Fairman's article is wholly general, containing no reference to the domestic
constitutional weaknesses of executive agreements or the international dangers created by
their use. One passage appears germane: "An undertaking given (by a foreign minister or
diplomatic agent] in disregard of limitations disclosed or otherwise known does not bind.
Limitations found to have been notorious might be deemed to have been known." Id. at 459
(emphasis supplied).
Even this premise-which is by no means unassailable-leads to Profesor Borchard's
conclusion only if it be assumed that the treaty is the only mode of international agreement
open to the United States, or that there are reasonably clear boundaries of subject matter
between the treaty and the executive agreement. It should be obvious by now that it is
impossible to make any such distinction. This lack of distinction is frankly admitted even
by writers who do not subscribe to our view that the treaty and executive agreement are
completely interchangeable. See, e.g., Levitan, Execulire Agreements, at 365; Notes (1944)
33 GEO. L. J. 57, (1942) 42 COL. L. REv. 831; Mathews, The Joint Resolution Method (1938)
32 Am. J. INT. L. 349.
Foreign governments can hardly be expected to make recondite investigations into the
nuances of American constitutional law before accepting the assurance of the President and
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argument is made that the United States may terminate executive
agreements at any time without "obloquy" and that other nations may
not under international law protest if the United States breaches such
agreements. It should be obvious that it is completely irrelevant whether
"incompetent organs" can bind a State under international law or
whether other governments are presumed to know our Constitution
unless it be assumed that executive agreements are not in accord with
our Constitution. The factual invalidity of the latter assumption-
upon which the whole logically fallacious, boot-strapping argument is
based-has been sufficiently demonstrated in the previous pages of
this article. What Professor Borchard refers to as the "current ration-
alizations of the executive agreement," as distinguished from "the
Constitution," comprises as we have seen, the diplomatic practice of
the Government, sustained by all its several branches, since the begin-
ning of the nation. Since it is this practice which determines the foreign
policy of the United States, "foreign countries" would appear to be as
safe in relying upon a compact the domestic validation of which is
secured in the form of a Congressional-Executive agreement as upon a
treaty.83 Certainly it is to this long historical record, rather than to the
animadversions of dissenting scholars that other governments are
entitled to look, if they must look, to ascertain what the constitutional
law of the United States is.14 Nor could the United States by changing
the State Department, our only constitutional organs of communication with foreign gov-
ernments, that a given engagement may be consummated by executive agreement, Thus,
Profe'ssor Fairman writes concerning the debate over Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416
(1920): "It would be surprising if international law contemplated that other high contracting
parties were to enter into these disagreements of the doctors, or if the validity of an engage-
ment hung in suspense pending the eventual triumph of one among conflicting theories."
Fairman, supra, at 456.
It is interesting to compare Professor Borchard's use of the Fairman article ill Conm-
merce Committee Hearings, at 187:
"Mr. Charles Fairman has written an article for the American Journal of Inter-
national Law, showing that foreign countries are only deemed to know our Con-
stitution, and not our peculiar local constructions. For example, Mr. McClure
justified executive agreements. That is not in our Constitution at all."
Upon the question of whether executive agreements are "in our Constitution" see supra,
Section III. Mr. McClure's book may not be in our Constitution, but 150 years of practice
are.
83. As will'be demonstrated, the legal procedures by which a treaty may be terminated
are as multifarious and as easy to manipulate as those by which an executive agreement may
be terminated. In both cases, the practical motives for respecting obligations are identical,
84. Compare the opinion of the Legal Adviser of the Department of External Affairs of
Canada, advising that government that it could safely rely upon a Congressional-executive
agreement for undertaking a program of joint development and use of the St. Lawrence,
quoted in Commerce Committee Hearings at 275, 277:
". .. It is understood that the United States authorities will place upon
record in a formal manner opinions by the Legal Adviser of the Department of
State and by the Attorney General of the United States to the effect that an Agree-
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its constitutional practice seek to evade existing international obliga-
tions without incurring the charge of violating international law.8
A full evaluation of the argument here raised necessitates a brief
detour through one of the more labyrinthine mansions of international
law. A great diversity of opinion characterizes the discussion by
scholars of the abstract question of the extent to which one govern-
ment based upon Congressional legislation would give rise to a valid obligation,
binding upon the United States as respecting Canada. It would be impossible for
the Government of the United States, after following such a course, to maintain
successfully, either in diplomatic negotiation or before an international tribunal,
that such an Agreement had no legal validity. International tribunals are accus-
tomed to recognize as an important source of law the formal opinions submitted by
persons in the position of the Legal Adviser of the State Department or of the
Attorney General. One could have complete confidence that an international
tribunal seized of a dispute of this character would decide that such an Agreement
created a legal obligation of which it could properly take cognizance.
"Notwithstanding the difficulty in pronouncing upon a question of this sort,
closely related to the constitutional law of the United States, it is submitted:-
(a) That an Agreement based upon the legislative authority of Congrezs
would give rise to a valid obligation, recognized by the Courts of the
United States;
(b) That it would not be possible for a Government of the United States,
either in diplomatic negotiation or in the course of arbitration before an
international tribunal, successfully to challenge the validity of such an
Agreement as creating an obligation recognized in International Law
and cognizable by international tribunals."
".. From this point of view it might be contended that authorities in the
United States would be inclined to give more weight to a treaty than to a legisla-
tive pact. It should not be overlooked that a treaty could be overridden by incon-
sistent legislation in the United States just as a legislative pact could be overcome
by the repeal of the legislation which invested it with authority. It should also be
borne in mind that the precedents, in which this procedure has been usLd, extend
over many generations and that there has been no instance in which an arrange-
ment based upon agreement and legislation has been questioned by any Govern-
ment in the United States. Bearing in mind these factors, there can be no doubt
that the two countries concerned would live up to the terms of an arrangement
based upon a legislative pact and it could be safely assumed that such an arrange-
ment would be as permanent as one based upon a treaty.
I "In considering this problem, it is necessary to go behind the screen of legalism
and to exnamine fundamental aspects of the problem. The strength of a St. Law-
rence pact would not lie in legalistic concepts. It would lie in the fact that a state of
affairs had been brought about which could only work on the basis of both coun-
tries loyally carrying out their undertakings." 1d. at 278.
On the general point compare Levitan, Recent Derelopments in the Control of Fcrign
Relations vnder the Constitution of the United Stales (Unpublished Ph.D. disertation in
University of Chicago Library, 1940) 189.
85. Compare the Tinoco arbitration (1923), reprinted in (1924) 18 A-M. J. INT. L. 147.
A persuasive analogy is the doctrine that "vested" rights established by a treaty are not
destroyed by its denunciation or repeal. Carneal v. Banks, 10 Wheat. 181 (U. S. 1825);
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 461 (U. S. 1923); The
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581, 609 (1889).
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ment is bound to take notice of provisions of the. constitutional law of
its co-contractors in effecting international agreements." To a con-
siderable extent, this seeming confusion is the result of attempts by
most writers to state sweeping generalizations instead of focusing at-
tention upon the various probable fact situations. Thus, if there were a
plain and readily apparent transgression by an agent of one State of an
express constitutional interdiction, it might be reasonable to infer that
the obligee nation had acted in bad faith and could not enforce the
agreement; such at least was the inference of Arbitrator Taft in the
Tinoco decision.87 The same result would seem proper where an agree-
ment had purportedly been made by an officer of a government known
not to be charged with general supervision of its international re-
lations "8 or by an officer who had been bribed by agents of the other
State. However, such bald infractions are comparatively rare. The
more common situation is one where a belatedly disgruntled State, or
one where there has been a coup d'etat or change of governments, seeks
to avoid performance of an international obligation by hiding behind
some technical argument of its domestic constitutional law. Thus
attempts have been made to maintain that an agreement was not
binding because authorized by a procedure which, while admittedly
valid in certain cases, was allegedly not applicable to the particular
situation. This sort of argument-which, if valid, would require
nations to make a recondite investigation into the constitutional and
statutory law of their co-contracting States before entering into any
agreements-has generally been brushed aside by international tri-
bunals. In the Serbian Loans case, the World Court intimated that a
country could not seek refuge in technical provisions of its law, but
was bound by the working interpretation of its constitution followed
in its everyday diplomatic practice." Analogously, in the Lighthouses
case, the Court held that an agreement (in the form of a contract)
86. See, e.g., WILLOUGHBY, FUNDAMENTAL CONcEPTS OF PUBLIC LAW (1924) 321-4;
Fairman, supra note 82; 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1922) § 494; 1 WHEATON, N1T.R-
NATIONAL LAW (Dana's ed. 1866) § 266; HARVARD RESEARCH, LAW OF TREATIES, at 992-
1002; 1 ANzILoTTI, COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (Gidel's trans. 1929) 364 el seq.;
Cavaglieri, Regles du droit de la paix (1929) 26 RECUEIL DES COURS (Academie d Droit
International) 500; Basdevant, La conclusion et la ridaction des traitls (1926) 15 id. at 581.
87. The decision is reprinted in (1924) 18 AM. J. INT. L. 147. However, various au-
thorities appear to deny even this position on the grounds that the declaration of a State in
its act of ratification that a treaty has been constitutionally consummated is conclusive as
to the facts and may not be impeached. See, e.g., 1 ANZILOTTI, op. cit. supra note 86; Cava-
glieri, supra note 86.
88. This argument is one of several made at various times by the Chinese Republic in
seeking to avoid performance of provisions of various treaties made in its early anarchic
years. See WILLOUGHBY, FOREIGN RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN CHINA (1920) 3-6.
89. See Case concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France,
P. C. I. J., Ser. A, Nos. 20/21, at 46-7 (1929).
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consummated in a manner frequently used by the contracting State
was binding and that the argument could not successfully be used that
its laws stipulated a different mode of ratification for the particular
agreement at bar. 0 Similar opinions have been rendered in several
arbitral decisions.91 Secretary of State Bayard in 1893 reproached the
Spanish Government for seeking to evade a claims settlement, nego-
tiated by executive agreement, on the grounds-not mentioned in the
negotiations-that the consent of the Cortes was necessary. 52 -
The reasonable conclusion that a State may not under sanction of
international law seek to escape fulfilment of its international com-
pacts because of alleged constitutional defects in the machinery by
which they were consummated is strongly re-enforced by consideration
of the accepted doctrines regarding inquiries by one State regarding
the authority of another's officials. Repeating Jefferson's admonition
in 1793 to the French Minister, Citizen Genet, that emissaries were
90. See Lighthouses Case between France and Greece, P. C. I. J., Ser. A/B, No. 62, at
22 et seg. (1934). The dispute was between the French Government (on behalf of a domestic
corporation) and the Greek Government. The contention of the latter State was that a con-
cession contract given to the French corporation by the Turkish Government, Greece's
predecessor in sovereignty in the area where the concession was located, had not been
validly ratified under Ottoman law.
See also the decision of the German Reichsgericht in the Paris Agreement Case, June 22,
1922, cited supra note 72.
91. See, e.g., (1) the French-Swiss Arbitration of 1912; for the umpire's decision see
(1912) 6 Am. J. Ihr. L. 1000; and (2) the Anglo-Spanish Arbitration of 1924 with regard to
the British consulate in the Spanish Zone of Morocco; the decision is reprinted in RtcLA=%-
TIONS BRITANNIQUES DANS LA ZONE ESPAGNOLE DU AlAROC: RAPPORTS (1925) 17; ze also
summary in WILLIAMs AND LAUTERPACHT (edS.), ANNUAL DIGEST OF PU13LIC INTEnNA-
TIONAL LAW CASES: 1923-1924 (1933) 19-21. The decision of the Permanent Court in the
Eastern Greenland case, P. C. I. J., Ser. A/B, No. 53 (1933), clearly leads to the same result;
see also Hudson, The Argentine Republic and the League of Nations (1934) 28 Au. J. INT. L.
125.
While various national courts have refused to give effect to treaties on the grounds
that they contravened the constitutions of their states, this has little significance on the
international law question here under discussion, since a domestic court is always obliged to
follow the constitution or statutes of its own country even if international law is thereby
transgressed. See HARvAMw REsEARCH, LAW OF TRnxrxEs, at 1005.
The statements of American Secretaries of State Marcy and Blaine sometimes cited
for the proposition that treaties "not in conformity with the Constitution" (S Moonn,
DIGEST, at 169) cannot bind the United States, dealt with the problem of treaties con-
taining provisions contravening substantive restraints of the Constitution, not with the
question of the status of agreements other than those validated through the treat'-making
procedure.
92. See Moore, Treaties and Executive Agreements (1905) 20 PoL. SC. Q. 403. A similar
position was taken by President Jackson in the Franco-American indemnity claims dispute
in 1831. See 5 MOORE, DIGEST, at 231-3; 5 MOORE, INERNA*,Tio.;AL ARBDIRATIO.S (1893)
4463 et seg. Of course, various Secretaries of State have sought refuge beyond the constitu-
tional division of powers between Congress, the Senate and President, and the President
when useful to justify breaches of good faith on the part of the United States.
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not privileged to inquire into American governmental practices, save
through diplomatic channels,93 Secretaries of State Foster and Seward
took the position that foreign governments could not properly inquire
whether existing agreements had been validly ratified under the Amer-
ican Constitution. 4 The Executive's declaration as to their legitimacy
was held to be unimpeachable by foreign nations. It is obvious that
the conduct of the officials of one government in challenging the author-
ity of the head of state or foreign minister of another to enter into an
agreement, or in seeking to verify the assertion that valid municipal
ratification had been obtained, could be considered a national affront.
The possibility of independent verification is thus so sharply curtailed
that even many of those writers who assert with solemn fervor that a
government is not bound by an "invalidly ratified" agreement con-
clude that it may be bound in good faith to make reparation to the
-obligee co-contractor, on the grounds of estoppel or implied warranty."
Almost a century ago, in the classic case of Doe v. Bradeny the
Supreme Court held that the determination of whether an agent who
purported to ratify a treaty on behalf of a foreign government had
acted within the scope of his authority was a political decision, which
could not be raised- in a law action. The effect of this decision-reit-
erated by the Circuit Court of Appeals in 1934°r--was to allocate the
determination of the authority of foreign emissaries to consummate
agreements to the President and the State Department. We cannot
think of any reason why foreign nations are not equally justified in
relying upon the solemn assertion of the President, who is the final
governmental agent of the United States in conducting international
relations and in directing fulfilment of our international law obliga-
tions,95 that in a given situation a Presidential or a Congressional-
Executive agreement is a constitutional means of committing this
government.
93. See WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1922) § 13; 4
MOORE, DIGEST, at 680.
94. See Fairman, Competence to Bind a State (1936) 30 AMx. J. INT. 1,. 439, 444-5. It is
not to be denied, however, that many States have at times sought to evade agreements on
the ground that the process of ratification failed to meet constitutional requirements. See
HARvARD REsEARcH, LAW OF TREATIES, at 992-1009; see also Potter, Inibitions Upon the
Treaty-Making Power of the United States (1934) 28 Au. J. INT. L. 456.
95. See McNair, Constitutional Limitations upon the Treaty-Making Power in ARNOLD,
TREATY-MAKING PROCEDURE (1933) 1, 6-7; and authorities cited in HARVARD REsEARCII,
LAW OF TREATIES, at 1007-9. As to the recognition that the always useful doctrine of
estoppel is applicable at international law see the Serian Loans case, P. C. 1. J., Ser. A,
Nos. 20/21, at 39.
96. 16 How. 635 (U. S. 1853).
97. State of Russia v. National City Bank of New York, 69 F. (2d) 44, 47-8 (C. C. A.
2d, 1934).
98. Thus a number of prize cases which had been decided by the United States Supreme
Court were referred to the international arbitral tribunal established by the Treaty of
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As Professor Willoughby has stated:
"It has sometimes been said that one State when dealing with
another is presumed to know which organ of that other State is
qualified to enter into treaties which will be constitutionally bind-
ing upon itself. Thus, for example, it has been asserted that,
although the Crown in Great Britain possesses the full treaty-
making power, the rulers of that country may be held to Imow
that, in the United States, treaties, after negotiation and approval
by the President and his advisers, require to be ratified by the
Senate before they become constitutionally operative. This is
probably a correct proposition but it is also correct to say that, in
any given case, one State is entitled to rely upon the assertion of
the executive head of a State or of his plenipotentiary agent, that
he is qualified to negotiate a treaty which will be immediately
binding without ad referendum proceedings. The assertion thus
made might be without constitutional warrant, but the State
would none the less be internationally bound, for it could not be
held that the other contracting State would be qualified or obli-
gated to determine the question, which might be a very technical
one, of the proper interpretation and application of the provisions
of the other State's constitutional laws. Thus, for example, the
many matters between the United States and China arising out of
the Boxer troubles of 1900 were settled not by a treaty but by a
'protocol' which, though a very important international agree-
ment, "as not submitted to the American Senate for approval. It
must be assumed that those who acted on behalf of the United
States assured all the other parties concerned that simple approval
by the President -was sufficient to bind the United States. The
constitutional validity of this action has, indeed, never been con-
tested in the United States, but had it been and had the courts of
that country declared that, though termed a protocol, the agree-
ment -%as, in fact, a treaty, and that, therefore, to be constitu-
tionally binding, required the approval of the Senate, China and
the other participating Powers would have a basis for a claim that
Washington of 1871 on the British assertion that the Court's decisions had not conformed
to international law. In six cases the international arbitral tribunal decided adversely to the
decision of the Supreme Court; in six it upheld the Court's decision. See Forx- ic: Rr-L-
Tio,.s: 1910 at viii, 597 et seq.; 4 MooRE, INrE=,RATio\NL ARBITRATIONs (1898) 838, 3902,
3911, 3928, 3935, 3945, 3950, 3957; 3 id. at 3159. In other words, although the Supreme
Court was bound by the domestic law of the United States, the President had the rezponvi-
bility of acting to ensure that the United States respected obligatons imposed upon it by
international law.
Thus also President Wilson released neutrals in situations where the federal courts had
held they had been validly convicted for violation of the Selective Service Act of 1917, on
the ground that international law precluded drafting of persons. See Er parle Larrucea,
249 Fed. 981 (S. D. Cal. 1917); see also Borchard, The Trcaty-M2faing Poxer as Suppartfor
Federal Legislation (1919) 29 YALE L. J. 445,44S-9.
As to the general doctrine, see HALL, Trs.-TisE oq I=RrtnO:NAL LAw (6th ed.,
Atlay, 1909) 295; 3 GfiNEr, ThArrt DE DILOMITIE ET DE Daorr DIFLOMILTIQUr (1932) 162
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whatever might be the constitutional situation according to its
own municipal law, the United States was still internationally
bound by the assertion of authority made by its official or organ
which had acted as the agency through which negotiations with
other States were to be carried on." 99
The rationale of this argument is much the same as that which
underlies the doctrine of "apparent authority" in the law of agency.
As a practical matter, in addition to the duty imposed by the tradi-
tional tenet of the equality and sovereignty of States, a foreign govern-
ment has no option but to rely upon the assurance of the head of state
of another government that constitutional procedures have been fol-
lowed in the consummation of international agreements. Bad faith
can be charged to the co-contracting State so as to excuse breach of
obligations allegedly created by an agreement only when there is an
egregious departure from constitutional requirements. The day has
long since passed-if it ever existed-when it can be charged that
foreign governments act in bad faith in assuming the United States
can be bound by Congressional-Executive or direct Presidential agree-
ments. It would be little short of fantastic to assume that foreign
governments which have seen the United States make and respect debt
settlements involving more than $10,000,000,000 (the inter-Allied
claims after the last war), undertake during the present war the Lend-
Lease agreements transferring many billions of dollars worth of assets,
acquire important portions of its territorial domain, and enter into
vital tariff and commercial arrangements without referral to the Senate
under the treaty clause were on notice that executive agreements have
no "constitutional dignity and force" or are inherently restricted to
''unimportant" or "administrative" matters.
A similar problem was involved in the Metzger case. The Haitian
Secretary for Foreign Relations had assured the State Department
that a given obligation would be respected. Thereafter, the Haitian
Government sought to extenuate its failure to effectuate the agree-
ment on the ground that under the law of the Republic, the matter
in question was not subject to federal control and that the agreement,
since it exceeded the minister's authority, was not enforceable. In
overruling this contention, the arbitrator, Justice Day of the United
States Supreme Court, said:
"I do not understand that the limitations upon official authority,
undisclosed at the time to the other government, prevent the en-
forcement of diplomatic agreements." 100
The same result would obtain even in the situation where the initial
instrument of international agreement contained a clause which re-'
99. WILLOUGHBY, FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC LAW (1924) 313-4.
100. FOREIGN RELATIONS: 1901 at262, 271.
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cited that the United States would not be bound unless the Senate had
given its consent.' 0' If, thereafter, a new instrument of agreement were
drafted and approved by joint resolution or Presidential declaration,
the foreign government would still be privileged to accept the assurance
of the State Department that this was an alternate effective means of
binding the United States.0 2 Thus the acquisition of the Texan and
Hawaiian Republics by agreement had been preceded by the negotia-
tion of treaties containing reservations as to Senate approval. In one
case, the Senate declined to consent by the required two-thirds ma-
jority; in the other, a presumed inability to obtain the requisite vote
precluded action from being taken on the treaties. In both cases in-
vitations authorized by joint resolution of both houses were proffered
as substitutes for treaties and were accepted by the foreign govern-
ments; in both cases the Supreme Court held that the procedure fol-
lowed was effective.'03
The Duration of Executive Agreements.
The nadir of unrealistic analysis in the comparison of treaties and
executive agreements is usually reached in the discussion of their com-
parative durations. Thus, in a recent catalogue of the "dangers and
weaknesses" of executive agreements, Professor Borchard concludes
that
101. In contemporary practice, the ratification clauses are frequently ambiguous with
regard to the mode of domestic validation to be pursued. Thus Article XX of the Bretton
Woods Monetary Agreement provides:
"SEC. 1. Entry into force.-This Agreement shall enter into force when it has
been signed on behalf of governments having sixty-five percent of the total of the
quotas set forth in Schedule A and when the instruments referred to in Section 2(a)
of this Article have been deposited on their behalf, but in no event shall this Agree-
ment enter into force before May 1, 1945.
"SEc. 2. Signature.-(a) Each government on whose behalf this Agreement
is signed shall deposit with the Government of the United States of America an in-
strument setting forth that it has accepted this Agreement in accordance with its
law and has taken all steps necessary to enable it to carry out all of its obligations
under this Agreement."
Artlckles of Agreement in INTERNATiONAL MONETARY FuN A.ND INTEILVATIO.AL B,%uM FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT (U. S. Treas. Dep't 1944) 36. Analogous provisions
are contained in the Bank Agreement, id. at 81.
102. Accordingly, a corollary good faith obligation is imposed upon the United States
not to enter into agreements-not performable by direct executive action-where there is
reason to believe that Congressional approval will not be forthcoming, or to insert a clause
in such agreements providing that the obligation will not be binding until approved by
Congress or under the treaty clause.
103. See supra, this Section. Professor Borchard has suggested that in "neither case
was the act of Congress preceded by an executive agreement." Borchard, Executire Agree-
ments, at 673. One wonders what kind of an agreement did precede the annexations. It is
interesting to compare the language of Chief Justice Chase in Texas v. White, 74 U. S. 700,
726 (1868): "The act which consummated her admission into the Union was something more
than a compact; it was the incorporation of a new member into the political body."
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"1executive agreements either bind a) only the administration
that made them, as Theodore Roosevelt and others have thought,
or b) are of uncertain duration. In the third place, they may be
terminated unilaterally by any future President at any time,
without incurring the charge of treaty violation. Fourthly, it is
unsafe for the United States or any foreign country to enter into
such agreements since, if congressionally approved, they can be
congressionally disapproved at any time." 104
In evaluating this categorical prediction of perils in executive agree-
ments, it is important to recall the major practical considerations
determinative of the survival value of any category of international
agreement. In the first place, through a familiar legal process of tran-
substantiation, treaties and executive agreements possess a dual
status: simultaneously they constitute (a) part of the law of the United
States, cognizable in the courts, and (b) intergovernmental contracts.".
In dealing with either treaties or executive agreements, acts which
constitute valid termination of their status as the law of the land may
not affect their character as obligations to another government, and
vice versa. In the second place, a substantial proportion of the treaties
and other international agreements negotiated in the past hundred
years have either contained permissive termination clauses or been
declared to have effect only for a given term of years; often both limit-
ing clatises have been included.0 6 In 1931, Elihu Root prepared a list
of more than four hundred international agreements made by the
United States which contained termination clauses.' A recent study
by Professor Robert R. Wilson"0 " indicates that there has been a
tendency in drafting both bilateral and multilateral international
agreements after 1918 to include provisions either calling for automatic
changes upon occurrence of stated conditions or authorizing the
signatories to initiate proceedings or convene a conference to undertake
general revision.0 9 In many cases modification by. mere exchange of
104. Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 678 (footnotes omitted).
105. See Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U. S. 238, 247 (1889); United States v. Ferreira, 13
How. 40, 46 (U. S. 1852); MATHEWS, AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1928) c. 27; CRAN-
DALL, TREATIES, at 465.
106. See HARvARD RESEARcH, LAW OF TREATIES, at 1177; TOBIN, Tn TER1INATIO1€
OF MULTIPARTITE TREATIES (1933) 202-5.
107. See SEN. ExEc. Doc. No. 1, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 51,79 el seg.
108. Wilson, Revision Clauses in Treaties Since the World War (1934) 28 AM. POL, SCI.
REv. 901. The study was limited to the period from 1918 to 1932 and subsumed only agree-
ments to which Great Britain, the United States, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, or Japan
were parties.
109. The general retention of the unanimity rule in effect converted the revision provi-
sions in the multilateral conventions discussed by Wilson, supra note 108, into provisions
authorizing convocation of a conference, at the request of a given number or percentage of
the signatory powers.
[Vol. 54: 181
TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
notes between the respective foreign ministers was authorized. In
some cases, it has been provided that failure to undertake such revision
or inability to agree on the terms of alteration after a stated period of
time would justify denunciation of the agreement.""0 Professor Wilson
concluded that there has been in recent years
"not a relinquishment of the rule of pacta serranda sunt, but
at least some evidence of a realization that pada, if they are to be
really effective, should be consistent with actual conditions, and
should thus reflect the continuing will of party states." I
Hence the inarticulate premise of Professor Borchard's argument, that
treaties constitute permanent international arrangements, is factually
erroneous. 1 2 In the third place, any assumption that treaties or any
other form of international arrangement can or should be considered
permanent in nature represents an impossible Canute-like attempt to
hold back the constant evolution and flux of power relations. While
not providing an effective means for revision of outmoded engagements,
Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations was an explicit
recognition of the undesirability of seeldng to endow treaties with a
putative immortality. 1 3 In the fourth place, in the present parlous
state of international relations, there are no judicial or police sanctions
available to enforce agreements between nations. The only currently
operative sanction (aside from fear in the case of smaller States) is the
practical necessity of honoring obligations so as to augment the proba-
bility of reciprocal respect for engagements on the part of other States.
These considerations are hardly operative only when an instrument
bears the charismatic title "treaty." 114
In the ensuing paragraphs, we propose to explore the implications of
these fundamental data of international relations for the problem of
the comparative duration of treaties and executive agreements.
1. The Termination of the Domestic Effect of International Conpacts.
If Professor Borchard is correct in his assertion that "it is unsafe for
the United States or any foreign country to enter into [executive]
agreements, since if congressionally approved, they can be congres-
110. See, e.g., the Honduran-United States agreement of December 1927,45 Srxr. 2618;
the German-Polish treaty, (1922) 12 LEAGUE OF NATIONS, TREATY SERILS 63, at 73.
111. Wilson, supra note 10S, at 909.
112. Riesenfeld, The Power of Congress in International Relations (1937) 25 CALIF. L.
REv. 643, 671, indulges in the same assumption.
113. See Hu, TREATY REviSiON UNDER ARTICLE NLVETEE11 OF THE COVENANT (1931);
DUN'N, PEACEFUL CHANGE (1937).
114. See former Secretary of State Hull's views as to the permanency of certain execu-
tive agreements negotiated at the Habana Conference of American States in 1940. DEP'T
OF STATE, CONFERENCE SER., No. 4S (1941) 20-1. See also the remarks of Secretary of the
Treasury Morgenthau on the 1936 telephonic stabilization agreement, infra, p. 343.
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sionally disapproved at any time," 115 exactly the same statement can
be made for treaties; for, in so far as their internal status as municipal
law is concerned, the two categories of international compacts are
terminable by approximately the same procedures and with equal ease.
The "international delinquency" resulting from unjustified unilateral
termination of an obligation is, as we have seen, equally serious in
terms of practical negotiations, albeit equally without juristic conse-
quences in the present stage of international organization, whether the
instrument abrogated had been validated domestically as a treaty or
as an agreement." 6
There are seven procedures by which the domestic status of treaties
as the "law of the land" may be terminated. First, provisions of a
treaty lose their operative effect if inconsistent terms or an express
stipulation of repeal are included in a later treaty."' In the second
place, following a precedent established in 1784 when the Treaty of
Commerce and Amity with France was modified by an exchange of
notes between the French Foreign Minister and Benjamin Franklin," 8
executive agreements have not infrequently been utilized as a method
of altering treaties. 119 Thirdly, a treaty may be terminated in whole or
in part by a Congressional act or joint resolution expressly providing for
its denunciation. 20 This procedure, advocated by Presidents Hayes and
Grant, 121 has been upheld in a series of court decisions,'22 culminated
115. Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 678.
116. Seesupra, pp.318-31. b
117. Thus the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, with Great Britain, regulating the con-
struction of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama was expressly modified by the Hay-
Pauncefote Treaty of 1901. 1 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 782. Similarly, the treaty of 1902 with
Spain terminated a whole series of previous treaties. 2 id. at 1710. For other examples of
supersession of treaties by inclusion of inconsistent provisions in later instruments see 5
MOORE, DIGEST, at 363-4.
118. See 2 MILLER, TREATIES, at 3, 158, 159-60.
119. See, e.g., U. S. TREATY SER., No. 32-A (1915) (agreement terminating Article 34 of
the Treaty of 1858); FOREIGN RELATIONS: 1916 at 33-6; U. S. ExEc. AGREEM'T SER.,
No. 67 (1934) art. XVI; 1 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 854; WILSON, HANDBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1939 ed.) 226, n. 55.
120. The first example of express abrogation by Congressional resolution was the statute
adopted in 1798 terminating, because of violation, the treaty with France ratified in 1778.
1 STAT. 578 (1798). The act asserted that the abrogations were justified by the prior in-
fractions of the treaties by France, but this claim was subsequently impliedly abandoned by
the United States. See 5 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS (1898) 4429-32. See also
10 STAT. 1089 (1854); 13 STAT. 566 (1865); 22 STAT. 641 (1883); 36 STAT. 83 (1909); 37 STAT.
627 (1911); 38 STAT. 1184 (1915).
121. See as to Grant's views, FOREIGN RELATIONS: 1876 at 255; as to Hayes' views, 7
RICHARDSON, MESSAGES, at 518. However, President Wilson thought the action of Con-
gress in directing denunciation of treaty provisions in the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 had
uncopstitutionally interfered with the treaty-making power. See CORWIN, TnE PRESIDENT,
at 222-3.
122. The earliest case in point is Bas v. Tingy, 4 Dal. 37 (U. S. 1800) (dealing with the
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by the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Van der Weyde v. Ocean
Transport Company.12 3 ith reference to the question of Congressional
denunciation, the Court said:
"In this instance, the Congress requested and directed the Presi-
dent to give notice of the termination of the treaty provisions in
conflict with the act. From every point of view, it was incumbent
upon the President, charged with the conduct of negotiations with
foreign governments and also with the duty to take care that the
laws of the United States are faithfully executed, to reach a con-
clusion as to the inconsistency between the provisions of the treaty
and the provisions of the new law. It is not possible to say that
his conclusion as to articles 13 and 14 are arbitrary or inadmissible.
Having determined that their termination was necessary, the Presi-
dent through the Secretary of State took appropriate steps to
effect it." 124
effect of the 1798 statute discussed supra note 120). The Court's logic is somewhat confuzed
by an assertion that the statute of 1798 constituted a declaration of "limited war" against
France; a general declaration of war clearly would have terminated the treaties. Sea Con-
wmn, NATIONAL SuPREmACY (1913) 70. Later cases expr-ssly or impliedly assume that the
act operated as an abrogation of the treaty under the rebus sic slanlibus doctrine. See
Hooper, Adm'r v. United States, 22 Ct. Cf. 408 (1887); The Brig William, 23 Ct. CI. 201
(1888). See also Professor V Y. Elliott's summary of the cases with citations in Judiciary
Committee Hearings, at 58-9.
123. 297 U. S. 114 (1936).
124. Id. at 117-8.
The point is so well accepted one wonders what Professor Borchard can mean in his
statement, Commerce Committee Hearings at 187, that "As I said yesterday, an Executive
agreement is repealable by the Executive or by Congress, which is not true of a treaty; and,
moreover, I don't think it is desirable to have this government or any part of it charged
with constitutional evasion." Compare his remarks in The Two-Thirds Rule as to Treaties:
A Change Opposed (1945) 3 EcoN. Couxct. P PERs, No. 8, at 6: "A treaty is something
quite different from a statute. A treaty binds the nation and cannot be changed by an act
of legislation. A statute can be." If Professor Borchard means to distinguish Congrc"s's
control over the "international obligation" of a treaty from its control over that of an execu-
tive agreement, then he is forced, as the concluding half of his sentence suggests, back upon
the vicious circle described in the text above that assumes, contrary to fact, that the execu-
tive agreement is not a valid mode of effecting international engagements under our Con-
stitution.
It is this same vicious circle that renders futile an attempted distinction said to have
been under consideration in recent months by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Krock, Treaty vs. Agreement Challenge to Congress, N. Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1944, § 4, p. 3,
cols. 1-2, which reads in part:
"A treaty is any permanent undertaking by the United States the interna-
tional commitments of which cannot be repealed by Congress, or terminated, except
as provided in the treaty, and which calls for the possible use of our armed forces,
or economic sanctions, or both, or other resources over which Congress has all or a
measure of control.
"An agreement is a compact betveen the United States and one or more other
nations definitely not involving the use of the Army or Nav.y, or economic sanc-
tions, and terminable at any time by a majority vote of Congress."
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In the fourth place, treaties have frequently been terminated in-
directly, by the enactment of conflicting or inconsistent legislation.12
In the fifth place, Congress may nullify a treaty by refusing to pass
supplementary legislation needed for its enforcement or by mere
failure to appropriate necessary funds.125 These last two methods,
while not formally denominated terminations of a treaty, palpably
have the same operative effect. In the sixth place, termination may be
effected by executive denunciation, with or without prior Congres-
sional authorization. The administrations of Presidents Madison,127
Grant, 12s McKinley, 129 Taft, 3 ' and possibly Lincoln 1 furnish pre-
The first half of this proposed definition of a "treaty" assumes that there is a difference in
the international commitments of a treaty and an executive agreement, which assumption,
as we have seen, is in turn dependent upon an unfounded assumption of a difference in con-
stitutional validity. Wholly apart from its bottomless circularity, this purported distinction
is, furthermore, a difference in terms of legal consequences, once it is known whether an
agreement is a treaty or an executive agreement, and not in terms of criteria that aid in
distinguishing the onefrom the other. When the problem is to determine whether an agree-
ment is a treaty or an executive agreement, it helps no whit to be told that if it is a treaty
Congress cannot repeal its international commitment but if it is an executive agreement
Congress can. The last half of the definition of a treaty and the part of the definition of an
agreement which are in terms of subject matter are completely unhistorical and, interest-
ingly enough, rely upon the powers of the whole Congress, and not of the Senate, to give
them whatever distinguishing effect they might have. Indeed, the most striking fact about
these tvo attempted definitions, apart from their failure either to distinguish from each
other or to divide the whole field, is their clear recognition of the powers of Congress over the
entire field of international relations.
125. See, e.g., The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616, 621 (U. S. 1870); United States v.
McBratney, 104 U. S. 621, 623 (1881); The Head Money Cases, Edye v. Robertson, 112
U. S. 580,599 (1884); Pigeon River Co. v. Cox, 291 U. S. 138 (1933).
126. James G. Blaine, who served long terms both as Speaker of the House and as
Secretary of State, once stated that the House of Representatives had never considered
itself obligated to appropriate money to enforce a treaty which it disapproved. See CORWIU4,
THE PRESIDENT, at 401-2; see also GEORGE WHARTON PEPPER, FAMILY QUARRELS (1931)
23-5; Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238 (1889).
127. In 1815, Secretary of State Monroe notified the Dutch Minister in Washington that
the Treaty of 1782 with the Netherlands had been terminated "by causes proceeding from
the state of Europe for sometime past." See 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS: 1873 at 722.
Madison's earlier uncertainty as to whether the power of termination belonged to Con-
gress or to the President and Senate acting in cooperation under the treaty clause is in-
dicated in his letter to Pendleton in 1791. 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON (Hunt, ed., 1906)
22,24.
128. In a message to Congress in 1876, Grant asserted that, in the absence of Congres-
sional action, he had power to decline to enforce a treaty when he thought the other con-
tracting nation had abrogated its terms. The operation of the treaty was thereafter sus-
pended for six months. 7 RIcHARDSoN, MESSAGES, at 371-3, 414-6; FOREIGN RELATIONS:
1876 at 204-309.
129. In 1899, McKi nley directed the American minister to Switzerland to serve notice of
denunciation of several clauses of the Treaty of 1850. FOREIGN RELATIONS: 1899 at 754-7.
130. In 1911, Taft directed the American Ambassador to notify the Russian Govern-
ment of our intention to terminate the Treaty of 1832. Thereafter the President's course
was approved by joint resolution. 37 STAT. 627 (1911). Taft subsequently declared he had
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cedent for this type of executive action. 1 2 President Franldin D.
Roosevelt denounced at least two treaties on his own initiative: in
1933, the extradition treaty with Greece, and in 1939, the treaty of
commerce and amity with Japan. 133 There are dicta in the 1910 deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in Charlton v. Kelly indicating the validity of
direct Presidential termination.1 34 In the seventh place, a treat may
be terminated by the President after enactment of a resolution of de-
nunciation by two-thirds of the Senate. It is an illuminating example of
the pervasiveness of constitutional usage to note that this procedure--
which appears to accord with the language of the treaty-maldng clause
of the Constitution more closely than do the methods commonly fol-
lowed-has been utilized only twice: in 1854 when the Senate author-
ized President Pierce to denounce a treaty with Denmark "at his dis-
cretion," "I and in 1920.13G
An executive agreement authorized by act of Congress, such as a
postal convention or reciprocal trade agreement, is subject to termina-
tion by the first six of the procedures indicated in the preceding para-
taken the initiative to circumvent Congressional adoption of an abusive resolution of
abrogation. TAFr, OuR CmEF M.!GrsT rtTE AwD His PoWERs (1925) 116-7. See also FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS: 1911 at 695-9.
131. In 1S64, Seward instructed the American Ambassador to Great Britain to give
Great Britain the required six months' notice of termination of the Rush-Bagot convention
of 1817, limiting naval armament on the Great Lakes. The Senate had assented to the
agreement. Thereafter, Congress adopted a joint resolution ratifying this action; Lin-
coln, however, subsequently withdrew the notice of termination, taking the position he had
the authority to determine whether or not to terminate a treaty. See SF-,. EXEC. Doc. No. 9,
52d Cong., 2d Sess. (1892) 24-32.
132. For other cases dealing with the Executive's power of denunciation see Ropes v.
Clinch, 20 Fed. Cas. No. 12,041, at 1174 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1871); Teti v. Consolidated Coal
Co., 217 Fed. 443, 450 (N. D. N. Y. 1914); Taylor v. Morton, 23 Fed. Cas. No. 13,799, at
785 (C. C. Mass. 1855), aifL'd on wore restrictive rationale, 2 Black 481 (U. S. 1S62).
In a series of cases, it has been held that the decisions of the Executive with respect to
the interpretation of treaties, the possession of sovereignty over foreign territory, or other
"political" aspects of international law were conclusive on the judiciary. See Foster v.
Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 307 (U. S. 1829); United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 689, 711 (U. S.
1832); Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet. 511 (U. S. 1838); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415, 420
(U. S. 1839); see also Phillips v. Payne, 92 U. S. 130 (1875). Sirhilarly, it has been held that
the courts may not question the decision of the Executive as to whether a "treaty" retains
its international validity. Hooper, Adm'r v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 403,420-1 (1887).
133. On the Greek extradition treaty see McCLuIE, ExEcuTnvc AGrxE=,.-r.s, at 17-18;
on the Japanese commerce and amity treaty see id. at 18-20.
134. 229 U. S. 447, 476 (1913). See also CRANDALL, TREATIs, at 461; 1 WVILLOUcmGy,
CONqSTITuTIONAL LAW, at 585.
135. 9 SEN. ExEc. J. 431 (1854). Subsequently Pierce gave Denmark such notice; this
procedure was held valid, Bertram v. Robertson, 122 U. S. 116 (1837). See also Hayes'
statement, 7 RICHmARsoN, MlEssAGES, at 619.
136. President Wilson secured the consent of two-thirds of the Senate to termination
of the United States' adhesion to the International Sanitary Convention of 1903. 3 MALLOy,
TREATIES, at 2877-9.
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graph,137 and presumably may be automatically terminated by repeal
of the authorizing act. 3' The status of an agreement negotiated by the
President on his own authority is more indefinite. Clearly any Presi-
dent has power to terminate the internal status of such agreements as
the law of the land. If the agreements deal with questions, such as the
war power, where Congress has concurrent jurisdiction, it is possible
that such agreements may also be terminated by legislation. But
where such agreements are predicated upon the President's independ-
ent constitutional powers, such as in the field of foreign relations, 139
under the separation of powers doctrine, Congressional action might
not affect either the domestic effect of the agreement or its status as an
international contract. 4 ' These are obviously uncharted problems to
which it is impossible to give dogmatic answers.
The existence of this variety of techniques for terminating the
municipal life of international agreements does not imply that Presi-
dents or Congresses will behave irresponsibly in ignoring the expecta-
tions created by their promises to other nations. But-speaking purely
of power-a treaty clearly may be terminated by as many-procedures
as a Congressional-Executive agreement and, paradoxical though it
may seem, even appears to be subject to termination in more ways
than is a direct Presidential agreement.
2. Of International Obligations and Pacta Sunt Servanda. In speaking
of the "dangers" of executive agreements, Professor Borchard ap-
parently seeks to transcend municipal law and invoke the authority of
some unstated principle of international law, of some "brooding om-
nipresence in the sky" that makes some mysterious difference in the ob-
ligations created by treaties and executive agreements; 141 for whereas
the denunciatory powers of Congress and the President are alleged to
be held in check by the fear of "incurring the charge of treaty viola-
tion," there is presumed to be no similar inhibition in the case of execu-
tive agreements. 4 2
137. See discussion and list of examples, Simpson, Legal Aspects of Executive Agreements
(1938) 24 IowA L. REv. 67,87-8.
138. This situation existd when the Tariff Act of 1897 was repealed by enactment of the
Act of 1909. The United States took the position that it was required to terminate all com-
mercial agreements concluded under the former act. See 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST, at 429-30;
see also FOREIGN RELATIONS: 1894, at 77-81.
139. See supra, Sections II and III.
140. Compare the views of President Jackson, 3 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES, at 146.
141. Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 678.
142. In light of the pitfalls into which Professor Borchard assumes Congressional action
will lead the United States and all other nations, it is curious that he concludes his article by
quoting approvingly Harry Elmer Barnes' assertion that the Senate's treaty power "is the
last remaining bulwark of our national safety." Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 683.
If he has so much confidence in a minority of one house, it is difficult to see how he could have
so little confidence in a majority of both houses.
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Considered initially from the standpoint of practical international
relations, this argument is a curious conglomerate of unreality and
cynicism. However repugnant the thought may be, the fact remains
that most countries have declined to observe particular international
engagements under one or another pretext when their provisions were
considered excessively onerous and when it was assumed that violation
would not lead to effective retaliatory action or have other adverse
countervailing effects. The circumstance that a particular contract
between nations bore the magic name "treaty" or had been "ratified"
by the "treaty-making process" has not in practice vested it w\ith any
guarantee of longevity or inviolability. A citation to the record of
history will serve to establish the point. A study made by John Bigelow
indicates that between 1783 and 1913 approximately 30 separate
treaties were concluded between the United States and Great Britain.
Of this total, no less than eight treaties were found to have been vio-
lated, several being transgressed by both signatories. 143
The rationale for such evasion has usually been a plea that force
or threats were used to induce the party seeking to avoid its obligations
to ratify the agreement, or that the agreement has become overwhelm-
ingly difficult to observe, or, alternately, some variation of the maxim
rebus sic stantibus.
The first two of these pleas, while raised at times by the diplomats of
almost every nation, have as invariably been characterized as invalid
by the States to whom they were addressed and have won little favor
at the hands of authorities in international law. *4 The question of
whether, and to what extent, changing conditions justify unilateral
termination of a treaty, is perhaps the thorniest problem in the entire
law of treaties. Great diversity of opinion has been expressed by
writers on the subject, with many taking the position that the principle
of rebus sic stantibus is untenable.'15 Possibly this antipathy stems
143. BIGELOW, BREACHES or ANGLO-AuERICAN TREwTEs (1917), especially at 183-4.
In 1922, Professor Borchard frankly recognized the frequency with which the United States
has committed infractions of treaties: See Borchard, The United Slates as a Faclor in the
Derelopment of Interyational Relations in W Vusa (ed.) THE HISTORY AND NATUPXD OF 13;TL-R-
NATIONAL RELATIONS (1922) 229, 289-90.
144. See CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS CIsIs (1940) 233-4, 242-4; 2 HyDn, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1922) 9; HARVARD R.ESEARCu, LAW OF TRETIES, at 1152-3. This doctrine
should not be confused with the rule inv.alidating treaties when duress is directly exerted on
the plenipotentiaries. Id. at 1149-52.
145. This is the conclusion of Professor Garner, Reporter for the Ilarrard Researd
Draft of the Law of Treaties. See HARV.ARD RESEARcH, LAW oF TREATIES, at 1102. For
significant recent -contributions to the controversy, see RADOINOvITCH, LA RLvISION D ES
TRAiT.s (1931) pt. 2, pp. 69-191; Williams, The Permanence of Trcalies (1928) 22 .1m. J.
Ii-r. L. 89; 1 OPPENHEim, INTERN'ATIONAL LAw (5th ed., Lauterpacht, 1937) § 539; Woolzey,
The Unilateral Termination of Treaties (1926) 20 Am. J. I T. L. 346, 349; CATT.AD, L&
CLAUSE "REBUS SIC STANTIBUS" DU DROIT PRIV, Au DRoIT INTERNATIONAL (1929);
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from the fear that the doctrine, once admitted into the House of Inter-
national Law, would provide a convenient rationalization for constant
unilateral denunciation of treaties. Yet it is clear that an attempt to
endow agreements with eternal life is foredoomed to failure and, even
in those cases where it could be imposed on weak powers by force or
threats, would be unjust. 4 ' Both Thomas Jefferson and John Adams
took the position that changing political and strategic conditions
might permit a nation to terminate all or parts of its obligations under a
treaty, without obloquy. On this subject Jefferson, although declaring
that treaties were in general inviolable, wrote: ". . if performance
becomes self-destructive to the party, the law of self-preservation over-
rules the laws of obligation to others." 147
There are a few cases in which national or international tribunals
have admitted, usually in a somewhat backhanded manner, the neces-
sity of permitting successful invocation of the'rebus sic stantibus doc-
trine: The pioneering Swiss Federal Tribunal has held in intercantonal
cases that the maxim was an implied condition in all long-term trea-
ties, 48 but had to be raised before a court as a basis for rescission rather
than utilized as the basis for immediate abrogation. The Permanent
Court indicated in the Franco-Swiss Free Zones case that it was pre-
pared to recognize the principle in a proper situation. 149 The only Amer-
McNAIR, LAW or TREATIES (1938) c. 34; BRiERLY, LAW OF NATIONS (1936) 200-8. See also
GRoTIus, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS (1625) bk. 2, c. 16, § 25.
One source of confusion is the dispute over whether the maxim permits legal denuncla-
tion of a treaty by one signatory in the event of a significant change in the conditions under
which it was negotiated or merely its termination by a court under such circumstances. The
international jurists are quite properly disturbed by the first interpretation, and have some.
times been misled into extending their objections to the second also.
146. See Brierly, Some Considerations on the Obsolescence of Treaties (1926) 11 TRANSAC-
TIONS OF THE GRoTius SOCIETY 11, 18-9; DUNN, PEACEFUL CHANGE (1937) 106-11; RADOI-
KOVITCH, op. cit. supra note 145, at 64-8; John Stuart Mill, Treaty Obligations (1870) 8
FORTNIGHTLY (N. s.) 715, excerpted in 5 MooRE, DIGEST, at 338-40.
147. 7 WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Fed. ed. 1904) 286. This position was taken
by Jefferson during the discussion in Washington's cabinet in 1793 as to whether the United
States could, if necessary, refuse to honor the commitment of the French Alliance Treaty of
1778 to protect France's West Indian colonies, in order to avoid war with England. Since(
the French Government never requested that we fulfil our treaty obligations, the issue was
not brought to a head. See BAILEY, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, at 72; for general background see
McLAUGHLIN, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTcRY, at 248-55.
148. See Canton of Lucerne v. Canton of Aargau, Swiss Trib. Fgdral, Feb. 17, 1882, 8
Recueil Officiel 43; Canton of Thurgau v. Canton of St. Gallen, Swiss Trib. Ffd6ral, Feb. 10,
1928, 54 id. I. 188; see also Lepeschkin v. Gosweiler & Co. (1923) 71 JOURNAL DES TRuln-
NAUx ET REVUE JUDICIARE 582; abbreviated translation in HUDSON, CASES ON INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1929) 100. The first two cases deal With inter-cantonal agreements but involve
the same principal as international agreemerits.
149. Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, P. C. I. J., Ser C., No. 58
(1932), especially at 156-8. See also LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW BY THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (1934) 43.
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ican case in point-the 1882 decision of the Court of Claims in Iooper v.
United States l-contains what is perhaps the strongest judicial
recognition of the doctrine. Except for the Hoopcr case, the effect of
all these assertions is weakened by the premise that the doctrine can
prevail only when there is evidence that the parties expressly intended
the particular agreement should cease in the event of -a significant
change in the "circumstances" existing when it was ratified.
A rule against perpetuities is as necessary in international juris-
prudence as in the law of property, and failure to give such a doc-
trine effective implementation is fraught with far more serious con-
sequences. 151 Complete resolution of the conflict between the need
for change and the desirability of preventing unilateral action in
transgression of international obligations is obviously dependent upon
the establishment of an international tribunal ith jurisdiction to
consider pleas that provisions in treaties or agreements have become
outmoded. 15 2
In the absence of any recognized international tribunal, capable of
There is a partial recognition of the doctrine by the Reichcgericht in Bremen v. Prus i,a
June 29, 1925, 112 Entscheidungen des Reichgerichts in Zivil-achen 21-32, summarized in
HARVARD RESEARCH, LAW OF TREATIES, at 1104-5. However, on the equities of the case, the
doctrine was found inapplicable.
150. 22 Ct CI. 403,420-1 (1887).
151. The problem is analogous to that created by the existence of "absolute" conditions
or perpetual restrictive covenants in deeds which eventually led courts of equity to develop
the doctrine of "changing neighborhood conditions," which has served to rationalize deci-
sions modifying the agreements. See Downs v. Kroeger, 200 Cal. 743, 254 Pac. 1101 (1927);
Notes (1938) 36 Mica. L. REv. 133, (1936) 103 A. L. R. 735, (1934) 88 A. L. IL 405, (1927)
16 CALIF. L. REv. 58.
152. See Garner, The Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibris and the Terminatior. of Treaties
(1927) 21 Am. J. INT. L. 509; Williams, supra note 145; Brierly, supra note 146; McNair,
Legal Character of Treaties (1930) 11 BRrr. Y. B. INr. L. 100, 109; Lauterpacht, The Absnce
qf an Internatio2ul Legislature and the Compulsory Jurisdiction of International Tribunals, in
id. at 134, 145. However, there are serious limitations on the extent to which an interna-
tional court can or should be expected or entrusted with the post of revising outmoded
agreements of international arrangements. As Judge Kellogg of the Permanent Court
observed in the Franco-Swiss Free Zones case:
".... the Court is competent to construe and apply treaties between the
nations and decide questions susceptible of solution by the application of well
recognized rules and principles of international law or domestic law where such law
is applicable to the question in hand .... It certainly does not, however, include
cases for the solution of which there exist absolutely no rules or principles of law,
and which the Court must decide solely upon the basis of its conception of political
or economic expediency.... But these questions of political or economic policy
are within the sovereign jurisdiction of every independent State and should not
and cannot be submitted to the International Court of Justice. There is also the
League of Nations, which is a political conciliation body to which all the members
may appeal. There is no need to impose upon the Court any such political ques-
tions destructive of its influence as a Court of justice." P. C. I. J., Set. A, No. 24,
at 38,42 (1930)
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enforcing its decrees, almost all nations have found it appropriate or
necessary on occasion to invoke the maxim unilaterally. Whatever
the logical tergiversations of professed scholars in the field of interna-
tional law, statesmen have readily recognized that the doctrine, al-
though potentially dangerous, has played an invaluable function. The
practice of nations-as contrasted with the theoretical law of nations-
has been well summarized by the English writer, E. H. Carr:
" 'Every treaty,' wrote Bismarck in a famous phrase, 'has the
significance only of a constatation of a definite position in European
affairs. The reserve rebus sic stantibus is always silently under-
stood.' The same effect is produced by the doctrine occasionally
propounded that a state enjoys the unconditional right to denounce
any treaty at any time. This view was stated in its most uncom-
promising form by Theodore Roosevelt: 'The nation has as a mat-
ter of course a right to abrogate a treaty in a solemn and official
manner for what she regards as a sufficient cause, just exactly as
she has a right to declare war or exercise another power for a
sufficient cause.' Woodrow Wilson observed in private conversa-
tion during the Peace Conference that, when he was a teacher of
international law, he had always supposed that a state had the
power to denounce any treaty by which it was bound at any
time ....
'"Even Great Britain which, as the strongest Power in the
world, had most interest in upholding the validity of treaties, was
manifestly disinclined to accept the view that treaty obligations
were unconditionally binding. The most famous example is that
of the Belgian Guarantee Treaty of 1839, under which the principal
European Powers, including Great Britain, bound themselves
jointly and severally to resist any violation of the neutrality of
Belgium by one of their number. In 1870 Gladstone told the House
of Commons, in a passage which was cited with approval by Grey
in his speech of August 3, 1914, that he was 'not able to subscribe to
the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly
amounts to an assertion that the simple fact of the existence of the
guarantee is binding on every party of it, irrespective altogether of
the particular position in which it may find itself at the time that
the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises.' Such an interpreta-
tion Gladstone thought 'rigid' and 'impracticable.' " 153
These considerations are as applicable to treaties as to executive
agreements. In fact, if we disregard mnodi vivendi or other admittedly
153. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS CRISIS (1940),234-5 (footnotes omitted). See also
FOSTER, THE PRAcTICE OF DIPLOMACY (1906) 299-301. (The author was a former Secretary
of State.)
For further examples of the practice of nations see the extensive list of references col-
lected in Hu, TREATY REVISION UNDER ARTICLE NINETEEN OF TIE COVENANT (1931) 2,
n. 10.
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temporary pacts, it is impossible from the standpoint of practical
international relations, to discern any reason why "executive agree-
ments" are any more susceptible to evasion than "treaties." As Pro-
fessor Borchard has pointed out on innumerable occasions, there are
at present no judicial sanctions compelling nations to adhere to inter-
national law or fulfil their contractual obligations with other States.154
If the normal (and desirable) policy of nations is that of respecting
their commitments, the rationale of obedience-:although cloaked in
the latinity of pacta sunt servaizda-is merely the same desire for
stability and avoidance of conflict which motivates men to obey the
laws of their community most of the time. 1 5 Nations obey agreements
because of the expectation that if they respect their obligations, other
nations will do likewise and both will benefit thereby. Assuming the
obligation was intended by the contracting parties to be durable, the
same motives for obedience exist whatever the name inscribed at the
head of the document or whatever the mode of validation. Speaking
of the oral gold stabilization fund exchange agreement, entered into
between Great Britain, France, and the United States in 1936, Secre-
tary of the Treasury Morgenthau said: "I would rather have a gentle-
man's agreement based on mutual good faith than any number of
signed ones." 156
The records of American diplomatic experience reveal precisely, as
the foregoing discussion would lead a realistic observer to expect, that
many direct Presidential agreements have survived and been honored
by the contracting nations for considerable periods of time. As Mr.
Levitan says: "History refutes the contention that executive agree-
ments are binding only on the administration entering into them." 'I7
In fact, one international engagement-considered by the State De-
partment to be a mere exchange of notes SLS..has remained in effect
continuously since 1817,159 a lifespan measurably greater than that of
154. In fact, Professor Borchard takes the extreme position that the impo~ition of
sanctions is completely incompatible with international law. See Borchard, The Place of
Law and Courts in Interizational Relations (1943) 37 A,. J. IiT. L. 46, 55.
155. Compare LAWRENCE, A HA'DBoo OF PUBLIC INTERXATIONAL IVw (11th ed.
1938) 88-9; GROTus, DE JuRE BELLI AC PACS (1625) bk. 3, c. 25, § 1; RADoirovIncr, op.
cit. supra note 145, at 16-18.
156. Quoted in MCCLURE, EXEcTTIVE AGREEMENTS, at vii.
157. Levitan, ERxecutire Agreements, at 376.
158. See Secretary of State Foster's discussion in H. R. Doc. No. 471, 56th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1899) 14 et seg. Since the agreement went into effect by executive orders isued by
both governments on the date the original notes were exchanged, and since no ratifications
were exchanged when the Senate gave its consent a year later, Foster concluded that the
arrangement from the international standpoint never took the shape of a treaty. Secretary
of State Seward called the agreement an "informal" arrangement in 1864. Id. at 30.
159. In 1940, negotiations between the Canada and the United States modified the
agreement to the extent of permitting naval construction and other activity on the Great
Lakes. 3 JONES AND MYERS (eds.), DOCUTSiENrs ON AMIERICAN FOREIN rG 'q R XiOs (1941)
169-78.
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any political or military treaty to which the United States has ever been
a party. The agreement referred to is that negotiated by Acting Secre-
tary of State Rush and Bagot, the British Minister, providing for
limitation of naval armaments on the Great Lakes. Another executive
agreement dealing with Canadian-American relations-that leasing
to the United States the territory of Horseshoe Reef in the Niagara
River "6 -has remained in effect continuously since 1850.11
The nineteenth century Anglo-German-American consortium pro-
viding for joint occupation of certain Samoan Islands remained in
effect for 25 years until it was determined to divide the archipelago
among the three powers. The Anglo-American Agreement of 1907
regarding the boundary between the Philippines and the Borneo Colony
lasted until 1930, when a treaty was negotiated and ratified altering
the boundary. 62 The United States has remained a member of the
Pan-American Bureau and its successor the Pan-American Union
continuously since 1889 although the original adherence resulted from a
simple executive agreement and was approved merely by inference
from the recurrent Congressional acts appropriating funds to defray
the American portion of the organization's expenses or to meet the cost
of sending delegates to. conferences. Similarly, the United States has
remained a member of the Universal Postal Union since 1875. In this
case also, the agreement was approved only by the President, pursuant
to authority contained in the postal statutes."3 American membership
in a half-score other international organizations-also resulting from
direct Presidential agreement, as authorized and implemented by Con-
gressional joint resolutions or appropriation bills--has not been ren-
dered precarious nor become a source of uncertainty to our associates
because of the failure to secure the magic imprimatur of Senatorial
consent under the treaty clause.
Even of those agreements which were admittedly intended only as
short-lived inodi vivendi many have remained in effect through several
national administrations until it was possible to work out a more
permanent arrangement. Thus the modus vivendi agreed to in 1888
fixing the conditions under which American fishing vessels might enter
Canadian and Newfoundland ports to purchase supplies'4--which
160. The text of the agreement is printed in 1 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 663.
161. Thus note the recognition of the continuance of the agreement in the Treaty of
1908, 5 MILLER, TREATIES, at 919.
162. See 3 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 2605; 4 id. at 4261.
163. 17 STAT. 304 (1872), re-enacted and modified by 48 STAT. 943 (1934), 19 U. S. C.
§ 1351 (1940).
164. The -nodus vivendi was contained in a protocol to the treaty negotiated in 1888 and
was originally intended to be in effect only until the treaty was ratified. See CRANDALL,
TREATIES, at 112-3. The Senate, however, refused to consent to the treaty and the vnodus
vivendi continued in operation. See 1 SEN. Doc. No. 870, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. (1910) 206;
4 id. at 15; see also TANSILL, CANADIAN-ABIERICAN RELATIONS, 1875-1911 (1943) cc. 1-4.
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has been characterized as "the most persistently vexatious dispute in
the diplomatic history of the United States" " -endured until the
Hague Arbitral Tribunal award of 1910, with certain modifications,
was confirmed by convention in 19 12.111 The allegedly "temporary"
arrangement fixing the Canadian-Alaskan boundary on the Sticldne
River, effected by exchange of notes in 1878, survived undisturbed
until the border line was determined by an arbitral award in 1903.' r
The modus ivendi of 1859 providing for joint British-Arnerican occupa-
tion of San Juan Island, off the coast of British Columbia, remained in.
effect until the termination of an arbitration proceeding in 1873 .1c3 In
1870, the Supreme Court of Washington Territory held that the agree-
ment, then 11 years old, had the effect of temporarily modifying con-
trary provisions of the Organic Act of the territory, a Congressional
statute.'69 The series of executive agreements negotiated by various
Secretaries of War with the Republic of Panama in 1904, 1905, and
1911, and ratified by statute enacted by Congress in 1911, survived
until 1923, when a treaty was negotiated after the completion of con-
struction work on the Panama canal. 70 The Monroe Doctrine, though
originating as a mere statement of one President's policy, has, despite
its absence of any elevated status in the putative heirarchy of instru-
ments of foreign policy beloved by taxonomical scholars, been main-
tained as a key tenet of American foreign policy from 1823 to date. The
Covenant of the League of Nations gave especial recognition to its
status at international law. By the 1940 Act of Habana (ratified by the
Senate as a treaty) all the Republics of the Americas committed them-
selves to enforce its provisions precluding acquisition of additional
territory or transfers of sovereignty as to existing possessions, by
European powers.' 7 '
Professor Borchard has taken the position that executive agree-
ments may validly be terminated unilaterally at any time. 72 For the
uninitiated this may create a picture of official guillotiners, busily
engaged in the hidden recesses of the State Department in killing
165. BAILEY, DIPLosmvrIc HISTORY, at 586; see also id. at 33, 151, 158, 295-8,415 el sel.,
422,438-9.
166. The 1912 treaty and the 1910 award were very similar to the treaty negotiated by
President Cleveland to which the Senate had refused its consent in 1888.
167. See CRANDALL, TREATIES, at 113; see also Bailey, Theodore Roserelt and tl-
Alaskan Bountdary Settlement (1937) 18 CAN. Him. REv. 123.
168. See CRANDALL, TREATIES, at 106.
169. Wattsv. United States, 1 Wash. Terr. (N. s.) 288 (1870).
170. See Senator Lodge's remarks, 64 ConG. REC. 1274 (1923). See also TarT, Otin
CaEF MAGISTRATE (1916) 111 et seg.; the statute referred to is 32 STAT. 561 (1912).
171. See BEms, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1942 ed.) 779; Lipp-
MANM, U. S. FOREIGN POLICY (1943) pt. 1.
172. See Borchard, E-xcuthe Agreements, at 678; see also COLEGROVE, Tnc AiIAnlcAz
SENATE AND WORLD PEACE (1944) 105.
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agreements. A measure of support is lent to this view by Theodore
Roosevelt's erroneous belief that executive agreements negotiated
under direct Presidential authority lapsed when the President who
had put them into effect left office.' 73 But the historical fact, as in-
dicated in the previous sections, is that a large number of agreements
have remained in effect long after the Presidents who had negotiated
them left office. As far as we have been able to ascertain, there is not a
single instance of a Presidential agreement which has been deemed
abrogated by the mere change of national administrations. The prac-
tice of the State Department is indicated in a letter written by the
head of the Treaty Division in 1934 to a student who had inquired if
various accords made during the Coolidge and Hoover administrations
were still in force:
"Executive agreements with foreign governments entered into
under one President continue to remain in force under his successors
unless and until the statutes or regulations in pursuance of which
they are entered into are repealed or the specified time for their
operation has expired, or notice of a desire to terminate is given by
one side or the other. As none of these eventualities has happened •
in the cases of the executive arrangements mentioned . . . those
arrangements are in force at the present time." 174
The plain purport of this statement is (a) that as a matter of govern-
mental practice direct Presidential agreements remain in force until
they expire according to their terms or until rescinded by negotiation,
and (b) that, subject to the same methods of termination, Congres-
sional-Executive agreements remain in force unless the act of Congress
pursuant to which they were negotiated or by which they were ratified
is repealed. As has previously been noted, this latter limitation is
neither a greater nor a lesser limitation than exists in the case of a
treaty, which also ceases to be binding domestically when a contrary
statute is enacted.
It does not, however, follow that an executive agreement which is
not predicated upon statutory authorization will necessarily be termi-
nated domestically if contrary legislation is enacted. This might not
be the case if the statute invades the President's independent constitu-
tional powers. The principle is exemplified by Lincoln's disregard of
Congress's expressed views in the matter of the projected termination
of the Rush-Bagot Agreement. Early in 1865 Congress adopted a joint
173. See 22 WORKS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT (Mem. ed. 1925) 580-1. It maybe urged
that a direct Presidential agreement as a sheer question of power can be terminated when a
new chief executive comes to office. But,. as pointed out above in the text, a treaty can also
as a sheer question of power be denounced at any time by a new President or abrogated by
enactment of a contrary act of Congress.
174. Quoted in Simpson, Legal Aspects of Executive Agreements (1938) 24 IoWA L. R.
67,86.
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resolution 175 purporting to ratify the President's previous action giving
notice to Great Britain of his intention to terminate the agreement
pursuant to its terms. Thereafter President Lincoln changed his mind
and notified the British Government that he had elected to rescind his
notice of termination.1 76 In other words, in the face of a contrary legis-
lative enactment, President Lincoln and Secretary of State Seward
held that the executive department possessed the exclusive authority
to decide whether or not to perpetuate this type of executive agree-
ment.177
Conflict between the legislative powers of Congress and the Presi-
dent's constitutionally allocated control of foreign affairs arose after
the last war because of the enactment of Section 34 of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1920, 11s directing the President to give notice of termina-
tion of provisions of all Congressional-Executive agreements 1I" and
treaties restricting the right of the United States to levy discriminating
duties on imports entering the United States in foreign-ownied ships or
to levy discriminatory tonnage dues on foreign vessels entering Ameri-
can ports. However, the termination clauses in the executive agree-
ments and treaties thus sought to be modified authorized total, but
not partial, denunciation. Consequently, the Congressional mandate
could not be complied with by the President without commission of an
international delinquency, unless the consent of the various nations
were obtained. President Wilson declined to terminate the Congres-
sionally proscribed provisions of either the executive agreements or the
treaties, asserting that the statute was an invalid attempt to invade
the Executive's prerogative to conduct American foreign policy. Pres-
ident Wilson's position has been followed by all his successors in
office. s0 We do not mean to imply that the Lincoln-Wilson doctrine
constitutes a general declaration of Presidential independence from
Congressional control in all matters relating to the termination or the
implementation of international compacts to which the United States
is a part3. But the limitations imposed by the practical necessity for
175. 13 STAT. 568 (1865). The resolution had been signed by Lincoln, before he changed
his mind and decided to perpetrate the agreement.
176. See Levitan, Executive Agreements, at377.
177. In discussing the history of the Rush-Bagot Agreement, Secretary of State Foster
appears to have concluded that the Lincoln-Seward position was a correct interpretation of
constitutional law. See H. R. Doc. No. 471, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (IS99) 36-7. However
Lincoln's Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, thought the President's action had been
illegal. 2 DkRxY OF GIDEON WVELLES (1911) 36, 45-6. See also CORY.M., Tu. PREMsIErr's
CoNrRoL OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1917) 125.
178. 41STAT. 988, 1007 (1920).
179. The agreements had been negotiated pursuant to authority conferred in a series of
general tariff or merchant marine statutes.
180. The entire episode is discussed in MIcCLTrRE, EXEcuTivE AGRE '.E.S, at 23-4.
President Harding's objections to the Congressional mandate are quoted id. at 24, n. 87.
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cooperation between the different branches of the Government and by
the general principle that, in dealing with matters subject to both Con-
gressional and executive control, the President should be guided
largely by the legislative mandate 181 are, upon the Seward-Lincoln
doctrine, the same in the case of an executive agreement as of a treaty.
The Way of Cooperation.
As good faith requires, when it becomes necessary or appropriate
because of the enactment of contrary legislation to terminate an execu-
tive agreement or when an administration desires to alter articles of
its foreign policy embodied in a pre-existing compact, the traditional
practice has been to resort to negotiation with the co-contractor State.
This has been done repeatedly during the lifetime of the Great Lakes
Limitation of Naval Armaments Agreement. The same policy has
been followed when, because of enactment of inconsistent legislation
or changes in diplomatic policy, it has seemed desirable to abrogate an
informal "understanding" with another nation. The Root-Takahira
"Agreement" of 1908,112 stating the opinions of the current executive
heads. of the two nations as to the proper extent of American and
Japanese interests in the Far East, was operative during the adminis-
trations of three Presidents until modified by the Lansing-Ishii "Agree-
ment" of 1917.1" In turn, the new "Agreement" remained in effect
during the administrations of Presidents Wilson and Harding, al-
though considered a mere declaration of policy,'84 until it'became ap-
parent that its terms had been outmoded by the agreements made
during the 1921-1922 Washington Conference. Secretary of State
Hughes then entered into negotiations with the Japanese govern-
ment with a view towards termination of the Lansing-Ishii "Agree-
ment"; this was accomplished by an exchange of notes in April 1923.188
A similar course was pursued when enactment of the Immigration Act
of 1924 outmoded the famous Japanese-American "Gentleman's Agree-
ment" of 1907.186
Moreover, the fact that an executive agreement (like a treaty) is
superseded domestically, as a general rule, by enactment of contrary
legislation does not mean that the international obligations of the
181. See Van Der Weyde v. Ocean Transport Co., 297 U. S. 114, 117-8 (1936); Com-
ment (1936) 35 MICH. L. REV. 88.
182. 3 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 2720.
183. However, the Sino-Japanese treaties of May 25, 1915 probably transgressed the
terms of the Root-Takahira Agreement. See FOREIGN RELATIONS: 1915 at 79-206; GRIS-
WOLD, THE FAR EASTERN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES (1938) c. 5.
184. See testimony of Secretary of State Lansing, Hearings before Committee on Foreign
Relations on Treaty of Peace with Germany, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919) 139-253.
185. See 3 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 3825-6; GRISWOLD, op. cit. supra note 183, at 216, 331.
186. See Hyde, Constitutional Procedures for International Agreement by the United
States (1937) 31 PROc. AM. Soc. INT. L. 45,48, n. 19.
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United States under the agreement are forthwith terminated. Uni-
lateral action on the part of the United States precipitated by act of
Congress not in conformance with the termination provisions of the
agreement cannot free the United States from the "obloquy" of a
breach of international law. Those who seek to deny this result and
to maintain that an executive agreement is inferior to a treaty, in this
regard 187 generally rely heavily upon Secretary of State Gresham's
rejection of the Brazilian claim that the United States had breached its
international obligations in giving notice of instantaneous termination
of the reciprocal trade agreement negotiated in compliance with the
Tariff Act of 1890 upon the repeal of the Act.13 But examination of
Gresham's correspondence with the Brazilian minister reveals that the
terms of the special legislation adopted in both republics under which
the arrangement was consummated "were well known to the executive
departments of both governments, and were recognized by them as the
basis of their action." Is9
Thus, the Brazilian government was on notice from the first that
the arrangement was subject to termination upon repeal of the author-
izing act, and the possibility of this action was an implied condition
subsequent in the agreement.'Y In other words, Gresham's note
furnishes no authority whatever for the position that an Congressional-
Executive agreement may as a general rule be unilaterally abrogated
by the United States without breaching international law.191
To prevent frustration of the expectationsuof foreign governments,
it would obviously be desirable policy for American diplomatic officials
in negotiating agreements which are based upon special Congressional
187. Borchard, Execulire Agreements, at 678, n. 49. Profesor Wright tool a similar
position in his THE CONTROL OF A2SERICAx FoRmIG. REL&TIONS (1922) 235-6. Wilcox re-
peated the misapprehension of this episode in THE rP.TrFxcATxo. Or INTERNAIONA,
CoNVENuIONS (1935) 231.
188. FoIEirN RELATIoNs: 1894 at 76, 79-S2.
189. Id. at 80. It should be noted, however, that Gresham took the poition that nations
in entering into international arrangements were bound to take notice of provisions of their
co-contracting State's constitutional law. Id. at S1. As to the irrelevance of this argument
to executive agreements see supra, pp. 317-S.
If it be insisted that what Gresham says is true of this particular agreement must ipso
facto be true of every Congressional-Executive agreement, by parity of reasoning exactly
the same thing is true of every treaty. As we have seen, a treaty is equally subject to Con-
gressional termination and there is nothing in international lawv which gives agreements put
through our Senate any special status.
190. Gresham held that the United States was also subject to having the agreement
terminated by Brazil if that country's Congress repealed the act by -virtue of which its
President had been authorized to enter into the agreement.
191. Professor Borchard cites Gresham's assertion that, the trade agreement was not a
treaty and his conclusion that it could be unilaterally terminated by act of Congrezz, in
Executive Agreements at 679, n. 49, without noticing the emphasis upon the disclosure to
Brazil of the fact that the agreement had been made pursuant to special legislation.
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legislation to make the statutory authority clear to the other nation.
Inclusion of provisions providing for termination upon brief notice
would subserve the same end. Similarly, in making both treaties and
agreements dealing with problems expected to be the 'subject of rea-
sonably frequent legislation, there has been a recent tendency in the
United States to include provisions providing for lapse of the entire
instrument in the event either signatory should enact inconsistent
legislation, 9 2 or provisions providing for termination on short notice."19
Thus the attempt has been made to remove prospectively the possibil-
ity of a situation in which the Executive would be forced through act of
Congress to commit international delinquencies by unilaterally termi-
nating international engagements. When Congress elects to repeal
statutes pursuant'to which international agreements have been ne-
gotiated, comity would seem to require inclusion of provisions pro-
viding that agreements entered into under the statute should be
terminated in the manner provided in the compacts themselves, rather
than forthwith. It would of course be equally desirable-because of
the greater political freedom which the American Congress possesses,
in contrast to the legislative bodies of countries with ministerial sys-
tems of goverment-to include similar notice provisions in treaties,
and to insert provisions in statutes which have the effect of repealing
treaties delaying their effective date until appropriate notices of
abrogation have been given.
In point of fact, Conlgress has, in recent years, been increasingly
attentive in enacting legislation to avoid transgression of obligations
incurred by executive agreement. We have previously adverted to the
well intentioned but maladroit attempt to fulfil treaty and agreement
obligations made by the draftsmen of the Merchant Marine Act of
1920. When the Tariff Act of 1909 was enacted, repealing the Act of
1897 and requiring termination of agreements negotiated thereunder,
"the Congress adopted the provisions contained in section 4
of the new tariff act. It was deemed proper that the stipulations in
regard to termination by diplomatic action contained in certain of
the commercial agreements should be observed faithfully in every
case. . . . Inasmuch as the agreements with France, Switzerland,
192. See, e.g., the 1923 commercial treaty with Germany, 44 STAT. 2132; the 1925
treaty with Estonia, 44 STAT. 2379; the 1929 aviation agreement with Canada, U. S. Exrc.
AGREEM'T SER., No. 2, par. _9; cf. the escalator clause of the London Naval Treaty, 46
STAT. 2858.
193. See, e.g., the 1929 high frequency radio wave length assignment agreement, U. S.
TREATY SER., No. 777-A, par. 17; the 1926 Roumanian customs agreement, U. S. TREATY
SER., No. 733; 1 MALLOY, TREATIES, at 558-9; id. at 987. (It should be noted, to avoid eon-
fusion, that prior to 1930, the texts of many important executive agreements made by the
United States were printed in the Department of State Treaty Series; the same practice
was, and still is, followed by Malloy, Miller, and other compilers of sets of "treaties" and
"other international acts" made by the United States.)
[Vol. 54: 181
TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
and Bulgaria contain no stipulations in regard to their termination
by diplomatic action, it was deemed proper by the Congress of the
United States that these agreements should not be terminated
abruptly, but should be continued in force until the expiration of six
months from April 30, 1909, the date when the foreign Govern-
ments concerned were formally notified by the Government of the
United States of the intended termination of the commercial
agreements .... ,, 194
These praciices evidence Congress's general determination to respect
obligations incurred by the United States through executive agree-
ments. 19 5
(Sections VII and VIII of this article and a reply by Professor Borchard
will be published in a subseuent issue.)
194. See Acting Secretary of State Wilson's message to the French Charg6 d'Affaires,
Lef~vre-Pontalis, reprinted in FoREiGN RELt TioNs: 1909 at 251; S HAcKwoRTH, DXGEST,
at 430-1.
195. Senator Pepper has recently expressed an appropriate morality for the Government,
Commerce Committee Hearings at 35: "In my opinion, we are just as much morally hound to
carry out the obligations of an agreement entered into between our executive department
and another executive department and agreed to by a majority of both Houses of Congre-s.
That is just as much governmental action of a responsible character as another kind of
agreement which happens to be agreed to by two-thirds of the Senate." Certainly this prin-
ciple is more likely than its opposite to secure reciprocal treatment from other governments.
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